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PREFACE

This thesis is the product of my keen
interest in international environmental politics, one of the
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problems the world faces today, its outcome
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support
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the long process of transforming my first ideas on this subject into the final draft. To all the persons whom

viewed in New York, Washington,

D.

C.,

and Nairobi,

inter-

I

I

would

like to express my thanks for their cooperation. My research

on

the

influence of

Non-Governmental

Organizations on the

environmental policy of UNEP and World Bank would not have
been possible without the support of the
v

library staff at

the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, at the
UNEP and
the UNDP in New York,
D.

My

C.

special

Wangu Mwani

and at the World Bank in Washington,

thanks
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Heinz
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Service),
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University
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of

and Nadia Saad
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World Bank). Without their advice and support during my research at

the

United Nations headquarters

in
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York,

I

would not have been able to finish this thesis.
My graduate studies at Amherst would not have been possible

without

the

granting of

exchange

an

scholarship

by

both the University of Heidelberg and the University of Mas-
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am also grateful
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for
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School at Amherst through the awarding of a foreign student

scholarship by the University of Massachusetts.
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I
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thanks to the staff of the political departments and
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INTRODUCTION

The discussion

of

sustainable development and how

it

can be achieved is becoming increasingly important,
because

unlimited economic growth without respect for nature and
its
laws is a major reason for the global ecological crisis.

Ac-

cording to the Brundtland Commission,

"sustainable develop-

ment" is defined as

development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their needs. 1
This vague definition given by the international commu-

nity is a response to ideological and organizational pressures. Sustainability is a relatively new concern. The defi-

nition of sustainability and conceptions of how it can be

achieved vary according to personal experience and ideological background.

2

In the context of this thesis,

the author

defines sustainable development according to the following
principles:

1.
Stanton S. Miller, "The Road from Rio," Environmental
Science & Technology
Vol.26, No. 9, September 1992, page
.

1712.
2.
Further definitions of sustainable development for example in Charles A. Francis, Cornelia Butler Flora, and
Sustainable Agriculture in TemperLarry D. King (Editors)
(New York, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990)
ate Zones
pages 3-8; Ian McAllister, Sustaining Relief with Develop(Norwell, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
ment
1993), pages 14-16.
,

.

.

1

^

Economically

1)

and

Socially

-

Sustainable

develop-

ment's purpose is to improve the
standard of living for the
bulk of the population. That means
that profits and the
function of a project should directly
benefit those for whom
the project was created, as well as
those displaced by the
project, and those remaining in the local
region. Profits
from and the projects themselves must
improve basic needs
such as food and water supply, health, electricity,
and
ba-

sic education.

2

)

Environmentally

hance biodiversity,

-

Sustainable development should en-

protect ecosystem stability,

and limit

short-term as well as long-term environmental damage.

3)

Process — An element of sustainable development is

the search for creative solutions which works to solve the

goals of economic development and environmental protection.
If

these

goals

are

not

harmonious,

a

compromise

must

be

sought.

Governments,
(IGOs)

,

International

Governmental

Organizations

development agencies, and multilateral lending agen-

cies unevenly incorporate sustainable development into their

planning processes. An important factor explaining this un3.
Accordingly, the adjective "environmental" as used in
this thesis exclusively refers to environmental concerns. It
is thus a much narrower expression than "sustainable", the
latter combining environmental and socioeconomic concerns.

2

.

evenness

is

institutionalism.

According to this

approach,

there is a causal relation between an organization's structure and its policy outcomes.
The thesis concentrates on XGOs as the main organizers
of cooperative efforts among governments which focus on pol-

icy shifts toward sustainable development.

It

investigates

efforts to promote sustainable development by two IGOs, the

United Nations Environmental

Program

(UNEP)

and

the

World

Bank. 4 These two organizations have been chosen because of

their structural
tion,

the World

differences.

Bank

a

UNEP

"closed"

is

an

"open"

organization.

organizaThis

means

that UNEP has a structure which makes it more sensitive to

external factors, while in the case of the World Bank, most

external factors have little influence on policy determination.

This thesis undertakes to show how outside pressure,

especially that of Non-Governmental Organizations

(NGOs) 5

,

has facilitated the inclusion of sustainable development to

varying degrees,

in direct

correspondence to the degree of

openness or closure of the institutional structure. The thesis draws

the

conclusion that UNEP

is

more

responsive to

NGOs and their values of sustainable development than the
IBRD. However, the World Bank has recently begun to open its

Also known as International Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD)
4.

Robert Livernash defines NGOs as non-governmental, non5.
profit organizations; see Robert Livernash, "The growing influence of NGOs in the developing World," Environment
Vol.34, No. 5, June 1992, page 14.
,

3

structure,

thus the influence of NGOs on
the organization
and its policies pertaining to
sustainable development
is

increasing. In general terms, this means
that open organizations are more responsive to environmental
NGOs and their
values of sustainable development than
closed organizations:
The more an organization shifts from
being closed to being
open, the more it promotes sustainable
development.
The thesis

is divided

into four chapters.

Chapter one

outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis,

alternative

theories,

Chapter two

and

Bank with

and

important

chapter three

respect to their

dimensions

investigate

foundation,

UNEP

including
of

NGOs.

and

World

organizational

and

financial structures as well as changes in these structures,

organizational
have on the
Bank,

values

and

institutions,

strategies,
the

programs

the
of

the policy outcome of these programs

successes as well as failures,

influence

NGOs

UNEP and World
in

response to

and the influence NGOs have

on these policy outcomes.

Since the World Bank as

a

development agency concerns

itself primarily with Third World development projects,

and

since UNEP tends to focus on Third World aspects of sustainable development,

the thesis concentrates upon the sustain-

ability of programs and projects in the Third World.

tainability

will

be

measured

according

to

the

Sus-

degree

to

which socioeconomic and environmental concerns as defined by
the author of this thesis have been included in these pro-

grams and projects. Two case studies on regional Third World
4

issues have

been chosen

for

particular

investigation.

The

first one deals with the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for the Elaboration of a Convention to
Combat Desertification, where UNEP plays a key preparatory
role. The
second one investigates the Sardar Sarovar Dam
Project in
India,

partly planned and financed by the World Bank.
levels of these case studies

-

The

one referring to an

international conference, one to a local project

-

first of

all indicate the differences in the character of the work
of

UNEP and World Bank,
oriented,

for the World Bank is mostly project-

while UNEP tends to encourage new thinking about

environmental issues already at the planning level. The case
studies also illuminate the different policies of UNEP and

World Bank in promoting sustainable development.
Chapter four summarizes the outcome of research done in
the previous chapters and compares the two international in-

stitutions accordingly, thus referring to the importance of
open or closed institutional structure for the realization
of sustainable development.

It also attempts

to predict

in

how far UNEP and the World Bank will develop their features
toward more

sustainability

in

the

future,

role of NGOs in this development process.

5

as

well

as

the

CHAPTER

1

STRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCE
OF IGOs

1

•

1

Import ance of Structural Factors

Sustainable development is now a catchword of
international development. International institutions
are widely
regarded as vital actors in the promotion of
national efforts for sustainable development, particularly
in developing countries.

According to the institutionalist approach, the structure

of

a

formal

organization

itself

facilitates

or

ob-

structs specific policy outcomes. These policy outcomes are
a

consequence

IGOs.

of

Important

the

values

classical

and

strategies

of

institutionalists

are

actors

in

Selznick,

who focussed on external values and how they could be infused into IGOs and their actors,

or Meyer and Rowan,

who

explicitly discussed and characterized institutionalized organizations.

During the 20th century,

institutionalism has

developed many different perspectives in several disciplines
such as economics, sociology, and political science. For the

purpose of this thesis,

however,

focus

theory

on

organizational

tional perspective.

6

it

as

will
one

sufficient to

be

important

institu-

Organizational theory seeks to explain

A detailed discussion of institutionalism for example
in Sven-Erik Sjoestrand, Institutional Change
(Armonk, New
York: M. E. Shape, 1993), pages 3-34.
6.

,

6

7

the nature

and

functioning

representatives

of

of

formal

organizational

Tnst, Thompson, and Haas. They

organizations.

theory

are

Emery

Main
and

all have in common that they

distinguish between open and closed organizations.
According to this distinction, this thesis uses the
degree of openness of the two IGOs as independent
variable,

measured

by

structure,

the

following

financial

IGO

structure,

features:

Organizational

values and strategies,

and

ease of access for NGOs. The dependent variable used is
the

extent to which the policy outcome of World Bank and UNEP

reflects sustainability concerns.

If this thesis

that NGOs actually influence UNEP to
the World Bank,

a

can prove

larger degree than

this would support the structural approach.

UNEP's efforts are more sustainable than the IBRD's because
its approach of sustainable development is much more similar

to the definition in this thesis than the World Bank's ap-

proach.

O

The author argues that different degrees of sus-

tainable development in policy outcomes between the two IGOs
are due to the different degrees of openness.

9

7.
More information on organizational theory in Jack C.
Plano, Robert E. Riggs, and Helenan S. Robin, The Dictionary
of Political Analysis
(Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO,
Second Edition, 1982), pages 84, 85.
.

8.
Detailed information on the definition and implementation of sustainable development by the two IGOs in chapters
two and three (especially 2.4, 2.7, 3.4, and 3.7)
9.
Other variables like economic prerogatives and political agenda will be dealt with in the following chapters.

7

In

order to measure

World Bank,

it

the

access

of

NGOs

to

UNEP

and

necessary to develop concrete indicators
of an organization's openness or
closure. Organizational
theorists such as Emery, Trist, and Thompson
have developed
typical features of open and closed organizations.^®
is

Open organizations accept their dependency on
a turbulent, uncertain environment as a natural state.
Accordingly,

they do not intend to control

it,

but try to manage it by

means of constant interaction: Outside experts and other external authorities interact with the open system and penetrate it with their values.
ronment

and

its

values,

Given the changes in the envi-

the

open

system

survives

through

evolution: It has to be able to break down an old integrity
an d to

continuously renew itself toward states of greater

heterogeneity and complexity.
central individual manages

Closed

organizations

a

Within the

system

itself,

a

dominant coalition.

perceive

the

turbulences

of

the

environment as dangerous aggressions, thus they seek maximum
control over them: Outside forces have to be predictable to

defend the market position of the organization.

Therefore,

closed systems reduce the influence of the environment and
its external values as far as possible and instead seek to

completely control the state they move to next. Accordingly,
F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist, Towards a Social Ecology
(London and New York: Plenum Press, 1973), pages 212, 214,
220-222; James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action
(New
York, New York: MC graw-hill book company, 1967), pages 1-4,
7-10, 84.

10.

.

.

8

the internal system has to be functional,
logical, and predictable. This is only possible within a rigid
and hierarchical structure: Thus closed systems try to
establish a

pyramid of power which is headed by one very powerful individual. Compromise is minimized. Instead, closed systems
aim
at growth toward maximum homogeneity:

the

tasks

are

repetitive,

and

The goal

efficiency

are

known,

reached with

is

technical logic.
Emery and Trist also describe their closed system as

being limited to passive adaptation, which means that such
an organization simply has to respond to the initial stimulus of its environment

systems)

.

(conditioned behavior,

goal directed

Open systems, on the contrary, are able to attain

active adaptation. Instead of trying to control the complexity of the environment by reducing it,

they cope with this

complexity by appropriately extending their system-environment relations (learning behavior, purposeful systems). 11

Though Ernst Haas does not talk explicitly about open
and closed systems

in

his book "When Knowledge

is

Power",

there are interesting parallels to Thompson in the defini-

tion

of

what

Haas

calls

"adaptation"

contrast

in

to

"learning" of organizations.

Adaptation is change that seeks to perfect
the matching of ends and means without questioning
the theory of causation defining the organization's task. Adaptation does not require new con11.
19,

Emery and Trist, Towards A Social Ecology
47,

50.

9

,

pages

7,

18,

knowledge I reserve the term learning
for
he situations in which an organization
is
induced
to question the basic beliefs
underlying
lection of ends .[...] Revaluation implies the seshifting
one s cognitive horizon toward
beliefs
aboSt
causes that are different from previous
beliefs
Revaluation is made possible by the
bodies of knowledge not previouslyexistence of
available.
Learning involves the penetration of
political obpectives and programs by new knowledge-mediated
understandings of connections. 2
.

In the case of adaptation,

actors add or drop activi-

ties without examining the values and implicit
theories underlying their programs. Thus, the organization
does not

question its ultimate purpose. It is concerned with changes
in the means, and not ends, of its actions. Technical
rationality has absolute priority.

In the case of learning,

ac-

question the original values and implicit theories that

underlay their programs. Both means and ends are questioned,
and the ultimate purpose is redefined. Substantive rationality prevails. Learning is possible only if consensual knowl-

edge is available, it becomes the basis of new ends and new

problem sets. 13
The author of this thesis believes that these defini-

tions involve sufficient parallels to the ones stated above
to

assume

that

there

is

a

certain connection between the

E. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power
(University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990), page 36; consensual knowledge is defined on page 21 as "Generally accepted understandings about cause-and-ef feet linkages about
any set of phenomena considered important by society, provided only that the finality of the accepted chain of causation is subject to continuous testing and examination
through adversary procedures."

12.

13.

.

E.

Haas, When Knowledge Is Power

10

,

page

3.

limitation of "adaptation" by closed
systems and the ability
of "learning" by open systems.
Given that this is the case,
the detailed features of "learning"
and "adaptation," as
listed in chapter four of Haas' book, can
be used
as indica-

tors with respect to open and closed
organizations and accessibility of NGOs.
Haas writes that learning will occur in an
organization

when adherents of two ideologies 14 have arrived
at
compromise.

The

and manipulates

a

working

executive head of the organization builds
a

dominant coalition by practicing crisis

management. The secretariat's autonomy is restricted, and
an
increase

in

shared

avoided altogether.

administration
Instead,

takes

place.

Voting

is

the organization aims at tran-

scendence of controversy by compromise. NGOs can participate
as

long as

they are

friendly to the dominant states,

and

epistemic communities are dominant as most relevant experts.

Knowledge becomes more consensual. Capital subscriptions and

voluntary contributions are sources of revenue. Program budgeting prevails. Learning includes the ability to reasonably

justify expanding and interconnected goals.
style

is

pragmatic and analytical.

Issues

Decision-making
are

linked

in

a

fragmented manner, but they simultaneously reach toward substantive linkage. 15

14.
The author of this thesis defines an ideology as
jor set of values.

15.

E.

Haas, When Knowledge Is Power

11

,

pages 90-92.

a ma-

In the case of adaptation,

one ideology prevails in an

organization. The executive head defers to
whatever dominant
coalition prevails. The secretariat is totally
penetrated by
dominant members. Voting is based on single or
qualified majorities. Various kinds of outside experts and
some selective NGOs are tolerated. Knowledge is not
consensual

and

does not become more consensual. The organization's
political goal structure is specific and static, and it has
diffi-

culties to decide if and how to change this structure when
it faces pressure to move toward interconnected and
expand-

ing goals.

Attempts to link different issues remain frag-

mented. 16

Open and closed organizations also have different financial structures which are strongly related to their orga-

nizational differences.

Open organizations

tend to have

a

smaller regular budget than closed ones. The reason is that
rich donors are afraid of supporting open organizations with
large sums of money: They know that the open organizational

structure - especially the more democratic decision making

process
Open

-

restricts their influence on budgetary decisions.

organizations

try

to

cope

with

this

democratic

"weakness" by drawing money from many different sources such
as voluntary and counterpart contributions to increase their

small regular budget. On the contrary,

closed organizations

attract rich donors: Voting is based on single or qualified
16.

E.

Haas, When Knowledge Is Power

12

,

pages 90-92.

majorities,

thus might be based on the amount of
financial
contribution. The stronger influence of donors
on budgetary
decisions in closed organizations considerably
encourages
their support.

Moreover,

open and closed organizations have different

dynamics of values and strategies. According to the
Dictionary of Political Analysis, values are "internal,
subjective
standards of morality, ethics, esthetics, and personal

pref-

erence." Thus a value is

a

"concept of what is desirable or

good." 17 Values are important because they motivate certain

strategies and policies.
kind

of

systematic

A strategy refers to

plan

for

achieving

"almost any

desired

goals." 18

Policies are the primary outputs of a political system. They
are the activities which determine who gets what in the po-

litical struggle. 19

Accordingly, the author defines the values of an IGO as
a

major set of subjective beliefs, shared by

its leading political actors.

sent these actors'

a

majority of

These values of an IGO repre-

ideology with respect to the final ends

they try to achieve within the organization.

IGO strategies

are the means political actors choose to facilitate the re-

alization of these values in form of certain policies. Thus
17.

Plano, Riggs, and
page 165.

Robin,

The

Dictionary

of

Political

Plano, Riggs, and
page 152.

Robin,

The

Dictionary of

Political

and Robin,

The

Dictionary

Political

Analysis
18.

Analysis
19.

.

.

Plano, Riggs,
page 85.

Analysis

.

13

of

the values of actors within an
IGO shape their strategies,
which in turn shape their policies.
However, the change of
strategies and policies do not
necessarily entail a change
of underlying values.

These are definitions of elements
relating to openness
and closure: A closed organization
tends to have a static
set of values, a dominant ideology
which is never questioned. 20 At the same time, the strategies
of the organization to realize these values are very likely
to change in
response to some modification in response to
policy failure.
This is what Ernst Haas calls "adaptation:" 21
Closed organizations adapt. An open organization is able to
go through

more fundamental changes, because it can change its underlying values,

gies

in

which in turn may cause changes in its strate-

order to

realize

these

new values.

This

is

what

Ernst Haas calls "institutional learning:" 22 Open organizations learn. It is assumed that IGO values develop according
to the knowledge which is available to their political actors, and that this knowledge is carried into the organiza-

tion by NGOs according to the IGOs degree of openness. 20

While it is relatively easy to measure strategies and

policy outcomes (as far as they already exist)

,

the measur-

20.
These values are very important because they shape the
organization's policy.
21.

E.

Haas

22

.

E.

Haas, When Knowledae Is Power

23.

E.

Haas

When Knowledae Is Power. page

3

.

page

3

.

When Knowledae Is Power. page

3

.
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mg

of

values

is

a

difficult task:

Strategies and policy

outcomes are externally visible and thus
can be investigated
on their own, based on political
research.
Values,

however,

only exist in the actors' minds. Thus their
investigation is
more difficult and should be done in several
steps:
First,
it is important to find out which statements
actors make and

which beliefs they write down. However,
cient,

this is not suffi-

for the truth of their statements and written
beliefs

cannot be taken for granted. Thus second it is important
to
investigate to which degree the strategies and policy
out-

puts of the actors' organization are consistent with the
actors'

statements and written beliefs.

That way,

strategies

and policies can be important additional indicators for values of IGO actors - though one has to be aware that the same

strategies and policies can be the result of very different
values. Thus it is important to keep these problems in mind

during the investigation.
As centers of international environmental research and

consciousness-raising, NGOs are excellent representatives of
external factors which try to influence IGO values,
gies,

strate-

and policy outcomes. 24 The United Nations Conference

on Environment and Development (UNCED)

Rio de Janeiro in 1992,

,

which took place in

and brought together 118 heads of

24.
More important information on NGOs in chapter 1.3, for
example how NGOs define sustainable development and why they
carry sustainable development advice.
15

state, shows the increasing
importance of NGOs in the international discussion on sustainable
development. 25

Based on all these characteristics
mentioned in organizational theory and deepened by
additional personal research, the author of this thesis has
developed the following criteria to measure openness of
IGO structure and
the

likelihood of NGOs to gain access to it.
Attributes of open
organizations are:

1)

Organizational structure
Power is shared between the executive head and

a

dominant coalition of member states
-

Main function of the executive head is coordination

-

Organization's internal structure facilitates nonhierarchical contacts with the other organizational
units

-

Decisions are rarely made by voting, but depend on

coordination and compromise
-

Transparency of decision making process within the
organization

25.
More than 7000 NGOs from 165 countries participated.
Compared to earlier conferences, their presence has increased considerably, for example at the Stockholm Conference in 1972, 4,000 NGOs participated; Miller, "The Road
from Rio," page 1712; the NGO number is based on information given by Wayne Kines,
Director of Communication at
UNEP until 1975 and Coordinator of NGOs at the Stockholm
Conference; for further information on the Rio Conference,
read Susanna Hecht and Alexander Cockburn, "Rhetoric and Reality in Rio," The Nation
June 22, 1992, pages 848-853;
Miller, "The Road from Rio," pages 1710-1713.
.
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- Locus of
2)

organizational power

Financial structure

Limited influence of donors on budgetary decisions
-

Funding depends on sources such as voluntary

contributions
- Small budget
3)

Values and Strategies

-

Compromise of two ideologies

~

Ideology of global interdependence prevails

-

Cross-cutting strategies, wide-ranging linkage of
issues

- Emphasis on monitoring and consciousness-raising
-

Increase of consensual knowledge

-

Mission of "learning" at the point of the
organization's founding

4)

-

Role of NGOs
NGOs not only consult, but also work actively within
the organization

-

NGOs are included in areas where sustainable

development is not first priority (for example
economic and juridical department)
-

NGOs have access to most important meetings and

informations
-

NGOs lobby actively

before important decisions are

made
-

NGOs tend to cooperate with the organization and its

programs
17

In the same way,

the author of this thesis has
devel-

oped criteria to measure closure
of igo structure and the
unlikeliness of NGOs to gain access to
it. Attributes of
closed organizations are:

1)

Organizational structure

-

Power is concentrated at the top

-

Strong hierarchical structure

-

Institutional structure makes wide-ranging reforms

difficult
—

Strong time— constraints for decision making

-

Lack of transparency of decision making process

within the organization
2)

—

Locus of organizational power

Financial structure

Considerable influence of donors on budgetary

decisions
-

Voting is based on amount of financial contribution

-

Large budget

3)

Values and strategies

-

One ideology is dominant

-

Ideology of economic liberalism prevails

-

Values of stability and predictability

-

Problems are coped with by shifts in strategies, not
in underlying values

-

Mission of "adaptation" at the point of the
organization's founding
18

4)

Role of NGOs
NGOs are limited to certain advice

-

NGOs are not included in areas where
sustainability

concerns are not first priority
-

NGOs have no access to important meetings
and

informations
-

NGOs do not participate in important decisions

-

NGOs tend to confront the organization and its
pro

grams

Organizational

and

financial

structures,

values

and

strategies, and the ability of NGOs to gain access to an or-

ganization are strongly interconnected.

For example, an or-

ganization capable of "learning" will be readier to listen
to the advice of experienced NGOs;

to "adaptation" will

an organization

feel threatened by outside

limited

influence,

and it will try to "control" and limit NGO access as much as

possible 26
Though not all of these criteria may be found in open
or closed organizations,

the author of this thesis believes

that it is sufficient when a large majority of the features
fits.

In exceptional cases proof might not be possible,

but

strong likelihood can be shown.

26.
A thorough explanation why NGOs succeed in gaining access to the World Bank and UNEP according to the openness or
closure of the IGOs' structure in chapter 4.
19
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2

Alternative Thpnn'og

Though the thesis focuses on
institutionalism, this is,
of course, not the only theoretical
approach to international relations. Given the limited
space of this Master
Thesis, however, a thorough explanation
of other theories is
impossible to include. Briefly, the forces
that shape international politics are roughly divided in
terms such as
27
28
power
interest
structure, and knowledge. 29 These different approaches are again split up in particular
,

,

theories,

such as neorealism, elite theory,

organizational theory, or

the epistemic community approach.

With respect to this thesis, critics of institutionalism focus on four alternative theories

theory

rationalism,

and

incrementalism

-

-

neorealism,

group

which claim that

27.
Especially from the economic point of view; further in29.
formation on power analysis in Robert 0. Keohane, Neorealism
its Critics, (New York, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986), especially pages 9-11, 194, 195.

—

—

28.
Especially from the point of view of political scientists and sociologists; further information on interest and
related theories in Robert Axelrod, Conflict of Interest
(Chicago,
Illinois:
Markham Publishing Company,
1970)
Robert H. Salisbury, Interest Group Politics in America
(New York, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970)
pages
.

;
.

,

Professor Ernst Haas, for example, argues that it is
very questionable if structural constraints are the only
ones or even main important factors shaping policy outcome
in international relations. This would mean that no member
of an international organization could contribute to a
change in policy outcome by change in personal values and
policies. Further reading in E. Haas, When Knowledge Is
Power pages 8, 9.
,

20

successful

sustainable development as achieved
by iGOs
not based on NGO influence. 30

is

Neorealists believe that power is the
underlying force
that shapes policy outcomes. Accordingly,
igo
actors'

forts and successes

in promoting or

ef-

inhibiting sustainable

development are dependent on the will of financial,
political, or military powers involved in the
organization and
its

policies.

For example,

the role of donor and recipient in-

terests can be important with respect to voting
or budget
priority of research and projects. 31 in addition,
openness
and closure of IGO structure itself (at the foundation
of an

organization) may be the consequence of political decisions

rather than being a background condition for promoting sus-

tainable development.

In

this case,

structure reflects in-

terests of one or several dominant founders responsible for
the creation of the institution.

Group theory

is

based

on

interest

as

the

underlying

force that shapes policy outcomes. The theory suggests that

interaction among groups
decisions.

is

the main reason

Individuals with common

interests

for political

join a

group

and exert pressure on the respective institutions. Thus the
30.
More information on institutionalism and its alternatives in James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism:
Organizational Factors in Political Life,"
American Political Science Review Vol.78, No. 4, 1984, pages
734-749.
.

31.
Considering, for example, the institutional reallocation of resources: Money can be given to new types of projects, possibly in different countries.
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policy output is an equilibrium of various
group interests.
With respect to this thesis, the promotion
or disregard of
sustainable development by World Bank and UNEP
would be the
consequence of an interest equilibrium among such
groups as
governments or financial donors rather than of NGO

influ-

ence.

According to rationalism, policy outcome is defined as
the maximization of efficient value achievement. These
values can always be redefined,
or earlier disappointments.

in response to new experiences

All

known relevant values of a

society are included. They can be of social,

economic
toward

character.

more

political,

According to rationalism,

sustainable

development

would

or

IGO changes
be

based

on

changes of societal values, causing IGO actors themselves to

review

their

rational

calculation

and

finally

convincing

them that it is most efficient to facilitate sustainable development. 32

Incrementalism sees policy as

continuation of an or-

a

ganization's past activities with only incremental changes.
Due to constraints of time,

intelligence, and cost, adminis-

trators are not able to identify the full range of policy

alternatives and their consequences. Therefore,
fit

calculation

or

the

formulation

and

a

cost-bene-

implementation

clear goals is impossible. Due to this uncertainty,
tors build their decisions
32.

E.

rather on

Haas, When Knowledge is Power
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,

of

IGO ac-

step-by-step changes
page

3.

based on past experience.

This might also be the case

for

the Bank's slow development toward
sustainability; it could
be the consequence of previous negative
experience with a
policy exclusively focussing on economic
growth.
In

addition

to

the

alternative

theories

mentioned

above, other factors may be the cause or
lack of IGO changes

toward more sustainable development. For example,
decisions
may be a consequence of bureaucratic rivalries
or career
concerns instead of true interest in sustainable
development.

Furthermore,

lack of leadership capabilities,

of

ap-

propriate management, of focus and political will, of awareness of the problem, and of sufficient financial sources
for

monitoring and personnel may inhibit the promotion of sustainable development.

The decline of the global economy or

events such as the oil crisis in the 1970s may diminish the

necessary financial support of donors. Preferences concerning more

or

less

sustainable development might be neither

clear nor clearly ordered,
an

entire

bureaucracy,

because the decision is made by

and

not

by

a

single

individual.

Changes might also be caused by ideological shifts of IGO
actors due to their previous experiences, or they may simply
be the consequence of their opportunism or personal preferences.

Moreover,

analysis,

actors might use unsystematic methods

thereby not profiting

from

the

of

available knowl-

edge. They might even be irrational. 33
33.
35.

E.

Haas, When Knowledge Is Power
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,

pages 10, 14, 15, 32,

It is not possible to list up, explain,
and investigate

all

theories which are competing with

institutionalism

in

this thesis. Some of the alternative approaches
may well be
interconnected, which makes a comprehensive
clarification

even more difficult. Thus the author has concentrated
on the
competing explanations which she considers most important.
All

these alternatives have to be taken seriously as

additional or overlapping factors. However, this thesis intends to show that they are not able to challenge the importance of IGO structure as the main factor in the promotion
of sustainable development.

For example,

though rationalism

and incrementalism consider knowledge to be an important un-

derlying factor in the promotion of sustainability concerns,
none of them lays emphasis on the "external" NGO knowledge

which penetrates IGOs according to their structure. Instead,
they argue that IGO actors gain their knowledge in response
to personal
ence.

experiences which are unrelated to NGO

influ-

Neorealist models so far do not offer well developed

models of environmental politics at all,

thus their criti-

cism is weak as well.
Due to such differences,

institutionalism has been cho-

sen as the framework for this thesis,

though the author is

well aware of the fact that other explanations might well be

substantiated. 34

34.

A broader discussion on alternative theories in 4.5.
24
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3

Important Dimensions of NGOs

As mentioned before, this thesis emphasizes
the influence of NGOs on the values, structure and
policy outcomes of

UNEP and World Bank.
To further improve the knowledge on the
likelihood of

NGOs to gain access to IGOs, the thesis will
investigate:

-

What different kinds of NGOs do exist, and are they

competitive or rather cooperative?
What are their values and strategies with reference
to the promotion of sustainable development?
-

At what point did NGOs enter into the IGO decision

process?
-

If NGOs have an influence on IGOs, to what extent and
in what form?

-

Is the influence limited to consciousness-raising,

or

does it include mobilization and policy

implementation?
-

Where are the limits of NGO influence and cooperation
with respect to IGOs?

-

Where do IGOs' values and strategies come from in
absence of NGOs?

-

If IGO policy and implementation succeeds unrelated
o

to NGO pressure, what are the reasons for it?

25

tr

The reason why the author has chosen
NGOs as carriers
of values is not only due to the
fact that they are of increasing political importance - considering
their strong
presence at UNCED, for example - but also
based on the fact
that they are centers of international
environmental re-

search and consciousness-raising

-

thus necessarily value-

laden. 36

Though there are differences

in

opinion,

most of the

NGOs share a common vision on sustainable development. 37
According to the World Resources Institute, most NGOs

want to reduce poverty, advance human development, and manage national resources in a sustainable way. They believe that local participation and/or control is important to the success of
sustainable development.®
This quotation indicates that the vision of sustainable de-

velopment shared by most NGOs is close to the one presented
by

the

author

of

this

thesis:

Most

NGOs

lay

emphasis

on

35.
Peter M. Haas, Robert 0. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, Institutions for the Earth (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 1993)
page 420.
.

36.
Werner J. Feld and Robert S. Jordan, International Organizations
(New York, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988)
page 7
.

37.
Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics
(Boulder & Oxford: Westview Press, 1991)
page
56; Livernash, "The growing influence of NGOs in the developing world," page 13.
.

38.

,

World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-1993
New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), page
.

(New York,
216.
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poverty reduction, advance of human
development, and management of natural resources at the same
time. 39
Though most literature refers to NGOs as
seldom to one specific NGO,
ments

on

the

kinds

of

NGOs

it

is

a

group and

possible to make state-

involved

in

certain UNEP and

World Bank programs. The author was able to get the
names of
all NGOs involved in the negotiations for the
desertification conference and the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project,

which

will support the comparison of the two IGOs. 40

When evaluating the influence of NGOs on UNEP and World
Bank,

it has to be taken into account that various types of

NGOs exist. The author of this thesis has identified several

important characteristics:

-

Some NGOs are small and work on the community level

with only limited resources (local NGOs)

.

They are

mostly located in the developing countries.
-

Others have grown large and prosperous (international
NGOs)

.

They are mostly located in the developed

countries.

39.
Further information on NGOs' distinctive policy framework with respect to sustainable development in chapters
2.5, 2.7, 3.5, 3.7, and 4.4; for further information on differences between their approach and the one of UNEP and
IBRD, read chapters 2.4, 3.4, and 4.3.

An exception are well-known international NGOs such as
"Greenpeace" or "Friends of the Earth."

40.
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-

Northern NGOs

are less aware of the importance of

sustainable development than Southern NGOs 42

.

-

Some of the NGOs cooperate with their governments.

-

Others oppose the policy of their governments.

This is only one way to characterize types of NGOs. The

literature mentions all kinds of NGOs.

For the purpose of

this thesis, however, it is sufficient to focus on the types
of NGOs specified by the World Resources Institute. Its dis-

tinction offers enough similarities to be used as addition
to the characteristics mentioned above.

The

institute dis-

tinguishes four types of NGOs: 43
1)

Grassroots organizations which focus on villages and

cities in the developing world. Their main strength is their

particular

local

sustainable

experience

development.

in

successfully

Grassroots

implementing

organizations

suffer

from certain weaknesses:

As local organizations,

to be small

are thus unable or unmotivated to

in size and

expand their activities or to

they tend

influence governments.

They

may also lack appropriate management abilities and technical
expertise.

Thus,

their survival

and growth depends

on

the

41.
Northern NGOs are defined as NGOs in the developed
countries, most of which are located in the Northern hemisphere.
42.
Southern NGOs are defined as NGOs in the developing
countries, most of which are located in the Southern hemisphere
.

World Resources
pages 216, 222-224.
43.

Institute,

28

World Resources

1992-1993

.

judicial,

financial,

and other details

of

public policies

and their ability to collaborate with
service organizations.
2) Service organizations which support
the development
of grassroots groups. They are more
effective at reaching
the Poor, though less effective at reaching
the very
Poor.

They work on all levels

-

regional,

national,

and interna-

tional. To be successful, they rely on active
participation
of their beneficiaries, thus they have to
adapt their programs to local conditions. Many service NGOs are not
innovative,

and can even be as rigid as governments departments.

They may have

limited

gerial skills.

They may be unable to successfully transfer

technical

capacities

or

weak mana-

local projects to a higher level and to sustain themselves

after initial outside help stops. Many service organizations
fail insofar as their projects are not supervised on a long-

term basis or compared to communities not affected by them.
Such an evaluation may be difficult,
NGO projects have multiple,

however,

because many

diffuse goals which may change

over time.
3)

"Thematic" organizations at the regional,

national,

and international level which work in fields such as environment, development, and family planning, and many of them

support service and grassroots NGOs.

International service

NGOs have more financial resources to pay for monitoring and

staff that

regional

grassroots and

service NGOs;

however,

many of them lack the local experience with sustainable de-

velopment

.

29

4)

Regional,

national,

and

international networks and

coalitions of NGOs.
The

World Resources

Institute

also

offers

additional

information on the relations between NGOs and
governments.
They are very complex and may vary from country
to

country.

Sometimes NGOs cooperate with governments and have
considerable impact on their policy outcomes, sometimes they
oppose

them

in

extremely

Greenpeace.

confrontational

Confrontational

tactics

sults and might lead to repression,

ways,

can

as

have

for

example

dramatic

imprisonment,

or

re-

even

death of NGO members. Depending on the situation, tactics of

cooperation may be more successful. According to the World

Resources Institute,
A program coordinated by KENGO 44 to develop,
test, and produce the Kenya Ceramic Jiko cookstove
proved so effective that the Ministry of Energy
became involved in organizing the training of artisans and the construction of demonstration centers. 45
In

some

cases,

governments

are

even

launching

NGOs,

though these NGOs might fail to win allegiance from other
NGOs.

The relations between governments and NGOs depend on

several factors,

such as the competence of the government,

the kind of political system,

particular NGO projects.

and the type and location of

Relations tend to be best when

a

populist and capable government meets an NGO with mainstream
44.

Kenya Energy and Environment Organizations.

45.
World Resources
page 227.

Institute,

30

World Resources

1992-1993

.

development programs.

However,

tensions are unavoidable,

even

this

is

the

for the government

is

interested

if

case,

in controlling NGO activities,

while NGOs want to maintain

their organizational autonomy.

For example,

conflicts arise

when a government uses its funding of NGO
programs to reduce
the autonomy of NGOs. 46
Environmental NGOs — and IGOs

-

have come

into exis-

tence only recently. This makes the analysis of their
characteristics,

influences,

the same time,

successes and

failures

difficult.

it is an interesting challenge to do re-

search in this newly emerging field of international politics.

On the whole,

one should be aware that models always

simplify reality. Yet, this simplification is necessary, for
it also is an attempt to clarify and thus understand reality.

World Resources
46.
page 226, 227.

Institute,
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CHAPTER

2

UNEP

2

•

UNEP s Foundation
/

1

In the middle of this century,
global environmental de-

struction emerged as one of the most
urgent problems of humanity. in response, the United Nations
Organization (UNO)
in 1972

initiated the Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment. It was UNO's first effort to
fight the danger of
global environmental destruction at the
international
level.

The Stockholm Conference was also the first
official recognition of the environment as a subject of
general international concern. As a consequence of this concern,
UNO created a new agency, called the United Nations
Environmental

Program or UNEP.

In Resolution 2997

(XXVII),

the UN General

Assembly established the necessary institutional and finanframework for the new environmental agency.

^

The openness of this institutional and financial frame-

work can be measured according to the criteria developed in
chapter 1.1 of this thesis. Thus the chapters 2.2, 2.4, and
2.5 will investigate in how far UNEP fits these characteris-

tics

.

United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile
Kenya: UNEP, 1990), page 3; Porter and Brown,
Global Environmental Politics page 71.
47.

.

(Nairobi,

,
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UNEP

2

'

s

Structnrp

2*2.1 Institutional Structure

Power is shared between the executive head
and

a dom-

inant coalition of member states:

UNEP is led by a small Environmental Secretariat
with
an Executive Director, an Environmental Coordination
Board,

and a Governing Council.

The Executive Director is elected

by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on the
nomina-

tion of the UN Secretary General. In his role as creator and
innovator, the Executive Director has the power to influence

the

implementation

ments.
r

’

and

amendment

of

international

agree-

The Governing Council has fifty-eight members,

e P r esen 'ting
"

each

one of the United Nations member governments.

The regional formula distributes the seats as follows: 16 to
Africa,
ica,

and

(WEOG)

three

13

.

to Asia,

6

to Eastern Europe,

to Western

13

The members

years

by

Latin Amer-

Europe and the Other States Group

are

UNGA.

10 to

elected on

The

a

Governing

staggered basis
Council

reviews

for

the

world's environmental problems and provides general policy
guidance for UNEP's secretariat and the UN system, supported
by

reports

Decisions

and
of

recommendations

the

Governing

of

the

Council

Executive

are

Director.

implemented

by

a

small secretariat of some 200 professionals. 48

Leroy
Bennett,
A.
International
Organizations
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), page
297; United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile
48.

.
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function of the executive head is coordination:

Since its foundation, UNEP has had three Executive Directors,

first Maurice Strong

Mostapha Tolba of Egypt
beth

Dowdeswell

of

of

Canada

(1976-1992),

Canada.

The

(1972-1976),

then

and since 1992 Eliza-

Executive

Director

is

not

only charged with supporting the Governing Council and im-

plementing its mandate, but also with coordinating programs,
advising other UN organs,

securing the cooperation of the

international scientific community,

and facilitating inter-

national cooperation for the promotion of sustainable development.

The

Executive Director meets with heads of states

and gives speeches in order to promote international envi-

ronmental consciousness-raising 49
-

Organization's internal structure facilitates non-hi-

erarchical contacts with the other organizational units:

UNEP's Environmental Coordination Board fosters cooperation among the secretariats of the UN and its specialized
agencies. More than a quarter (95) of all the UNEP projects

under implementation in 1991 were implemented in coordination with other UN agencies and bodies, for example with the

World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on climate, with the
pages 3, 13, 35; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics pages 48-51, 71; Mark Imber, "Too Many Cooks," International Affairs Vol.69, No.l, 1993, pages 58-62; interview
Dominic
York with
New
in
15th
conducted on January
Environand
Energy
Kenya
the
of
representative
Walubengo,
ment Organizations (KENGO)
.

.

Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics pages
48-51; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," International Affairs pages
49.

,

,

58,

61,

62.
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Food and Agriculture Organization
and agriculture,

Scientific,

and with

(

FAO)

the United Nations

and Cultural Organization

and training.

In

addition,

on tropical forests

the

Educational,

(UNESCO)

operational

on education

directives

for

sustainable development as given by the
Executive Director,
the Governing Council, and the Environmental

Secretariat,

are

implemented,

commissions,
ernments.

for example,

by the UN regional

by non-governmental organizations,

Finally,

economic

and by gov-

UNEP works together with organizations,

committees, councils, and universities all over the
world 50
.

Decisions are rarely made by voting,

but depend on

coordination and compromise:
The sovereignty of UNEP's members leads to a situation

where they reserve the ultimate power of decision making for
themselves and give no real authority to UNEP. Instead, Executive Director and Governing Council are responsible for
the coordination of sustainability activities and the promo-

tion of governmental cooperation, especially on the planning
level 51
.

50.
Bennett, International Organizations page 297; United
Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile pages 4-39;
Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics pages 48,
71; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," pages 59, 60; Mostapha Tolba,
"UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," in
Matsuura, Kumiko, Mueller, Joachim W.
and Sauvant, Karl P.
Annual Review of United Nations Affairs 1992
(Dobbs Ferry,
New York: Oceana Publications, Vol 3
1993), pages 1069,
1080-1087, 1151, 1170; pocket, figure A.l.
,

,

,

,

.

.

,

51.
Bennett, International Organizations
pages 55, 297;
United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile pages
3, 13, 35; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
pages 48, 71; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," pages 59, 60.
,

,

,
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Transparency of decision making process
within the
organization:
The
proved,

transparency
for

example,

of

the

by the

decision
fact

that

making
NGOs

process

(as

is

"external

factors") can attend all Governing Council meetings. 52
-

Locus of organizational power:

During the Stockholm Conference in 1972, the G 77 urged
the participants to locate UNEP in the developing countries.

As a consequence of this pressure,

located

in

Nairobi,

Kenya.

Thus

UNEP's headquarters are
the

organization

is

the

first UN body to be based in the Third World. The importance
of this decision for UNEP is that is made the organization

more accessible for Third World,

especially African based,

NGOs. This meant African NGOs were able to take more advan-

tage of UNEP's openness than of opportunities to exploit access to organizations headquartered in the United States or
Europe. 53

52.

More information on this issue in chapter 2.5.

pages 297, 298;
53.
Bennett, International Organizations
United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile pages
3, 13, 35; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
pages 48, 71; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," pages 59, 60.
,

,

,

36

2-2.2 Financial Strnrtnro

Limited influence of donors on budgetary
decisions:
Due to the fact that UNEP's budget is
extremely

lim-

ited,

its main strategy is to start up programs
which will

draw funding from other agencies, organizations,
and governments. Of all the 995 projects supported by
UNEP between
1972 and 1985, 55 percent of the funding for these
projects
did not pass through UNEP's hands at all.
ments,

National govern-

for example, spent $200 million on environmental mon-

itoring

facilities

and

$500

million

on

environmental

search stimulated by UNEP's programs during these years.
addition,

UNEP

is

financially

supported

by

reIn

international

agencies such as the World Bank and the Arab Gulf Program
for United Nations Development Organizations (AGFUND)

,

which

is an important source of aid for Clearing-house activities

in less developed countries.
-

butions

Funding depends on sources such as voluntary contri:

Unlike other organizations in the UN system,
not a funding agency.

UNEP is

UNEP's funds come from four sources:

The regular budget of the United Nations; voluntary contri-

Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1990), pages 17, 380; Peter M. Haas, Saving the
Mediterranean
(New York,
New York: Columbia University
Press, 1990), page 9; United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile page 37; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," page
62; appendix A, figure A. 2.
54.

.

.

,
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butions to the Environment Fund;
trust funds; and counterpart contributions. In 1991, the UN
budget contributed with
about $6.1 million (6.9 percent), the
Environment
Fund to-

taled over $59 million (66.4 percent),
counterpart contributions equaled about $5.4 million
(6.1 percent), and trust
funds about $18.4 (20.6 percent). 55
The G
of

7,

minus Italy, contributes more than 50 percent

the voluntary member contributions.

contributions
tries. However,

come

from

the

wealthy

Thus most of these

industrialized

coun-

the amount of money given by voluntary con-

tributions is extremely small.

For example,

the US govern-

ment as leading contributor gave only about three percent
of
its annual

national research budget for cognate activities

to UNEP - 36 percent - and this is still the largest share

between 1972 and 1980 in comparison to the other contributors. 56
-

Small budget:

In comparison to other IGOs such as the World Bank or

the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 57

,

UNEP has

a

55.
Tolba, "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," page 1167; Tolba, "UNEP - 1990 Annual Report of the
Executive Director," in Matsuura, Mueller, and Sauvant, Annual Review of United Nations Affairs 1991 page 786.
.

Vig and Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s page
Haas, Saving the Mediterranean
page 9; United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile page 37.
56.
17;

.

P.

,

,

57.
Information on the World Bank's budget in 3.2.2; UNEP's
budget for 1990-1991 totaled about 1.33 billion; James Gustave Speth, "1991 Annual Report of UNDP," in Matsuura,
Mueller, and Sauvant, Annual Review of United Nations Affairs 1992 pages 1441, 1442.
.
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very small budget:

In 1993,

the overall financial contribu-

tions equaled $135 million. However, present efforts
and financial commitments still lag behind the crisis. When
UNEP
focuses on the financing necessary to implement its
programs, the issue becomes difficult. For years, UNEP's budget

remained roughly constant,

which meant that it shrank be-

cause of inflation. At the end of the 1980s,

began to grow,

but

they will

its resources

have to multiply many times

over in order to solve the immense environmental problems of
today. Recently, UNEP's Executive Director has estimated an-

nual costs of $400 million in order to implement UNEP's sus-

tainable development projects. Though this sum met with some

criticism from rich potential donor states,

UNEP's

budget

has doubled between 1990 and 1992, reaching $100 million. If
this

trend

continues,

the

$400

million

level

could

be

reached before the year 2000. 58

2

.

3

UNEP's Programs

UNEP

is

the

primary

IGO

that

global sustainability negotiations.
one

third

of

all

agreements

since

initiates

and

manages

Nearly 50 agreements
have

-

1972

at

-

least

partly been negotiated, led and administered under UNEP auspices and involve most of the world's countries.

UNEP has

page 304; United
Bennett, International Organizations
pages 34, 40,
Profile
Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP
DiExecutive
1990 Annual Report of the
"UNEP
41; Tolba
rector," page 786; appendix A, figure A. 3.
58.

,

,

,
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played a major role in the adoption of five
international
agreements: The Basel Convention on the Control of
Trans-

boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal in
1989,

the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone

Layer in 1985, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987, the Convention on the Conser-

vation of Migratory Species (CMS) in 1979, the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora

(CITES)

,

and the Regional Seas Programmes.

Thus UNEP

has been involved in most of the major environmental conven-

tions of the 1970s and 1980s. 59
Furthermore,

UNEP promotes international environmental

guidelines as basis for future treaty negotiations and tries
to generate general political will for the promotion of sus-

tainable development. To reach this aim, UNEP regularly prepares

participates

and

scientific,

and

in

a

number

non-governmental

intergovernmental,

of

meetings,

for

example

in

UNCED. 60

Though

most

of

UNEP's

activities

take

place

on

the

global level, it also develops, coordinates, and carries out
some national and regional programs and projects in favor of

sustainable

development.

For

example

it

recommends

pilot

Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics pages
52; United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP
51,
Profile page 32; a complete list of all UNEP programmes in
appendix A, figure A. 4.
59.
48,

,

,

Tolba "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," pages 1069, 1080-1087, 1151, 1170; United Nations
Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile page 36.
60.

,

,
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projects for self-sustaining food
and fuel production, and
for the protection of river
watersheds in villages and semiarid stock-raising zones. UNEP
supervises and implements
training workshops on soil and water
conservation
and man-

agement for Western Africa.

It

helps

launch national

pro-

grams for resource management in countries
such as Peru and
61
Mongolia.
In addition,

its

this

UNEP can use the information gathered
by

"Earthwatch" network.

action

program,

The Stockholm Conference adopted

charging

UNEP

as

network

manager.

Earthwatch not only assesses the current environmental
situation and possible dangers worldwide, but also
collects
and

distributes

information

about

them.

The

three-part

Earth-

watch Program consists of the Global Environmental
Monitoring System

(GEMS)

the world,

the International Registry of Potentially Toxic

Chemicals
tal

(IRPTC)

questions

which has 110 monitoring stations around

,

to

and INFOTERRA, which directs environmen-

appropriate

international

sources.

That

way, UNEP has set up an international network which enables

countries to exchange information collected through national
impact studies.

Moreover,

ronmental reports,

the organization publishes envi-

creates technical and world databases 62

61.
Tolba, "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," pages 1069, 1080-1087, 1151, 1170; United Nations
Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile page 36.
,

62.

For example INFOTERRA, UNEP's global information sys-

tem.

41

as well as computerized planning pools,
and runs public information campaigns. 63
In 1990-1991, UNEP's $68 million budget
was distributed

to

programs:

13

Environmental

Assessment

(21.8

percent),

Terrestrial Ecosystems (17.5 percent, including
desertification), Environmental Awareness (13.6 percent), Technical
and

Regional Cooperation (10.6 percent), Oceans

(10.3 percent),

Energy, Industry, and Transport (6.3 percent), Environmental

Management

(5.7

(4.0 percent)

Settlements

,

percent),

percent)

Peace and Security

(0.6

tion is an excellent

Atmosphere

Lithosphere

,

percent).

(0.9

21,500

users

FOTERRA's
shows

from

over

(including

issue

INFOTERRA,

countries

95

information services.
a

strong

priority

The
for

and

,

This financial distribu-

indicator for UNEP's

assessment

Human

,

percent)

priority:
IRPTC,

took over one-fifth of the program budget.

GEMS)

also

percent),

(5.0

Human Health and Welfare (2.2 percent)

(1.9

Environmental

Water

benefitted

In

and
1991,

from

IN-

financial

distribution

terrestrial

ecosystems,

with a special focus on arid lands (just under one fifth of
the overall budget)

.

Thus desertification

(and the sub-pro-

grams for tropical forests and woodland ecosystems)
of

UNEP's

central

activities.

The

are one

desertification program

page 14; Bennett,
Saving the Mediterranean
63.
P. Haas,
page 298; Porter and Brown,
International Organizations
Global Environmental Politics page 52; United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile pages 3, 36.
,

,

,

,
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aims at the provision of assistance
to 15 countries which
are victims of soil degradation. 64

According to Camilla Toulmin, director of the
Drylands
Programme and member of the International Panel
of
Experts

on Desertification,

a

broad definition of the causes of de-

sertification has been drawn up and agreed upon within
the
context of Agenda 21. It is defined as "land degradation

in

semi-arid and dry subhumid areas resulting from cli-

matic variations and human activities "^5
.

UNEP reports that over 35 percent of the land surface
of the earth is now threatened by desertification. According

to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Re-

search

(CGIAR)

,

every

year

about

6.0

million hectares

of

arable land are lost through desertification. Three-quarters
of the desertification occurs

in

the developing countries.

Desertification originally develops for various reasons: The
causes of this major environmental destruction are

a

very

complex combination of environmental and socioeconomic problems in fields such as water supply and utilization, health,
food,

population,

ence,

and technology.

destroyed

if

heavy

development,
The

rains

meteorology,

culture,

sci-

affected areas are then further
follow

lengthened

droughts.

"Too Many Cooks," pages 62, 63; Tolba, "UNEP
1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," page 1114.

64.

Imber,

The
-

65.
Camilla Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification: Setting
the Agenda for a Global Convention," Dryland Networks Programme: Issues Paper (London, England: International InstiJune 1993)
tute for Environment and Development (IIED)
No. 42, page 2.
,
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population moves out of these regions
and crowds in other
areas, thus facilitating further
environmental destruction
and land degradation. This effect
is reinforced by overpopulation and poverty in the developing
countries, leading to a
vicious circle which mutually enforces
poverty and environmental destruction. 66

These are the reasons why desertification
is one of the
major obstacles to sustainable development and why UNEP
has chosen it as an issue of major concern.
According to
this

importance,

the

case

study which

has

been chosen to

show the influence of NGOs on UNEP is the International
Convention to Combat Desertification.^
The idea to realize such a convention developed during
the

UNCED

preparatory

African countries

felt

process.

that

Representatives

from

the

the desertification

issue

had

66.
Appendix A, figure A. 5. offers a multi-level set of explanations for desertification; further information on desertification and its consequences in Jeremy Rifkin, Biosphere Politics. (San Francisco, California: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1991), page 74; Speth, "A post-Rio compact,"
Foreign Policy No. 88, Fall 1992, pages 149, 150; Langston
James Goree, Wangu Mwani, and Anjala Saini
(Editors),
"Report of the Workshop 'Listening to the People: Social Aspects of Dryland Management'", Proceedings Vol.l, No. 4, December 1993, page 1; Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
"More People and a Threatened
Environment," CGIAR
(Washington,
D.C.:
CGIAR,
January
1993), page 3; interview with Walubengo.
.

.

,

.

67.
Goree, Mwani, and Saini (Editors), "Report of the Workshop 'Listening to the People: Social Aspects of Dryland
Management'", page 1; International Institute for Sustainable Development (USD), "A Brief History of the INCD,"
Earth Negotiations Bulletin Vol 4 No. 24, 17 January 1994,
page 1
.
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.

,

been poorly addressed during the
UNCED preparatory process.
Due to the pressuring by these
countries on UNGA, the desertification issue gained importance at
the Earth Summit in
1992. A formal commitment was made
according to Chapter 12
of Agenda 21 to negotiate and convene
a conference by June
1994, with particular focus on African
countries. During

its

47th session in 1992,
tion 47/188,

the General Assembly adopted Resolu-

calling for the establishment of the Interna-

tional Negotiating Committee for a Convention
to Combat Desertif ication (INCD). 68

UNEP plays an important role in the INCD through
its
Desertification Control Program Activity Center (DC/PAC)
,

established in 1978 following the UN Conference on Desertification in Nairobi in 1977. 69
Meanwhile, the Secretariat for the INCD has been estab-

lished in Geneva.
ranged:
1993,

Five

negotiation sessions have been ar-

In Nairobi in May/June 1993,

in New York in January 1994,

and in Paris

in June

1994

-

in Geneva in September

in Geneva in March 1994,

with agreement and signature.

The General assembly not only invited all UN member states
to participate

in the

but also all

relevant NGOs to

contribute constructively to the outcome.

The Desertifica-

INCD,

tion Convention will consist of

a set of

general principles,

68.

Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification," pages

4,

13.

69.

Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification," pages

4,

13.
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agreed objectives,

and a series of legally binding
commit
ments to move toward such objectives. 70

2

•

4

UNEP's Values and Strategies

— Compromise of two
ideologies;

UNEP's concept of sustainable development combines
two
ideologies; Environmentalism and belief in economic
growth.

The concept itself never varied. The 1991 Annual
Report of
UNEP's Executive Director Mostafa Tolba shows how UNEP defines sustainable development. The programs launched during
1991 can be separated in the two areas environmental protec-

tion

(for example water,

socioeconomic
women,

energy,

concerns
industry,

soils,
(for

biological diversity),

example

information,

human
and

and

settlements,

transportation.)

The various programs indicate UNEP's intention to integrate

environmental

and

developmental

concerns

according

to

the

definition given in chapter one of this thesis. 71

Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification," pages 20, 21,
KENGO, ENDA-TM, NEST, and GUAMINA, Proposals to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention to
Combat Desertification (INCD)
(Nairobi, Kenya: KENGO, ENDATM, NEST, and GUAMINA, August 12-20, 1993), page 2; Toulmin,
"Combatting Desertification," pages 20, 21, 23; International Institute for Sustainable Development (USD)
"A
Brief History of the INCD," page 1.
70.
23;

.

.

Tolba, "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," pages 1061-1064.
71.
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For example

in

the

chapter "The Year in Retrospect,"

Mostapha Tolba writes that
We have done what we could [...] in the hope
that the world community will rise to the challenge of meeting the needs of a growing population
while protecting, even enhancing, the human environment ^
.

With respect to desertification, he explains that
Soil degradation affects not only agriculture
and forestry, but other sectors of the economy including the manufacturing and commercial sectors.
Land degradation can have adverse effects on other
sectors: e.g. siltation of dams can reduce the
production of energy. [...] To formulate sustainable land use policy, it is important to identify
the main issues and problems of soils and land use
and their relation to the specific environmental
conditions and socioeconomic needs. 3
Thus,

sustainable

development

as

defined

by

UNEP

is

based on the concept that the ideas of environmental protection,

and

social

mutually

needs,

and

economic growth

reinforcing.

Accordingly,

are
in

complementary

the

late

1970s

UNEP began to concentrate on specific measurements, and on
research and seminars
forts.

By

the

late

focussing on concrete

sectorial

environment

development

1980s,

and

efno

Tolba "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," page 1067.
72.

Tolba "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," page 1077.
73
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longer were a separate category,

and UNEP started to focus

its resources on science and monitoring. 74
-

Ideology of global interdependence prevails:

From the beginning,

a

considerable number of scientific

holists belonged to UNEP's staff. 75 They saw the world as

a

single entity and believe that all environmental conditions
are

the

forces.

consequence

of

the

mutual

interplay

of

multiple

Coordination between the different programs and ac-

tivities within UNEP was therefore believed to be essential
for the success of sustainable development. 76
-

sues

Cross-cutting strategies, wide-ranging linkage of is-

:

As pointed out by Mostapha Tolba,

many issues are in-

terlinked and inseparable from the protection of sustainable
development, such as afforestation, soil conservation, irrigation, protection of biodiversity,

health and overall liv-

ing conditions. This wide-ranging linkage of issues in turn

leads to appropriate cross-cutting strategies,

focussing on

P. Haas, From Theory to Practice: Ecological Ideas and
Development Policy (Harvard University, Massachusetts: Working Paper Series, No. 92-2), pages 31-34.

74.

It would be an interesting question for further inves75.
tigation to what extent UNEP has its values because its secretariat is comprised of holists; alternatively, one could
imagine that UNEP was charged to have these values at UNCHE,
and hired a staff with corresponding beliefs.

pages 15, 29, 30;
Haas, From Theory to Practice
Executive Directhe
1991 Annual Report of
Tolba, "UNEP
tor," page 1070.
76.

P.

,
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areas important for the promotion of sustainable
development. 77
-

Emphasis on monitoring and consciousness-raising:

UNEP is not an executive program,
scientific research;
ing-house,

instead,

monitoring

it

charged to do major

mainly serves as

environmental

data

and

clear-

a

research,

it

operates demonstration projects which promote international
consciousness-raising.

If

successful,

these would later be

adopted by the member states and other UN organs on large
scale.

Thus,

UNEP's aim is to bridge the gap between envi-

ronmental awareness and action. 78
-

Increase of consensual knowledge:

The Executive

Director and the Governing

Council

are

charged with the promotion of important international scien-

tific

and

other professional

communities

order to

in

ex-

change and reassess knowledge on sustainable development. 79
This

fact

creates

the

best

conditions

for

an

increase

of

consensual knowledge according to the definition in chapter
1.1

of

this thesis.

There,

consensual

knowledge refers to

"phenomena considered important by society" and a "chain of
In addition, consider the wide-ranging linkage of issues with respect to UNEP's programs in chapter 2.3; Tolba,
"UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," pages
77.

1087,
78.

1088,

Imber,

1103.

"Too Many Cooks," page 58.

Bennett, International Organizations page 297; United
Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile pages 3, 13,
pages
35; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
48, 71; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," pages 59, 60.
79.

,

,

,
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causation

[...]

subject to continuous testing and examina-

tion through adversary procedures."
-

Mission of "learning" at the point of the organiza-

tion's founding:

UNEP's

catalytic

function was

already

established at

the point of the organization's founding. Thus the implicit

mission of "learning" was UNEP's goal from the beginning: To
gain more consensual knowledge on the global environment and
function as major international knowledge pool on sustainable development.

2

.

5

Influence of NGOs on UNEP

NGOs not only consult, but also work actively within

-

the organization:

UNEP attaches great importance to its links with NGOs.
It maintains

contacts with NGOs throughout the world,

they work actively

and

with the agency in order to plan and im-

plement conferences,

meetings,

and projects.

programs,

For

example, UNEP's Governing Council invites NGOs to its meetings.

Moreover,

UNEP has set up procedures for mutual con-

sultation and effective coordination of activities at the
field level.

tered with

there were nearly 15,000 NGOs regis-

In 1982,

UNEP's

Environmental

Liaison

Center.

1986,

80
conference of NGOs in Nairobi.
•

UNEP even organized

In

a

•

•

Haas, Levy, and Parson, "A summary of the major documents signed at earth summit and the global forum," Environment Vol.34, No. 8, October 1992, page 15; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean page 16; United Nations Environmental
pages 35, 36; Feld and Jordan,
Programme, TJNEP Profile
80.

P.

.

,

,
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A good example for the active work
of NGOs within UNEP
and its programs and projects is the
INCD. When the committee failed to agree on a final compromise
text after the
first session in Nairobi, NGOs decided to
take several ini-

tiatives.

They held an international NGO conference
at Bamako in August 1993. Here they elaborated their
role

in the

Convention process and implementation,

formulated concrete

proposals, provided a discussion forum on NGO strategies
in
order to offer and develop their own skills and experience
in the negotiating process. NGOs also raised funds to
ensure

the publication of their "Econews" newsletter throughout the

next four sessions, and developed networking strategies
Such strategies

include:

Getting thorough

information

from the broad NGO network and from official sources;

tening to and analyzing government positions;
individual

NGO

positions,

because

split

every

night

during

conferences

opinions

to

lis-

and unifying

weaken

their power on critical positions toward governments.

meet

8

discuss

NGOs
the

"happenings," write articles and solve NGO conflicts. Other

strategies are lobbying, organizing seminars and using local

media to highlight their positions. 82
International
Walubengo.

Organizations

page

.

223;

interview

with

81.
KENGO, ENDA-TM, NEST, and GUAMINA, Proposals to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention to
Combat Desertification (INCD)
page 2; Toulmin, "Combatting
Desertification," pages 20, 21, 23.
,

(Nairobi, Kenya:
82.
Heinz Grejn, Lobby Manual for NGOs
Environmental Liaison Centre International, January 1994),
interview with Walubengo;
167-172;
appendix
C;
pages
.

51

Finally,

NGO

working

groups

are

established

parts of the INCD texts. They analyze,

discuss,

for

all

draft,

and

write out textual amendments. They also
gather support from
the UNEP Secretariat for the amendments.
Much more
impor-

tant,

however,

are

receptive government

officials who are

willing to integrate these amendments to their own
negotiations and national policy. 83
-

NGOs are included in areas where sustainable develop-

ment is not first priority (for example economic and juridical department)

According to UNEP's general focus on sustainable development,

it

where

all

is

unlikely that the organization has areas at

sustainable

development

not

is

first

priority.

Should such areas exist, however, it is likely that NGOs are
included there

-

according to their active role in the orga-

nization.
-

NGOs have access to most important meetings and in-

formations

:

NGOs have access to UNEP's information network and can

attend

all

meetings

preparatory meetings

organized
for

the

by

UNEP,

for

example

the

Desertification Convention. 84

interview conducted on January 15th in New York with Tony
representative of the UN Non-Governmental Liaison
Service

Hill,

83.
C;

Grejn, Lobby Manual for NGOs
pages 167-172;
interview with Walubengo; interview with Hill.
.

appendix

84.
P. Haas, Levy, and Parson, "A summary of the major documents signed at earth summit and the global forum," page
page 16; United Na15; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean
tions Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile pages 35, 36;
,

,
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This access might further be broadened in the future:
in the
Address to the Third INCD Session, the Administrator
James

Gustave Speth of the UNDP explained that
A new generation of national action programmes would specify what actions the country
would take in a variety of sectors and policy areas in order to halt land degradation and address
the underlying forces leading to desertification.
Their development would involve extensive participation of NGOs, affected communities, women's
groups, and grassroots organizations. 85
-

NGOs

lobby

actively before

important decisions

are

made:

The preparatory meeting for the Desertification Conven-

tion shows NGOs lobbying strategies: They write their opinions for Econews,

participate in the delegation of the re-

spective country, have meetings with delegations between the
sessions to convince them to support NGO positions, and make

interventions during INCD sessions. However,

it is far bet-

ter to lobby between the sessions, when government delegates
do not have fixed instructions yet but are still developing

their position.
successful

In their home

countries,

persuading government

NGOs can be most

officials

and

members

of

the parliament familiar with their point of view to maintain
or add the right aspects in the draft text and to delete the

Feld and Jordan, International Organizations
terview with Walubengo.

,

page 223;

in-

Speth, "Towards an Effective And Operational International Convention on Desertification," Address to the Third
(New York, New York: UNDP, January 17, 1994),
INCD Session
page 3
85.

.
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wrong aspects in order to promote
sustainable development.
For any lobbying success, however, it
is very

important that

NGOs coordinate their lobbying activities. 86
NGOs tend to cooperate with the organization
and its
programs
As a consequence of the broad connections
between UNEP

and NGOs,

the latter have increasing impact on UNEP.

Their

most important contributions are not their small resources
but their consciousness-raising, cooperation, and ability
to

move other institutions to follow their advice. For example
at the

INCD,

NGO representatives 8 ^ have the mainstream NGO

position, which is that it is more reasonable to use existing

institutions

and

financial

resources

more

efficiently

rather than increasing financial aid or creating new institutions.

This shows their cooperative attitude toward UNEP

and the governments involved in the preparations. Meanwhile,

UNEP has had so much positive experience with NGO cooperation that the organization itself increasingly seeks the ad-

vice of NGO members. Also, some governments now give financial support for NGOs' environmental actions. 88
86.
C;

Grejn, Lobby Manual for NGOs
pages 167-172;
interview with Walubengo; interview with Hill.
.

appendix

87.
The NGOs who attend the INCD are mostly local grassroots and service NGOs from the Third World. Only 4 or 5 out
of 4 0 NGOs expected at the Negotiating Committee come from
Northern countries.
88.
Aubrey Williams, "A growing role for NGOs in development," Finance and Development December 1990, pages 31-33;
interview conducted on January 15th in New York with Wangu
Mwangi,
editor for "Econews Africa " in Kenya.
.
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According to the results of chapters 2.2, 2.4, and
2.5,
the author concludes that UNEP has a very open structure.

2

•

6

Successes and Failures of UNEP's Programs

One can argue that the programs which UNEP has created

already are

successes

in

themselves.

The

agreements which

have been achieved in various conventions and protocols show

UNEP's ability to bring governments,

industries,

and other

important international factors together in order to develop

strategies for global environmental protection. To

a

certain

degree, the organization has been successful in bringing de-

veloped and developing countries closer together in order to
fight common dangers threatening people in the present and
the future.

120 countries around the world now participate

in UNEP's programs,
18

and eight international conventions and

protocols and agreements have been adopted.

OQ

Executive Director Mostafa Tolba himself played an im-

portant role by participating directly in the negotiations
during the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer,

89.

pushing forward negotiations on limits on the

United Nations Environmental

pages 40, 41.
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Programme,

UNEP Profile

,

global use of chlorof luorcarbons (CFCs). 90
According to Professor Peter M. Haas,
ne 9°tiating meetings, Executive Director Tolba urged delegates to seek
consensus and
constantly pressed for a strong treaty. He
personally chaired meetings and at one point
even
threatened not to let the delegates go to
dinner
until they had reached agreement. 9 ^
.

-

UNEP

'

successes,

s

information

and

however,

negotiating

go

further than exchanging

treaties.

Meanwhile,

many

na-

tions have themselves initiated far-reaching sustainability
programs, and more than 40 have integrated national conser-

vation strategies into their development plans. 9 ^
However, UNEP's programs and projects sometimes fail to
be successful due to factors mentioned in chapter 2.2.

example,

it

is

a

long

way

from

signing

an

For

environmental

treaty and implementing the policies in one's own country.
For example, Greenpeace criticizes the Montreal Protocol be-

cause it does not protect the ozone layer from further deterioration. Moreover,

it is impossible to verify national or

industrial compliance with CFCs reduction,

for most of the

respective national data and statistics are secret. However,

despite of non-compliance,
90.
49.

Porter and Brown,

a

Global

convention might still be an
Environmental

Politics

,

page

91.
P. Haas, "Banning chlorof luorcarbons
epistemic community efforts to protect stratospheric ozone," International
Organization Vol.46, No.l, Winter 1992, page 194.
:

.

92.

pages

United Nations Environmental
3,

40,

41.
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Programme,

UNEP Profile

,

improvement,

for

cism,

will

which

through

it

leads to public discussion and
criti-

inspire

grassroots

people

organizing.

will be an incentive

to

That

change
way,

the

situation

UNEP's

activism

for new relationships between

scien-

tists and decision-makers, engineers and financiers,

indus-

trialists and environmental activists on behalf of the
environment - for environmental changes do not only depend

on

the cooperation of national governments,

but take place

in

many spheres and on all different levels. 93

Another

problem

that

is

the

United

States

has

the

strongest influence on both the UNEP secretariat and council
decisions. It is the single largest financial contributor to
the organization.
sions.

The American

influence

has

created ten-

Some of the secretariat's proposals were criticized

for being responsive to the needs of the United States and

other developed countries rather than to the Third World.
During the Reagan and early Bush years,

withdrew

government

support

for

the United States

international

population

planning through United Nations agencies, arguing that economic

growth

could

solve

population problems.

all

At

the

same time, UNEP has a democratic voting structure (one state
-

one vote)

and the Third World Countries held and still

93.
Greenpeace International, The Failure of the Montreal
Protocol, (June 1990), pages 2, 3; United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile pages 3, 40, 41.
,

Democratic in comparison to the World Bank's voting
structure, which depends on the amount of financial contributions
94.

.
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hold the majority of the seats in the UNEP Governing
Council:

This situation increases the possibility

of

limiting

the influence of the United States and other industrialized

countries in UNEP. Over the years,

the Third World members

have often succeeded in strengthening their position and fi-

nally reaching acceptable sustainability agreements by consensus 95
Moreover,

Third World countries

increasingly

criti-

cized Mostapha Tolba. Although he has sometimes defended the

position of the developing countries against that of the industrialized countries,

in

recent years the G 77

has

in-

creasingly accused him of being too susceptible to the interests and problems of the North,
Climate change,

ozone depletion,

focussing on issues as:

and biological

diversity.

The G 77 wanted Tolba to put more emphasis on issues such as
fresh water,
tion,

urban air,

water pollution,

and

desertifica-

which are of primary concern in the Third World.

By

1990 the Group had lost confidence in Tolba and finally was

able to deprive UNEP of a major role in the UNGA resolution
on UNCED. In UNGA, the developing countries have more possi-

bilities to influence the negotiations, for they enjoy
to-1 majority.
and

The G 77,

Indonesia,

through UNGA

- as

especially Brazil,

theoretically

now

gains

India,

more

a

10-

Mexico,

influence

long as they stay united. Some defend the

and Kraft, Environmental Politics in the 1990s
page 314; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politic s,
page 48.
95.

Vig

,
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shift,

while others fear that the General Assembly is too

broad an institution to deal with that issue. 96
Also the Food and Agriculture Organization

(FAO)

and

the World Health Organization (WHO) do not want UNEP to intervene,

for they are large and well— entrenched bureaucra-

cies already dealing with environmental aspects to
degree.

Thus UNEP,

certain

a

which neither has the status of

cialized UN agency nor possesses

a

spe-

a

large staff and budget,

has never been treated as an equal by FAO, WHO, and others.
As a consequence,

the ability of UNEP to influence policies

of other specialized UN agencies are very limited.

In addi-

tion, UNEP and other UN agencies compete with UNDP for addi-

tional authority and financial support in environmental projects in the Third World.

For example,

UNEP and UNDP both

released their own environmental agendas in preparation for
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
in 1992, and the United Nations Children Fund and the United

Nations Population Fund have both included environmental issues in their antipoverty and population stabilization pro-

grams 97
An additional problem is the fact that the capabilities
for sustainable development in the Third World are very lim-

Christopher Anderson and Peter Aldhous, "Third world
muscles on climate treaty," Nature, Vol.349, No. 6312, February 28, 1991, page 727; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics pages 50, 51.
96.

,

page
Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
97.
page
1990s,
52; Vig and Kraft, Environmental Politics in the
316.
,
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ited because of a lack of environmental monitoring
capabilities and small enforcement staffs. Finally, UNEP's
analytic

models are sometimes inadequate and analytically questionpartly due to the fact that ecological surveys and en-

a kle,

vironmental research are still
governments.

The

monitoring

a

low budget priority of all

technology

for

environmental

protection is much less developed than, say, the one for social demography. 98

With respect to the INCD, NGO member Christopher Manu

criticizes the actions of the world community to combat desertification. He believes that the actions so far
low what

needed to

is

Combat Desertification

implement the UN Plan of Action to
(PACD)

Not

.

sources insufficient, there is also
for

appropriate

are be-

implementation.

only
a

the

are

financial

lack of political will

Though most African

coun-

tries are parties to the Desertification Convention,

impor-

tant elements for them such as financial resources,

imple-

mentation and monitoring mechanisms were not included in the
original text of the convention. qq
•

•

•

the results of

Due to these problems mentioned above,

UNEP have been disappointing to many people. However,

most

Gaye D. Ness and Stephen R. Brechin, "Bridging the gap:
International organization as organization," International
Organization Vol.42, No. 2, Spring 1988, page 261; Vig and
page 240; P.
Kraft, Environmental Politics in the 1990s
Haas, Saving the Mediterranean page 16.
98.

.

,

,

Christopher Manu, "The Road to the Desertification Con(Nairobi, Kenya: KENGO, Vol.4, No. 2,
vention," Resources
7-10
pages
1993
99.

.

)

,
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of the criticism refers to factors
which lay beyond UNEP's
influence. Considering the fact that UNEP
is a recent and
small organization, the author believes that
it has already
had an influence far beyond its years, and
an impact far

greater than its size or resources.

^

^

S uccesses—and

Failures of NGOs' Influence on UNEP's

Programs

NGOs have been successful insofar as they have partici-

pated in and influenced the preparations and negotiations of
the international environmental conventions mentioned above.

For example,

several NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of

the Earth^l were present in Montreal and contributed to the

outcome of the agreement.

NGOs are not only successful at

the international planning level,

but also at the national

and local level, when it comes to the implementation of programs. For example, NGOs publicly ask people running for of-

fice for their sustainability agenda.

NGOs can study envi-

ronmental law and politics, and then provide appropriate in-

formation for small governments which do not have the staff
or technical

ability to deal adequately with these issues.

100. United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile
pages 40, 41; Vig and Kraft, Environmental Politics in the
1990s pages 249, 316.
,

.

Even NGOs such as the Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute, which is the umbrella trade organization for
the largest CFC producer in the world and announced plans to
curtail all such manufacturing.
101.

61

On the

level

of

local

programs,

the

advantage of NGOs

is

their socioeconomic and ecological experience
with respect
to the realization of sustainable development.
Their

rela-

tive

independence and local

experience allows them to pay

attention to professional rather than to political or geographic

considerations

the

in

selection

of

personnel

and

where governments

are

projects 102
Especially in the Third World,

rather poor and thus depend on external assistance, NGOs are
of increasing importance,

for example they help to plan pro-

jects and evaluate them. 103 According to John

ister

for

Environment

and

Natural

K.

Resources

Sambu, Minin

Nairobi,

Kenya
We work quite closely with NGOs in all areas,
environment namely. We have several NGOs working
on the conservation of the environment, forests,
wildlife, etc. In the National Environmental Action Plans, NGOs are well represented. 104
As based on information by Masse Lo,

representative of

the NGO "Environment-Et-Developpement Du Tiers Monde" (Enda102. Williams, "A Growing Role for NGOs in Development,"
page 32; Ness and Brechin, "Bridging the gap," page 272
Fred Pearce, "Japan's billions may bypass World Bank," New
Scientist Vol.134, No. 1825, June 13, 1992, page 4; United
Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile page 14; interview conducted on January 16th in New York with Safei
Hamed, Professor of environmental planning at the University
of Maryland, College Park.
;

.

,

103.

Interview with Walubengo.

Interview conducted on January 17th in New York with
John K. Sambu, Minister for Environment and Natural Resources in Nairobi, Kenya.
104.
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TM)

in Dakar,

the new environmental minister in
Senegal has

also started to work closely with NGOs. They
now get invitations for information exchanges 106
.

However, it seems that NGOs have only limited influence
on national powers insofar as they can advise them
and try

to persuade them to promote sustainable development.
Accord-

ing to Dominic Walubengo, representative of the Kenya Energy

and Environment

that

Organizations

governments

do

not

have

(KENGO)

to

,

tell

a

major problem

NGOs

or

their

is

con-

stituents how much money they received and what they intend
to do with it.

This lack of accountability in national af-

fairs is an on-going problem, especially in undemocratic so-

cieties.

At the same time,

some NGOs are criticized them-

selves for occasional mismanagement. 106 According to Robert
Livernash,

Many service NGOs fail, however, in that they
do not help poor people, are not innovative, and
are as rigid as government departments. In addition, some service NGOs have been criticized for
having limited technical capacity for complex projects, for an inability to replicate successful
projects, for a limited ability to sustain themselves after initial outside help is withdrawn,
and for relatively weak managerial and organizational skills. 10
'

105. Interview conducted on January 16th in New York with
Masse Lo, NGO representative from Enda-TM, Senegal.

Pearce, "Japan's billions may bypass World Bank," page
Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Profile
United
4;
Williams,
"A Growing Role for NGOs in Development,"
page 14;
page 32; Ness and Brechin, "Bridging the gap," page 272; interview with Walubengo.
106.

,

Livernash, "The growing influence of NGOs in the developing world," page 18.
107.
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NGOs may fail especially in matters of organization
and
regular attendance at meetings. Many of the grassroots
NGOs

do not have access to the funds necessary to attend
meetings,

the

thus their points of view cannot be highlighted.

other hand,

international

NGOs

have

personnel to attend the conferences,

enough money

but their wide

On

and

scope

does not enable them to discuss grassroots issues. As a consequence,

such meetings may fail to include the opinions of

grassroots NGOs with respect to sustainable development. 108
The differences among NGOs are not part of any fixed
pattern,

but depend on concrete issues.

example,

often do not

see

Northern NGOs,

for

desertification as an important

environmental problem, thus they offer little support in the

discussion and implementation of more sustainable development. 109

The

INCD

is

an

example

of

NGO

successes

as

well

as

failures. Their successes are already visible. First of all,

parts of the Conference text include NGOs as important actors
(f),

in

combating desertification.

For

example Article

10

titled "National Action Programmes", points out the ne-

cessity to
give grassroots organizations, and non-governmental organizations more generally, an effective role in the preparation, implementation and
review of the programmes, making full use of their
108.

Interviews with Mwangi and Walubengo.

109.

Interviews with Mwangi and Walubengo.
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expertise [and granting them
institutional recognition and appropriate assistance]
10
.

Thus NGOs are included in

broad variety of fields,

a

giving them a basis to influence the
formulation and implementation the International Convention to
Combat Desertification. 111
At the same time, however, NGOs power to
'
influence the
outcome of the convention is limited. At the
Conference of
Parties, NGOs merely have observer status.
According to Article 24 (2 k)
.

The Conference of Parties is the supreme body
of the Convention. It shall keep the implementation of the Convention under regular review, and
inake
within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation. To
this end, it shall: [...] seek, as appropriate,
the services and cooperation of, and information
provided by, competent intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations; [...]112
,

110. United Nations General Assembly, "Negotiating Text of
the Convention," Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for
the Elabora tion of an International Convention to combat Desertification
in
those
Countries
experiencing
serious
Drought and/ or Desertification, particularly in Africa (New
York, New York: 17-28 January 1994, Third Session, Agenda
item 2, UN Document A/AC. 241/15)
page 184; the complete
document can be read in appendix C; similar provisions referring to NGO involvement are found throughout the text,
namely in Article 15 (b)
titled "Assistance in the elaboration and implementation of action programmes," Article 16
(2.), titled "Coordination in the elaboration and implementation of action programmes," Article 18
(d)
titled
"Information collection, analysis and exchange," Article 20
(1., 2. (a)), titled "Transfer, acquisition, adaptation and
development of technology," and Article 21 (l.a, 3., [4.]),
titled "Capacity building, education and public awareness."
,

111. United Nations General Assembly,
the Convention," pages 194, 195.

"Negotiating Text of

112. United Nations General Assembly,
the Convention," pages 194, 195.
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This means that NGOs' views do
not take legally part in
formal consensus building, but are
considered advisory. They
will not sign the Convention, but
play a major role behind
the scenes. As long as they can not
improve their legal

status in decision-making - which is highly
unlikely, given the
governments' resistance - their major focus
will be
to im-

prove their techniques of lobbying and
other means of indirect influencing. Two rounds of negotiations
have shown that
NGOs' input in the elaboration of the
Convention can
be very

constructive.

Many

of

their concerns are

now part of the

^ raf1: conven tion. 113 It is possible to prove
concretely the

influence NGOs have on the Final Draft of the Convention
by
comparing this with the text "NGO Interventions at the
2nd

Session of INCD,

"

which in

9

statements sums up the views of

the NGO community with respect to INCD formulation and
im-

plementation. One example is Point

7,

referring to Financial

Resources and Mechanisms:
The Conference of the Parties should elaborate the criteria for funding thereby taking into
account: [...] principles of transparency and accountability in management of the resources. ^

113. Goree, Mwani, and Saini (Editors), "Report of the Workshop 'Listening to the People: Social Aspects of Dryland
Management'", page 1; Grejn, Lobby Manual for NGOs
page
.

205.
114. NGO interventions at the 2nd Session of INCD (Geneva,
Switzerland: September 13-24, 1993), page 206; appendix C.
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In comparison,

Article 23

[

4 .]

of the Negotiating Text

states that
The modalities in paragraph 3
shall
transparency and accountability in the provide
manage9
ment of the resources of the fund,
[

According

to

an

interview

Wangu Mwani and Masse Lo,

with

.

.

.

NGO

representatives

the striking similarities within

these two texts prove the influence of NGOs
and their values
on the text of the convention: They
succeeded in making
their proposals part of the Negotiating Text of
the Convention - thus without their active lobbying, the
provisions
would not have been included.
Another example is point 9
(ii)

of the NGO statements, where they write

For the purpose of achieving ecologically
sustainable development within the context of the
objectives of this Convention, and to implement
its provisions, annexes and protocols, the Parties
shall be guided, inter alia, by the following
principles: [...] the principle of collective responsibility for the maintenance of a sound and
healthy global environment which entails, inter
alia, rational and ecologically sustainable management of natural resources, avoiding land degradation and loss of productive capacity [...].

Similarities to point
and Article
ally,

3

(d)

9

(ii)

can be found in Article

of the Convention,

NGO propositions

are

integrated

115. United Nations General Assembly,
the Convention," page 194.

116.

for example.
in

the

2

Addition-

INCD,

be

it

"Negotiating Text of

Interview with Mwani and Lo.

117. NGO interventions at the 2nd Session of INCD
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.

page 207.

with respect to participation and
education of local people,
women issues, proposals concerning
trade,

debt,

or

subsi-

dies 118

Despite

NGOs

influence

'

behind

the

scenes,

it

is

a

failure of NGOs that they have not managed
so far to include
their legal rights in the Convention to a
considerable degree. Legal aspects can be important tools
for the national
implementation of the Convention, for in case of
non-compliance,

governments could be sued by the international
community. However, this would require massive changes
in

the

general norms of the international system, thus it is
difficult to achieve. Though point 8 of the NGO statements

pro-

poses very concrete and far reaching measures with respect
to "Legal Aspects Relating To Ratification And Domestic Im-

plementation Of the Convention,"

the

Convention only men-

tions very briefly in Article 10

(d)

that National Action

Programs shall

removing
tion,"

"create an enabling national environment by

legislative

other

and

this

to

required

ac-

followed by similarly vague statements concerning

legal aspects in Article 11
in

obstacles

case

NGOs

have

(m)

failed

and Article 21
so

far

to

)

Thus

integrate

their

(

1

.

(

i)

points of view into the text of the Convention.

118. Goree, Mwani, and Saini (Editors), "Report of the Workshop 'Listening to the People: Social Aspects of Dryland
Management'", page 1.
119. United Nations General Assembly,
the Convention," page 184.
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"Negotiating Text of

CHAPTER

3

THE WORLD BANK

3,1 F ° un dation of the W orl d Bank and of its
Environmental

Department

The developmental and environmental policy of the
World
Bank are strongly interconnected.

Thus,

it

is

important to

not only analyze its environmental department but the World

Bank as a whole.
The World Bank was founded in 1944 at the Bretton Woods

Conference. When the Bank began to operate in June 1946,
had two functions:

First,

it

to help reconstruct the European

and Japanese economies destroyed by the Second World War,
and second,

to assist

in "developing"

the "less developed"

world - a vague expression open to interpretation. Until the
mid-1950s, however, the Bank's main goal was the restoration
of global

economic stability,

while the developmental con-

cern remained peripheral. 120

Over the long term, the Bank's inadequate financial resources and the strong competition of the Marshall Plan aid

with its generous grants forced the Bank to shift its main
focus from Europe and Japan to a new constituency to keep
120. Winsome J. Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries (Boulder & London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1987), pages 2, 22; Robert L. Ayres,
Banking on the Poor
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 1983), pages 1, 2; Pearce, "Japan's billions may by.

pass World Bank," page

4.

69

itself in business. Simultaneously,

developing

countries

pressured the

Bank

emerged

for

as

an increasing amount of

independent

multilateral

aid

nations

according

and

to

the

second goal of the World Bank's charter. Moreover, the
Third

World Countries used their influence in the United Nations
General

Assembly

and

the

Economic

and

Social

Council

(ECOSOC) to formulate an agenda promoting Third World Devel-

opment. Foreign aid was seen as crucial to develop the Third

World economies. Capital transfers from the World Bank, private banks,

UNDP,

and

other organizations

became

increas-

ingly important 12
As a consequence,

the World Bank began to concentrate

its financial assistance to the Third World.

However,

until

the late 1960s its multilateral aid was limited to the stim-

ulation of economic growth. According to Robert Ayres,
Between fiscal years 1961 and 1965, 76.8 percent of all Bank lending was for electric power or
transportation. Only 6 percent was for agricultural development, and a paltry 1 percent for social service investment. 122

According

the

to

trickle-down

theory

of

economic

growth, the Bank believed that progress in this industrial-

ization and capitalization would later also benefit the poor
page 1; E. Haas, When
121. Ayres, Banking on the Poor
Jeff Frieden, "Third
pages
142;
is
Power
Knowledge
12, 13,
,

,

World Indebted Industrialization," International Organization Vol.35, No. 3, Summer 1981, pages 408-410, 414; Leslie,
The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing
Countries pages 2, 20, 22.
.

.

122. Ayres,

Banking on the Poor
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,

pages

2,

3.

of these countries, and would solve
their "peripheral" problems such as high population growth, low
levels of savings,

and political instability. From the very
beginning, the Bank
had to borrow money from US investors in order
to finance
its lending program. This dependence on the
United States
forced the Bank in a conservative direction: The Bank
would

finance only those projects that yielded enough money to
re-

pay

the

initial

investment,

thus

avoiding

riskier

sec-

tors. 123

During the years when Robert
the World Bank

(1968-1981),

a

McNamara was president of

major change occurred in the

organization: The World Bank recognized that its exclusive
focus

on

capitalization

and

industrialization

had

not

brought the expected results with respect to development in
the

Third

World.

Thus,

especially

after

1973

the

Bank

shifted its funding projects away from building basic economic

infrastructures

toward the

reduction

of

Third World

poverty. The nature of the projects changed in favor of the

poor people, who had long been neglected:
to experimental rural projects,

pects of

development.

agriculture,
planning.

education,

This

focussing on the social as-

liberal

urban

Funds were given

policy concentrated

development,

Due to this enlargement,

and

on

population

several internal changes

occurred, for example in 1973, the Agriculture and Rural Depages 4, 5; Leslie, The
Banking on the Poor
World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries pages 2, 20, 22; E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power
pages 12, 13, 142.
123. Ayres,

,

,

.
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velopment Department was created,
in 1975
Population, Health, and Nutrition

,

and in 1979

Department.

,

the

The Bank be-

came increasingly bureaucratic
and a center of attention
for
journalists, politicians, and the
public. Now it was not
only the most important international
development organization, but also became the largest
124
antipoverty
agency.

In 1981,

Ronald Reagan became President of
the United
States and A. W. Clausen replaced
McNamara as World

Bank

president.

The

new American

poverty-oriented

development

administration
of

the

Bank

criticized
under

the

McNamara.

Clausen,

the former Chief Executive Officer of
the Bank of
America and thus an eminent commercial banker,
was more
likely to adapt to President Reagan's
market-oriented

strategies: He focused rather on the development
of the private sector than poverty alleviation. From the
beginning,
the Reagan administration opposed McNamara's "welfare"
policy,

and aimed at the reduction of American financial par-

ticipation in it. The American influence was very strong due
to the

fact

that the United States

is

the

Bank's

largest

donor. 125

124. S. Shahid Husain, "The World Bank and Economic Policy
in Developing Countries," Recovery in the Developing World
(Washington, D.C.
The World Bank, 1986)
page 50; Ayres,
Banking on the Poor pages 1, 5-7; Leslie, The World Bank
and St ructural Transformation in Developing Countries pages
:

,

,

,

2,

3,

22.

125. Ayres, Banking on the Poor
pages 229, 230, 231, 232;
Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries page 26.
,

,
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The changes

in

development policy under McNamara
are
important insofar as the new social
and population aspects

indirectly facilitated environmental
protection, for example
the fight against overpopulation.
Moreover,
due to increas-

ing international pressure and public
concern for the promotion of sustainable development, an Office
of Environmental

Affairs was created for environmental advice
in 1972.
ever,

How-

it consisted of only 6 professionals
who had to review

more than 300 new project proposals each year.
Thus, it was
not capable of having much impact on the lending
activities
126
of other World Bank units.
While the global community became increasingly aware
of
the need for sustainable development in the 1970s,

concern

with

at

environmental

World

Bank.

2

protection

The

Bank

was

itself

less

prominent

admits

that

during

the

these

years, some of its projects were damaging the environment.
It became apparent that the Bank's response
did not match the changing realities either in the
degree of effort devoted to environmental matters
or in the approaches actually used. This, combined
with a few well-publicized cases in which Bank
projects actually had negative environmental consequences - such as contributing to the destruc126.

Haas, From Theory to Practice
page 37; Porter and
Global Environmental Politics
pages 54,55; Vig and
Environmental Policy in the 1990s
page 297; Ayres,
Banking on the Poor pages 5-7; S. Husain, "The World Bank
and Economic Policy in Developing Countries," page 50;
Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries pages 3, 22.
P.

,

Brown,
Kraft,

,

.

,

,

127. Ayres, Banking on the Poor
pages 4, 5; Leslie, The
World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries page 20.
,

.
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tion of tropical rain forests and posing threats
to wildlife, indigenous people, and established
human settlements - prompted the institution to
rethink and adjust its policies toward environmental management.
3*2 Structure of th e World Bank and of Its Environmental

Department

3.2.1 Institutional Structure

Power is concentrated at the top:

-

The

World

Bank

is

led

by

the

president

and

small

a

board of directors. Power is concentrated at the top. 129
Strong hierarchical structure:

-

The World Bank's structure is strongly hierarchical.^ 39
-

Institutional

structure

makes

wide-ranging

reforms

difficult:
As the previous pages have shown, this is true for the

first

decades

changes

took

of

the

place,

World
for

Bank's

example

Though

existence.

under

McNamara,

it

some
is

doubtable if they can be called "wide-ranging reforms." This

would only be true for more fundamental structural shifts,
128. The World
1990, page 11.

Bank,

The

World

Bank

and

Environment

the

,

pages 65-67; Philippe Le
129. Ayres, Banking on the Poor
Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge
(Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1989),
page 61; an overview of the World Bank Structure in pocket,
figure A. 6.
,

,

pages 65-67; Le Prestre,
Banking on the Poor
Challenge page 61; an
Environmental
The World Bank and the
pocket, figure A. 6.
in
Structure
overview of the World Bank
130. Ayres,

,

,
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for example an increased degree
of openness in favor of
sustainable development. It is mainly
due to pressure from

American environmental groups and
congressmen in the 1980 s,
that some more fundamental changes
of this kind occurred. In
1986, World Bank President Barber Conable
announced

the com-

plete reorganization of the Bank. Conable
established a new
Environmental Department and new
environmental
offices
within the Bank's regional operations
divisions. This step
was necessary for the environmental
aspects of development
projects and the evaluation of natural resource
conservation
131
in general.

Many

of

the

new

positions

were

given

to

scientific

holists and ecological epistemic community members.
As
sult,

sustainability concerns

entered

the

new reorganized department was given only

a

discussion.

a re-

The

few powers and a

small staff of 60 professionals with very limited powers to

review the environmental impact of development projects. At
the same time, the staff of the Bank itself expanded consid-

erably in the 1970s and 1980s,

for example from 1,348 pro-

fessionals in 1971 to 3,617 in 1986. Including technical and
support staff, the World Bank today has

a

permanent staff of

World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, First Annual Report, Fiscal 1991),
pages 2, 3; The World Bank, The World Bank and
the Environment
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, First
Annual Report, Fiscal 1990), page 72;
The World Bank, The
World Bank and the Environment (Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank, First Annual Report, Fiscal 1992), pages 126, 127.
131. The

.

.

.
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5,000-6,000 people.

This includes the staff of mission
offices all over the world, for example
132
in China and
India.

In 1989, an Environmental Assessment
Operational Directive (EAOD) was adopted, which required
environmental as-

sessments of new Bank projects and components
with significant environmental impact. EAOD was developed
by scientific
holists in order to make project participants
understand the

interdependency of ecological issues, and to propose
alternatives to current development actions. 133 According

to the

World Bank,
The central environment department, located
the Vice-Presidency for Sector and Operations
Policy (OSP)
is a policy-oriented,
interdisciplinary group that is responsible for planning,
formulating, and coordinating the Bank's overall
environmental policies and approaches. It recommends environmental and social policies, initiatives, guidelines, and standards to Bank management. 134
in

,

^

Today the Environmental Department focuses upon issues
such as tropical deforestation,

the loss of biological di-

versity, and the problems of desertification in sub-Saharan
Africa. It works together with several countries which face
132. P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean
page 13; P. Haas,
From Theory to Practice pages 37, 38; Le Prestre, The World
Bank and the Environmental Challenge pages 60, 61; Porter
and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
pages 54,55; Vig
and Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s page 297; interview with Hamed.
,

,

,

,

.

133.

P.

Haas, From Theory to Practice

134. The World
1992, page 125.

Bank,
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World

.

Bank

1992, pages 39,

and

the

40.

Environment

.

immense

environmental

problems

and

helps

their management of natural resources.

them

to

30 National

improve

Environ-

mental Action Plans (NEAPs) so far have been designed
to develop comprehensive national environmental planning
strategies. 135

Currently

,

106 higher level and 34 support-level staff

work in the Environmental Department, which is composed of
economists,
foresters,

experts.

engineers,

land

anthropologists,

use

planners,

sociologists,

and

ecologists,

institutional

It conducts policy and research functions in envi-

ronmental, economic,

and social areas,

supplies certain op-

erational support to the regions, and provides training for
staff. The Regional Environment Divisions are located in the

technical departments of each of the four regional offices
and together contain 30 high-level staff and about 15 consultants. In addition,

a

certain number of Bank staff works

partly on environmental matters. For example, the Legal Department has

its

own environmental unit,

and the

Economic

Development Institute has included the environment as crosssectional

theme

countries.

The

in

its

training

Environmental

Global Environment

Fund

(GEF)

activities

Department
Office

of

for

also
the

borrowing

houses

the

Administrator

and the GEF Office of the Operations Coordinator. Moreover,

Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics pages
54,55; Vig and Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s
page 297; P. Haas, From Theory to Practice 1992, pages 39,
40; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1990, page 12.
135.

,

,

.

,
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the

Environmental

Department

increasingly

cooperates

with

major international institutions and
organizations such as
the Economic Development Institute (EDI),
the International
Finance Corporation

(IFC)

,

and specialized agencies within

the UN system. 136
However, the legal structure of the World Bank
makes it

very difficult for the environmental department or
external
forces such as NGOs to push forward more fundamental change
in favor of sustainability. A major problem is that the
Bank
is unaccountable

to its member states:

The Bank's Articles

of Agreement states that management and staff are responsi-

hle exclusively to the Bank and to no other authority.

13 "^

According to Patricia Adams,
Even the accountability of the board of executive directors is ambiguous: The Bank argues that
its executive directors are individuals deriving
their authority from and owing their paramount
loyalty to the Bank, even though they are elected
by, and vote on behalf of, member countries. 3 °
To sum up,

some major reforms took place in the World

Bank in the late 1980s.

Though most of the old structural

problems continue to exist, the new Environmental Department
136. The

World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
pages 2, 3; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment 1990, page 72; The World Bank, The World Bank and the
Environment 1992, pages 126, 127.
,

.

.

Patricia Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF in Sub-SaVol.46,
Africa," Journal of International Affairs
No.l, Summer 1992, pages 98, 99.
137.

haran

"The World
138. Adams,
Africa," page 100.
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and

the

IMF

in

Sub-Saharan

itself has a far more open structure than
the rest of the
Bank. This structure facilitates the promotion
of sustainable development in the Bank.

Strong time— constraints for decision making:
In an average week,

the World Bank approves some $400

million in loans, and the top level of the Bank has just two
weeks to review multi-million dollar projects. In addition,
the extensive individual workload of the small environmental

staff leaves little time for an extensive project analysis
or

for

the

improvement

of

knowledge.

its

The members

had

little time to communicate their concerns and perspectives

with other departments of the Bank in order to promote environmentally sound projects. 139 The World Bank itself admits
that
Overall, based on time recorded by staff,
some 270 staff years (regular staff plus consultants)
were devoted to environment this year
[1991]. This corresponds to about 6 percent of total Bank staff time. 140
-

Lack

of

transparency

of

decision

making

process

within the organization:
The World Bank works relatively independently from both

member governments and NGOs. Not only are the minutes of ex139. Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge pages 60, 61; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental
Politics pages 54,55; Vig and Kraft, Environmental Policy
in the 1990s page 297; interview with Hamed.
.

.

.

140. The World
1991, page 3.

Bank,
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World

Bank

and

the

Environment

,

ecutive directors '

meetings

records.

governors,

nates,

All

Bank

officers,

and

secret,

but

executive

employees

are

also their voting
directors,

immune

from

alter-

the

legal

process regarding their professional performance.
To amend
the World Bank's Articles of Agreement
would reguire a

three-fifth majority of its members, which makes
democratization extremely difficult. The time constraints
mentioned
above further inhibit a democratic control of the
planning
and implementation of programs and projects. 141
-

Locus of organizational power:

The USA is the country which contributes most to the

World Bank's budget,

and it had the strongest influence on

the World Bank from the beginning. It is likely that it used
this influence to locate the World Bank in its capital Washington, D.C. While this decision makes the organization eas-

ily accessible

for the United States,

local

NGOs

from the

Third World have difficulties to gain access to the organization for financial and geographical reasons. 142

141. Adams,
"The World
Africa," pages 109-111;
page 142.
142. Ayres,

Bank
E.

and the
Haas, When

Banking on the Poor

80

,

IMF in Sub-Saharan
Knowledge is Power

pages 64, 65.

,

3.2.2 Financial Strnrturp

Considerable influence of donors on budgetary
decisions

:

The World Bank's donors act relatively autonomously
in

budgetary matters. This is due to the confidence of the
financial community which the Bank gained during the 1950s.
World Bank's lending started with less than $800 million in
loans in the first decade of its existence.

increased over the years.

the end

By

of

It has greatly

fiscal

1985,

the

Bank had committed $149.6 billion aid to the developing mem-

ber countries. 143
This autonomy

is

not absolute,

however.

The

Bank in-

creasingly joins with private commercial banks and private
lenders in offering a loan. The advantages for the private

lenders are more security with respect to planning and loan-

repayment

-

for example they profit from greater information

about recipient countries and loan administration services.
The Bank,

on the other hand,

money available.

has greater total amounts of

Some new money sources are especially im-

portant, for example the Middle East, Norway, and Japan. The

situation could become problematic if co-financing increases
to a

level

of two-third

of the

total

loans.

Private banks

143. P. Haas, Levy, and Parson, "Appraising the earth summit," Environment Vol.34, No. 8, October 1992, page 18; Le
Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge
pages 61-63; Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries pages 3, 26.
,

,

,
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have some criteria which are very different from the
ones of
the World Bank's donors, for example where loans
should go
and to what purposes.

increases,

the more

The more the amount of private loans

influence private bankers have on the

policy of the World Bank. 144 According to Robert Ayres,
At the extreme, then, all of the changes now
under consideration at the World Bank run the danger of converting it into little more than an underwriter of the schemes of commercial banks,
multinational corporations, and the supply-side
theories of the more committed capitalist ideologues 14b
.

This extreme so far has not been reached, however, and
the World Bank's donors still possess a considerable degree
of autonomy in financial matters.
-

Voting is based on amount of financial contribution:

In the World Bank,

voting is weighted in relation to

the amount of a country's contribution. 146
-

Large budget:

The World Bank currently is the leading international

development bank.

In

this

position,

it

controls

and

tributes billions of dollars annually. 147 Accordingly,

disits

clients and creditors are all the more eager to define the
144. Ayres,

Banking on the Poor

,

pages 238, 239, 242, 244.

145. Ayres,

Banking on the Poor

,

page 245.

Levy, and Parson, "Appraising the earth summit," page 28; Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge pages 61-63.
146.

P.

Haas,

,

147.

For example more than $16 billion in fiscal year 1986.

82

governing criteria of its loans. In
practice, these criteria
are mainly defined by the developed
countries. 148

8

•

8

The W orld Bankas Programs

In

the

1970s and

1980s,

the World Bank has developed

so-called "structural adjustment programs."

provide

loans

"adjustments"

for
of

projects

Third

which

World

aim

at

economies

structure of the developed countries.

These programs

market-oriented
to

the

For example,

economic
in

the

1970s and 1980s, the Bank supported rain forest colonization

schemes in Brazil and Indonesia and cattle ranching projects
in Central

and South America,

on sustainable development as

all of which where not based

defined in chapter one.

The

World Bank defends its structural adjustment programs:

Ac-

cording to Kevin Cleaver, Chief of Agriculture at the Africa
Technical Department of the World Bank,

agricultural prices,
boards,

such programs free

eliminate costly government marketing

and allow farmers to make a living.

He claims that

occasional failure is due to civil war, political or social
strife, or a poor economic policy environment. 149
148. P. Haas, Levy, and Parson, "Appraising the earth summit," page 28; Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge pages 61-63.
,

Edward Schuh, Kevin Cleaver, Walter Coward, Robert
Herdt, and Ruth Katz, "Improving African farming is a
two-part job," The New York Times Vol.142, October 3, 1992,
page 22L; Omar Sattaur, "Greens in muddy water over Indian
dam," New Scientist Vol.132, No. 1789, October 5, 1991, page
page
16; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
149. G.

W.

.

.

,

54.
83

Only since the late 1980s has the
World Bank financed
more programs which give sustainability
concerns higher priority. in fiscal year 1990, 11 free
standing loans or credits were approved - compared to only
two in 1989 - which
added environmental and social concerns to
economic
ones.

Furthermore,

in

1990

about

50

percent

of

Bank

loans

and

credits during the year combined socioeconomic with
environmental components, for example forestry projects, soil
con-

servation,

and wildlife management.

nearly

Bank,

30

percent

of

all

According to the World

projects

approved

in

1992

even had significant environmental impact. 150

Another
the EAOD,

important

development

is

the

introduction

of

which incorporates the Bank's environmental con-

siderations into its lending activities. 151 in addition, efforts are taken to change the current UN system of National

Accounts to

include environmental

aspects

in

income

esti-

mates. According to Professor Peter M. Haas,

Such efforts may have real consequences for
Bank practices: when resource depletion is accounted for Indonesia's annual growth rate falls
from 7,1% to 4%. 152

150. P. Haas, From Theory to Practice
1992, page 40; Porter
and Brown, Global Environmental Politics pages 54, 55; The
World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1990, page
6; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1992,
pages 20-24.
.

,

.

.

151. The World
1990, page 7.

152.

P.

Bank,

The

World

Bank

Haas, From Theory to Practice

84

.

and

the

Environment

1992, page 40.

.

Moreover, the GEF which is managed by the World Bank
in

cooperation with UNEP and UNDP,

will

provide

funding

for

sustainability programs. The GEF is a pilot scheme to help

developing countries to contribute to the solution of global
sustainability problems.
mid-1991.

Governments

GEF funds totaled
the

in

$ 1.3

billion in

developing countries

are

the

primary agents for identifying and selecting projects,

as-

sisted by GEF agencies, NGOs, and the private sector. During
1992,

six GEF investment projects totaling $80 million were

approved. In addition, the GEF was considering

more than 70

projects totaling more than $580 million. 153

Another new resource
provement

in

developing

transfer

countries

for

are

sustainability
the

im-

debt-f or-nature

swaps. Their objective is to reduce Third World debt burden
in exchange for certain activities which promote sustainable

development in these countries. The World Bank facilitates
this

process,

though

such transactions.
ernments,

it

is

not

participating directly

in

Debt-f or-nature funding from donor gov-

commercial

banks,

and

NGOs

have

generated

more

than $60 million for conservation so far. Between 1987-1990,
10

debt-f or-nature transactions were arranged,

valuing $84

millions 154
The World Bank and the Environment
78, 79; The World Bank, The World Bank and
the Environment
1991, pages 101-103, 107; The World Bank,
The World Bank and the Environment 1992, pages 5, 6.
153. The World
1990, pages 8,

Bank,

,

.

.

Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
78, 79; The World Bank, The World Bank and
1991, pages 101-103, 107; The World Bank,
the Environment
The World Bank and the Environment. 1992, pages 5, 6.
154. The World
1990, pages 8,

,
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Moreover,
(OED)

the

Bank's Operations Evaluation

Department

currently is studying the human experience of
involun-

tary resettlement resulting from Bank-supported
energy and
agricultural projects. This project study will review

the

sociological,

resettlement

environmental,
from

the

legal,

perspective

and economic
of

the

issues of

settlers

them-

selves 155
.

In addition, the organization increasingly acknowledges

prominent

environmental

organizations,

leading

NGOs,

and

committees - for example, the Committee of International De-

velopment Institutions on the Environment.
in

It

regular meetings of bodies such as UNEP,

expert meetings, and

participates
environmental

environmentally related events

-

such

as the international conference "UNCED." In order to facili-

tate the flow of information and to increase contacts with
NGOs, the World Bank uses the EAOD and GEF. 156

Unfortunately,

these positive changes are mainly lim-

ited to the Environmental Department. At the same time, en-

vironmentally damaging projects

in

other World Bank units

continue to exist.

The Bank recently gave

and mining

in

sectors

Brazil

loans to energy

and to enormous dam-building

projects in India which both caused significant environmen155. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1990, pages 3, 9, 81-83; The World Bank, The World Bank and
the Environment 1991, pages 53, 64, 72.
.

.

156. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1990, pages 3, 9, 81-83; The World Bank, The World Bank and
the Environment 1991, pages 53, 64, 72.
,

,
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tal damage. Loans for such
destructive programs and projects
often much higher than loans
for environmentally sound
ones. In addition, despite massive
criticism, the structural
adjustment loans so far have nor become
more sustainable. 157
The World Bank itself admits that it
still has problems
with its environmental policy:
In

cases staff have had to grapple with

P os ed by the existence of significant
S
between environmental

tradeoffs
economic objectives.
In addition,

and

short-term

due to international recession the global

financial situation is so unstable that World Bank
lending

respect to the promotion of sustainable development are
declining. 159
One of the Bank's most criticized recent programs has

been the construction of large dams in India.

One

of

the

world's biggest dam projects is the Sardar Sarovar Project
on the Narmada River in India, approved by the Bank in 1985.

The original plan was to provide drinking water for 40 million people in drought-prone areas of northwest India, irri-

gation

for

nearly

2

million

hectares

of

land,

and

1450

157. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
pages
54, 55; interview conducted on March 9th in Washington, D.C.
,

with Ms. Perumalpellai-Essex,
Environmental Department.
158. The World
1990, page 6.

Bank,

The

employee at the World Bank's

World

Bank

and

Environment

the

.

159. Bruce Stokes, "World Bank faces a new world, too," National Journal
Vol.24, No. 17, April 25, 1992, page 1000;
Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics page 55.
.
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megawatts of hydroelectric power.

An additional aim was to

bring employment opportunity to one
of the poorest and most
drought-prone regions of western India.
The total cost is
estimated at $11.4 billion. The Bank has
so far contributed
$327 million of the $1.4 billion spent to
date. The program
was assigned and approved by the local and
national governments in India and the state company Sardar
Sarovar Narmada
Nigam Ltd. 160
The Sardar Sarovar Dam

projects

planned

in

the

is

valley.

the

first

After

of

its

30

large

completion

dam
in

1994, the project is expected to irrigate 1,875,000
hectares

and generate up to 1450 megawatts of electricity ^^1
Accord.

ing to Morse and Berger,

The Sardar Sarovar dam, under construction on
the Narmada River, at Navagam and Kevadia, will
impound water to a full reservoir level of 455
feet. It will submerge 37,000 hectares of land in
three states: Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya
Pradesh.
The Sardar Sarovar dam,
along with
planned developments farther upstream, is designed
to divert 9.5 million acre feet of water from the
Narmada River into a canal and irrigation system.
The canal itself is the biggest in the world in
terms of its capacity, and will extend 450 kilometers to the border with Rajasthan. [...] In addition to the 100,000 people living in the villages
in the submergence area, there are likely to be
140,000 farmers who will be affected by the canal
and irrigation system. Finally, there are the peo160. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1992, page 106; Susan K. Miller, "World Bank admits mistakes
over
dam," New Scientist Vol.134, No. 1827, June 27, page
.

.

4.

161. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1992, page 106; Susan K. Miller, "World Bank admits mistakes
,

over

dam," page

4.
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pie living downstream
below the dam, numbering
thousands more, whose lives will be
significantly
affected. 162
,

In

1985,

the Bank entered into credit and loan
agree-

ment with the government of

India

and

the

affected

local

governments. The agreement entitles "project-affected"
persons to be resettled under conditions which at
least
equal

their previous

ones.

In

the

same

year,

the

Bank

offered

credits and loans in the amount of $350 million to India and
its affected states in order to enable them to construct the

dam and the canal.
for additional

Meanwhile,

$440 million

applications have been made

for the dam and an associated

project. 163

3

.

4

The World Bank's Values and Strategies

-

As

One ideology is dominant:

illustrated above,

the World Bank

has strongly believed that the

for a

long time

ideology of maximized eco-

nomic growth will also solve the ecological problems in the

developing
that

free

countries.

Most

of

market mechanisms or

will in the long run enable

a

its

economists

individual

have

argued

property

rights

country's prospering economy

Bradford Morse and Thomas R. Berger, Sardar Sarovar:
Report
of the Independent Review (Ottawa, Canada: ReThe
page XII.
source Futures International (RFI)
1992),
162.

,

163. Morse and Berger,

Sardar Sarovar

89

.

pages XII, XIII.

to take care of most social and environmental
problems. 164
If the World Bank had any definition of
"sustainable devel-

opment" in the first decades, it seems to have been
to sustain and develop its own political and financial
power by

giving money only to projects which promised profits for
the
World Bank and its donors. Only in the late 1980s the Bank
to think about the integration of appropriate social

and environmental concerns in its economic planning.
-

Ideology of economic liberalism prevails:

From

the

beginning,

professional managers.

the

All

Bank

had

few

key positions

in

generalized
the

or

Bank were

held by economists favoring either classical or managed liberalism: 165 President Robert McNamara was former head of the

Ford Motor Company and U.
1960s, and A. W.

America.

Current

S.

Secretary of

Defense

in

the

Clausen was the former head of the Bank of

President

Lewis

T.

Preston

was

former

chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the New York City
investment bank of J.

P.

Morgan

&

Co.

Thus the ideology of

164. Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge pages 61, 63. According to Le Prestre, opponents of
this theory argue that individuals do not always know what
is in their best interest, and that the individual's preferences do not necessarily reflect the interest of the environment. Thus economists and ecologists often had - and
still have - very different points of views, the former more
short-term and the latter more long-term oriented.
.

165. Further information on classical and managed liberalism
in E. Haas, When Knowledge is Power pages 66, 143.
,
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the

organization

tended

to

be

dominated by

economic val-

ues. 166
-

Values of stability and predictability:

The World Bank from the beginning placed high value on

stability and predictability. As

a

consequence, the Bank is

known for its institutional rigidities and its hostility to-

ward new ideas and reforms.
-

Problems are coped with by shifts in strategies, not

in underlying values:

Traditionally, the World Bank supposed that natural re-

sources would guarantee

a

steady stream of future income. As

explained in chapter 3.1,

it preferred macroeconomic models

in

such

development sectors as

infrastructure

and

mining,

while ignoring the consequences of social factors and environmental deterioration. Later, McNamara's shifts toward so-

cioeconomic strategies tried to cope with the social probHowever,

lems.

as

long as the shifts

in

strategies lacked

the environmental perspective, they could only be successful
to a limited extent.

Only in the Bank's recent policy more fundamental values have begun to change.

Today,

the organization acknowl-

166. Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge pages 60, 61, 69; Pearce, "Japan's billions may bypass World Bank," page 4; Stokes, "World Bank faces a new
world, too," page 1000.
.

The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge pages 60, 61, 69; Pearce, "Japan's billions may bypass World Bank," page 4; Stokes, "World Bank faces a new
world, too," page 1000.
167.

Le Prestre,
.
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edges that the promotion of development
and the protection
of the environment are complementary
aspects of the same
168
agenda.
The Bank lists four objectives with respect
to its environmental strategies:
- To assist member countries
in setting priorities, building institutions, and implementing
programs for sound environmental stewardship
— To ensure that potential
adverse environmental impacts from Bank-financed projects are addressed
- To assist member countries in
building on
the complementarities between poverty reduction
and environmental protection
- To address global environmental
challenges
through participation in the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) lbbf

The Bank now claims to prevent the destruction of natural habitats, land degradation, degradation and depletion of

fresh water resources,

pollution,

nizing

urban,

industrial,

and agricultural

and degradation of the "global commons."

that

environmental

destruction

is

an

Recog-

increasing

threat to economic development, the World Bank aims at less

resource-intensive

development

World. New strategies are,

strategies

for example,

the

in

Third

the pricing of en-

ergy at its true economic cost. The Bank has also developed
168. Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF in Sub- Saharan
Africa," page 100; Ayres, Banking on the Poor
page 10;
Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries page 3; The World Bank, The World Bank
and the Environment 1992, page 4.
,

,

.

169. The

page

World

Bank,

The

1

92

World

Bank

and

the

Environment

,

various

long-term

degradation

and

perspective

integrating

studies,

integrating

environmental

issues

land

into

the

analysis of economic and social conditions.
However, this is
just a beginning. Many of the World Bank's
promised shifts
in underlying values so far have not been
realized,

constitute only

a

or they

small part of the Bank's programs and pro-

jects. 170

Mission of "adaptation" at the point of the organization's founding:
The

that the
the

superficial

in

implicit mission of

point

of

deeper

1980s,

shifts

organization's
structural

the

first

"adaptation"
founding.

changes

decades

was dominant at

Only

toward

suggest

the

in

the

late

promotion

of

sustainable development prove the Bank's increased capability of "learning."

3

.

5

Influence of NGOs on the World Bank

-

NGOs are limited to certain advice:

In the first decades of its existence, the Bank did not

pay much

attention

Since 1982,

however,

to

NGO

participation

in

its

projects.

there has been a policy dialogue be-

tween the Bank and NGOs through the NGO-Bank Committee which
is

composed

of

senior

Bank

managers

and

26

NGO

leaders,

170. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1990, page 2; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment 1992, page 1.
,

.
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about

three-fifth

of

tries. 171 As a result,

Bank-generated

the

latter

from

developing

coun-

NGOs increasingly succeed in making

information

accessible

for

the

public,

and

promoting popular participation in sustainability
decisions.
Between 1986 and 1991, NGOs participation in the annual

200

'

projects increased from 10 to 80 projects. 172
Meanwhile, the Bank has begun to collaborate with leading environmental NGOs in a variety of environmental activities,

for

example

together

they

have

published

"Conserving the World's Biological Biodiversity."

the
in

book
addi-

tion, a growing number of NGOs attend the annual meetings of

the Bank. 173
NGOs

have

provided

the

GEF

technical knowledge to identify,

ronmentally sound projects.

fund

with

review,

scientific

and

and prepare envi-

The fund implementing agencies

171. This dialogue may also be due to the oil crises in the
mid-70s, when the Bank started to aim at substantial flexibility with respect to changes in the economic environment.
As a consequence, there was growing dialogue and cooperation
between developing countries and the Bank; Husain, "The
World Bank and Economic Policy in Developing Countries,"
page 52.
172. Paul Handley and Anthony Rowley, "Pressure Politics,"
Far Eastern Economic Review
Vol.154, No. 47, November 21,
1991, page 67; Williams, "A growing role for NGOs in Development," pages 31, 33; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean
page 16; D. Joseph Wood, "The World Bank of Tomorrow: Policies and Operations," Recovering in the Developing World
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, First Annual Report,
1986), page 101; P. Haas, Levy, and Parson, "Appraising the
earth summit," page 31; Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF
in Sub-Saharan Africa," page 105.
.

,

.

173. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1991, pages 104, 105; The World Bank, The World Bank and the
Environment 1990, page 3.
,

.
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must hold a special NGO forum before
each biannual meeting.
Finally, Mohamed El-Ashry, a former NGO
lobbyist, directs
this department since July 1991. His new
policy makes public
disclosure of project information a requirement
for granting
Bank funds. 174
Due to the fact that the World Bank is still
a relatively closed organization, the author of this thesis
had to

obtain most

information on Bank politics relating to sus-

tainable development and NGO involvement from the World Bank
itself.

One

can

assume

that

the

organization would

never

publish the information that NGOs are not sufficiently in-

volved in World Bank's planning and decision-making: Thus it
is difficult to judge if NGO participation is currently more

than marginal. One rather critical perspective on the Bank's

attitude toward NGOs is presented by Professor Safei Hamed,
who occasionally counsels the World Bank as an Environmental

Planning

Specialist.

began in the

His

association with the

mid-eighties,

institution

and since then he has been in-

vited to attend some of their forums, conferences, and work

174. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1991, pages 104, 105; The World Bank, The World Bank and the
Environment
1990, page 3; Handley and Rowley, "Pressure
Politics," page 67; Williams, "A growing role for NGOs in
Development," pages 31, 33; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean page 16; Wood, "The World Bank of Tomorrow: Policies
and Operations," page 101.
.

.

.
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shops. He has never heard about NGO
involvement in projects
until 1992:

In fact I remember one occasion when
I was
asked to consult for the Bank and prepare a
study
to basically establish a regional environmental
agency for one of the Third-World-Countries that
when I suggested as part of my recommendation that
the governor of the Province will have an advisory
board from the University Community and also from
the NGOs, I remember that the Project Director refused that recommendation - he accepted the University Advisers to the governor and the new environmental agency, but not the NGOs. 175
-

NGOs are not included in areas where sustainability

concerns are not first priority:
Structural adjustment loans are still excluded from the
Bank's environmental

someone else
tal

-

assessments

-

neither by NGOs not by

though some of them have explicit environmen-

objectives.

have always been

This
a

important

is

insofar

these

as

loans

major issue of criticism with respect to

their failure to promote sustainability. 176
-

NGOs have no access to important meetings and infor-

mations; NGOs do not participate in important decisions:

Considering the fact that the World Bank is still con-

trolled by those who contribute most,

it is not astonishing

that NGO participation even today is restricted in many ar175.

Interview with Hamed.

Haas, From Theory to Practice 1992, page 40; Porter
and Brown, Global Environmental Politics pages 54, 55; The
World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment 1990, page
1992,
6; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
pages 20-24.
176.

P.

.

,

.

.
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eas,

for example NGOs do not attend World Bank Board
of Gov-

ernors

meetings.

Though NGOs attend the first day of GEF

committee meetings,

afterwards the

session

merely the final drafts are public. As
major

Bank donors

and

ecological rethinking,

recipients

a

closed,

is

and

matter of fact, the

still

refuse

profound

a

which would disrupt the flow of de-

velopment finance. 177
As a conseguence of such restrictions,

involved

in

watchdogs,

World

Bank's

exchanging

programs

and

and

projects

publicizing

World Bank activities. Additionally,

the major NGOs

work

information

as

about

NGOs can react to the

Bank's closure by extending their indirect influence on the

World Bank through UNEP or through governments participating
in the World Bank.

Third World Countries lacking resources

remain open to NGOs

and

depend

on

their assistance heav-

ily 178
- NGOs

tend to confront the organization and its pro-

grams:

Though the

analyzing

and

frequency of NGO participation

planning

has

increased,

the

main

in

project

impact

of

NGOs on the World Bank has been their criticism and even
open confrontation of some of the Bank's development projects on the environment. For example NGOs criticize the orHaas, From Theory to Practice
interview with Walubengo.
177. P.

From Theory to Practice
terview with Walubengo.
178. Haas,

97

.

.

pages 42,

43;

pages 42, 43;

in-

1992,

1992,

ganization's

support

of

large

development

projects,

cash

cropping,

and chemical-based agricultural development.
As a
consequence of such criticism, the focus of the
Bank has

started to

switch toward poverty and environmental

studies of Bank-supported economic policies.

impact

Primarily due

to the pressure of NGOs, the World Bank's Environmental
De-

partment since 1987 has been responsible for extensive environmental assessments of development proj ects

.

^

According to the results of chapters 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5,
the author concludes that the World Bank has a relatively

closed structure,

partment

.

Since

with exception of
the

late

changes have taken place,

1980s,

its

some

Environmental

deeper

De-

structural

which indicate that the Bank has

begun a very slow opening process right now.

3

.

6

Successes and Failures of the World Bank's Programs

The World Bank's structural-adjustment programs,

primarily
taken

focus

little

on

economic

account

growth,

social

of

and

have

until

environmental

which

recently
conse-

quences. The unlimited economic growth as facilitated by the

World Bank programs was not only accompanied by mass pauperization, but also by short-term ecological exploitation,

at

"Pressure Politics," page 67;
179. Handley and Rowley,
Aubrey Williams, "A growing role for NGOs in Development,"
pages 31, 33; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean page 16;
Wood, "The World Bank of Tomorrow: Policies and Operations,"
page 101.
,
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the expense of long-term environmental
protection and sustainable economic growth. This pattern of
growth included
the depreciation of present and future
natural resources.
Currently, the Bank's pressure on developing
countries to

reduce

their budgetary

deficits

forces

them to

draw down

their ecological capital even faster then they would
otherwise.

Developing countries even have to use structural ad-

justment loans in order to pay for imports they needed. That

way the structural adjustment money finally returns to the

World Bank instead of solving the long-term ecological and

socioeconomic problems. 180
The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project shows very well how the

lack of sustainable development considerations in the Bank's

policy harms people and the environment. Simultaneously,

it

reflects some recent changes in World Bank strategies toward

more environmentally sound strategies,

which in the future

may contribute to more success of World Bank projects. 181
The resettlement policies and programs,

activities,

and the environmental

rehabilitation

aspects of the Dam Pro-

180. Scientific American Magazine, Managing Planet Earth
(New York, New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1990)
pages
Adams,
the
IMF
in
Sub-Sa"The
World
Bank
and
134;
120, 121,
haran Africa," page 103;
A1 Gore, Earth in the Balance
(New York, New York: Penguin Books USA, 1993), page 191;
Stanley Please,
"Development Priorities for Sub-Saharan
Africa," Recovery in the Developing World (Washington, D.C.
The World Bank, 1986), page 109.
.

,

.

.

:

"World Bank admits mistakes over dam," page 4;
G. K. Helleiner, "The IMF, the World Bank and Africa's adjustment and external debt problems: an unofficial view,"
World Development Vol.20, No. 6, June 1992, page 780.
181. Miller,

.
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jects,

all of which are closely interconnected,

cern during the 1980s. As

a

roused con-

consequence, the World Bank it-

self has provided an independent and unsparing review
of its

projects for the first time. The Independent Review on
the
Sardar Sarovar Dam Projects in India has been carried out in
1991-1992 by Bradford Morse, administrator of the UNDP,

Thomas R. Berger,

a

and

Canadian lawyer concerned with environ-

mental and human rights issues. The Bank's effort in estab-

lishing the review, providing the authors with all necessary
documents,

and

engaging

in

the

frankest

discussions

with

them, might be an indicator of the organization's determina-

tion to understand its previous mistakes. The review inves-

tigates the social and environmental impacts of the projects
and identifies weaknesses in planning and implementation. 182

The Independent Review has identified weaknesses in the
Bank's appraisal of the projects,
mentation,

in

the borrower's

imple-

The performance

and in the Bank's supervisions.

of the projects has clearly failed to fulfill the demanded

policies and guidelines of the World Bank and the government
of India. 183

"World Bank admits mistakes over dam," page 4;
"The IMF, the World Bank and Africa's
Helleiner
adjustment and external debt problems: an unofficial view,"
page 780; Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar pages XI, XIV,
360-362; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1992, pages 4, 106.
182. Miller,

G.

K.

,

.

,

pages 349-353; The
183. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
Environment
1992, pages
the
and
Bank
World
The
World Bank,
.

.

104-106.

100

First of all

,

they did not study the appropriate
social

impacts of the projects and did not
provide the necessary
basic data. Thus, the social impacts of the
projects could
not be appropriately considered. In addition,
the Bank's
en-

vironmental

workplan,

loan agreements,

to

required
be

later postponed until

under

the

1985

developed by the end of
1989,

is

still

credit

and

1985,

and

not available.

These

failures have led to a disjointed piecemeal approach to en-

vironmental planning which is ineffective.

For example,

no

comprehensive environmental assessment has been made of the
canal and water delivery system in the command area,

which

could lead to serious problems with waterlogging and salinity.

There

is

evidence that sediment will

collect

at

the

head of the dam, causing dangerous flooding. 184
This lack of appropriate planning led to an inadequate

understanding of the nature and scale of resettlement. As

a

result of the dam project, 18,000 tribal people had to leave

their homes. The people potentially to be affected were not
consulted. 185 This lack of participation seems to be

a

gen-

eral World Bank problem. According to Patricia Adams,

Participation in decision making is by invitation only, and the public is barred from learning about Bank designs on their local environment
and Bank policies for their country's economy. Ul184. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar, pages 349-353; The
World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment 1992, pages
104-106.
.

349-351;
pages
Sardar Sarovar
Berger,
and
4.
page
over
dam,"
mistakes
Bank
admits
"World
Miller,
185. Morse

.
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timately, the riglit of all those
affected by World
Bank projects to a hearing, to sue
and to protect
their environment and their economy
remains nonexistent. 186

Even supposed World Bank

"experts"

often have

little

knowledge about the daily lives of their
constituencies, and
lack sufficient analysis of the full impact of
World

Bank

projects.

This lack of consultation resulted in opposition

to the project and created great obstacles to successful
im-

plementation of the resettlement. 187 The Bank and the Government of India failed to follow their own principles and

policies set out between 1980 and 1985, namely that oustees
should improve or at least regain their former standard of
living. Now, many farmers are rendered marginal or landless.

The mass migration in other areas

increased the likelihood

that they will participate in environmental exploitation. 188

These are just the basic failures,
added.

The

authors

of

the

review

and more could be

conclude that given the

negative experience in virtually each previous project with
a large resettlement component,

the Bank should have adopted

a more realistic estimate of how many people have to be and

can be resettled. 189
186. Adams,
"The World
Africa," page 105.

Bank

and

the

IMF

Sub-Saharan

in

187.
188.

Adams, "The World Bank and the IMF in Sub-Saharan
Africa," page 105; Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar pages
349-351; Miller, "World Bank admits mistakes over dam," page
.
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pages 349-353; The
189. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
Environment
1992, pages
World Bank, The World Bank and the
.

.

104-106.
102

Instead,

passu"

the

World

Bank

developed

("concurrently with construction")

to overcome these deficiencies.

so-called
studies

"pari

in

order

These studies undermine the

basis for environmental planning, because they
mean that appropriate environmental impact studies are not done prior
to
the

approval

struction.

of

This

the

projects,

but

concurrently with

greatly undermines the prospects

for

consus-

tainable development.^®®
So far,

the only positive result of the project seems

to be that where the canal has already provided water, agri-

culture has greatly developed. However, the people profiting
from

this

promised

-

seldom
but

are

land

local

landless

speculators,

families

influential

-

as

was

politicians,

and wealthy farmers. Thus, the dam projects increase the gap

between rich and poor,

(for the rich mainly profit from its

benefits, while the poor have to bear the losses)

come

clearly

does

not

correspond

to

the

.

This out-

definition

of

"sustainable development" as given in the first chapter of
this thesis. In addition, the dam involves an expenditure of

over Rs. 800 million to produce an initial firm power gener-

ator of 226 MW which will be reduced to 100 MW when irrigation commences

fully.

Compared with about Rs.

150

million

for a 100 MW thermal power station, the dam is an unjustifi-

ably costly way to produce power. The irrigation which will

result from this power generation is not justifiable either:
190. Morse and Berger,

Sardar Sarovar

103

.

pages XXI, 132, 134.

The project will irrigate 123,000 ha of land
by submerging
90,000, thus the expected increase in yields
(400-800 percent) are not realistic. Furthermore, over
138,000 people
will be displaced, over 41,000 ha of forests and
50,000 ha
of other land will

resources
lost.

,

be submerged,

and significant wildlife,

and sites of cultural importance will be

Though the project authorities

intend

to

compensate

for these losses, by means including afforestation, new pro-

tected areas for wildlife, and resettlement of the oustees,
however, even official sources admit that most of these com-

pensatory measures are insufficient. 191
Thus the Sardar Sarovar Dam Projects show

a

clear pref-

erence for economic and financial considerations at the ex-

pense of long-term social and ecological destruction. On the
whole, the overall costs clearly outweigh the overall benefits with respect to the promotion of sustainable develop-

ment as defined in chapter one. At the same time, the newly

emerged self-criticism of the Bank certainly is
"success"

of the project despite

its

failure

a

in

resultant
other as-

pects. World Bank President Lewis Preston himself has admitand Denys Trussell
(Editors)
The Social and Environmental Effects of Large
Dams
(Wadebridge, England: Wadebridge Ecological Centre)
pages 199, 201; further information in Environmental SerDams on the Narmada: The Official
vices Group (WWF-India)
View (New Delhi, India: Environmental Services Group, 1985);
Dams on the NarEnvironmental Services Group (WWF-India)
mada: A Peopled View (New Delhi, India: Environmental SerUwe Hoennig, Tapping Indian Water Revices Group, 1986)
Two Controversial Projects will bring Change to
sources
Millions (D+C, 5, 1986)
191. Edward Goldsmith, Nicholas Hildyard,
,

.

,

,

;

104

ted

that

the

project

failed

policies and guidelines.

to

correspond

to

World

Bank

He promised to react with special

remedial actions. Thus, the positive consequence
of the dam
constructions seems to be its certain learning affect

on the

World Bank and Indian government with respect to
sustainable
development.

After the very negative report of the

impact

assessment of the dam, the Bank decided to review its performance on larger dams. It decided to go ahead with sleight
changes,

that

however,

include

the

and

included

it

environmental

future

aspects

recommendations

of

dams

and

dam

ssfsty. The publication stresses the need for improved meth-

ods

of

financial

evaluation with respect to

environmental

and social costs of dam projects in monetary terms. Increasing attention is paid to improved resettlement procedures.

The Bank has appointed resettlement specialists in most of
its regional environmental divisions. The report also under-

lines the importance of an effective national and local en-

vironmental
time

institutions.

approved

a

$153

In

1991,

million

loan

the
and

Bank

for the

credit

to

first

the

Dam

Safety Project in India, aimed at strengthening the institution.

The project will also facilitate the use of improved

reassessment procedures
about 940

large dams

in

for

flood-handling capabilities of

four Indian states,

including the

funding of remedial efforts if necessary. Finally, the Bank

review "Dams and the Environment" draws the conclusion that

analysis early in the planning process often leads to pro-
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tective measures which in turn result in net
economic bene192
fits
.

However, the authors of the Independent Review
believe

that the Bank's incremental strategy to obtain
resettlement

compliance further undermines the success of the projects.
Instead, Morse and Berger recommend that the Bank uses
its

good offices to ensure the appropriate resettlement benefits
to the affected people. They criticize that the Bank contin-

ues to

focus on the reduction of environmental damage al-

ready done rather than avoidance of environmental destruction.

However,

so

far

it

seems

that

profit too much from such projects:

some

powerful

people

For politicians,

they

bring votes and international kudos, and for local contractors and foreign engineers, they mean money. 193
Finally,
Bank:

an

important

change

occurred

in

the

World

Due to the Indian government's refusal to accept any

more loans for the projects, the Bank definitively cancelled
192. Miller, "World Bank admits mistakes over dam," page 4;
Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar pages XI, XII; The World
Bank, The World Bank and the Environment 1990, pages 3, 31;
The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1991,
page 43; The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1992, page 4; interview conducted on January 16th in New
York with Nadia Saad, former employee in the World Bank's
Environmental Department.
.

.

.

.

193. Goldsmith, Hildyard, and Trussell (Editors), The Social
and Environmental Effects of Large Dams page 199; Morse and
Berger, Sardar Sarovar pages 349-351; P. Haas, From Theory
to Practice
1992, page 42; further information in Bharat
Dogra, "The Indian Experience with Large Dams," in Edward
The Social and
Goldsmith and Nicholas Hildyard (Editors)
Studies
Case
Dams:
Large
Effects
of
Environmental
Centre,
1986,
(Wadebridge, England: Wadebridge Ecological
Vol.2)
,

,

.

,

.

.
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its participation in 1993.

Additional positive consequences

of the Sardar Sarovar Dam Projects
are that the Bank has re-

cently

started

to

move

toward

more

environmentally

sound

policies in other fields. For example, it
suspended loans to
a colonization and road-building
program in the Amazon rain
forest until the Brazilian government sets
aside
land

reserves

for

indigenous people and wildlife.

advocated

leaving

projects.

Instead,

primary

forests

encourages

it

alone

in

borrowing

The

for

Bank has

deforestation
governments

to

cultivate crops with proper soil management. Other positive

developments in Bank projects include numerous agricultural
research stations around the world which focuses upon soil
and water management in fragile ecosystems. Thus, the World

Bank has focused more and more on environmental problems in

recent years, and increasingly supports sustainable develop-

ment

projects

"learning"

in

the

toward

more

Third

World.

sustainable

Insofar,

development

some

has

true

taken

place. 194

194. Marites Danguilan-Vitug, "People versus forests," Far
Eastern Economic Review Vol.155, No. 36, September 10, 1992,
page 55; Vig and Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s
page 297; Wood, "The World Bank of Tomorrow: Policies and
Operations," page 102; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics page 54.
.

,

,
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3

7

Successes and Failures of NGQs

1

Influence on the World

Bank's Programs
In the 1970s, NGOs began to
criticize World Bank policy

of large development projects instead
of those directly benefiting the poor. This criticism contributed
to the World

Bank's shift in focus toward improving
income contribution,
promoting rural development, and addressing
basic human
needs such as health, education, and family
planning,
all of

which are essential part of sustainable
development.

Since

the late 1980s, NGOs have increased their
impact on the Bank
with their criticism of specific projects and
general World

Bank policies and practices,

for example serious effects of

programs on the environment or the negative conseguence
of
programs,

such as displaced communities and poor resettle-

ment performance. Due to such criticism, the World Bank
and

other multilateral development banks

(

MDBs

)

have agreed to

adopt environmental assessment procedures as part of their

project
jects

cycles

to

support

sustainable

development

pro-

195

The Sardar Sarovar dam project exemplifies well the in-

fluence of NGOs on World Bank programs. India has a long

history of NGO participation, which is based on the Indian

195. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
page
54; Livernash, "The growing influence of NGOs in the developing world," page 15; Williams, "A growing role for NGOs in
Development," page 33; P. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean
page 16.
,

,
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tradition of community and
spiritual leadership, resulting
from the success of Mahatma
Ghandi. Given the lack of
state
welfare, Indian NGOs have worked
at many
levels of society,

from social services to local
economic development «« NGOs
try to fight poverty and
environmental depletion directly,
aiming at the development of
necessary mechanisms and bureaucratic procedures which achieve
accountability and recoverability of production loans,
addition, sustainable
small farmer organizations in the
Third World receive technical, financial, and educational
assistance from national
and international NGOs. 197
.

m

Due to these functions,

NGOs play an important role in

projects such as the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project.
They influence the dam project by provoking public
awareness
in

form of articles, books,

interviews,

the

for example, which were

extremely critical. From the beginning,

local NGOs stood in

opposition to the project, criticizing its negative
socioeconomic and ecological
Indian NGO

"Narmada

impact on the

Bachao Andolan"

region.

In

1988,

the

began to mobilize the

affected population in order to oppose the dam project. This

attracted the attention of other national and international
196. Accordingly, the Indian NGOs consist of a broad area of
professionals, for example agronomists, civil engineers,
economists, sociologists, lawyers.

197. David Barton Bray, "'Defiance' and the search for sustainable small farmer organizations," Human Organization
Vol 50
No. 2, Summer 1991, pages 126, 129, 130; Morse and
Berger, Sardar Sarovar page 131; Sattaur, "Greens in muddy
water over Indian dam," page 17.
.

.

,

.

109

NGOs,

who published

articles

and

monographs

on

the

dams'

negative environmental and social impacts. 198
The tireless efforts of NGOs have also
contributed to a
quicker resettlement policy. According to Morse
and Berger,
as a consequence of NGO pressure the rate
of resettlement
has quickened: Due to collaboration between Nigan
officials
and local

NGOs

such as Arch Vahini

Ashram, the identification of land,

tion by oustees,

and the Anand Niketan
its purchase and selec-

and many other aspects of the relocation

process increased in rate and effectiveness.

The NGOs used

their longstanding connections with the affected villages to

encourage acceptance of government policy and to begin the
process

of

land

selection.

Moreover,

stantly updating oustee lists,
the people who qualified

the

NGOs

were

con-

in order to ensure that

for the benefit package

all

actually

became officially eligible. They also designed housing sites
and accommodations and ensured that the resettlement process

was done

quickly,

accurately,

and without

corruption.

cording to the research done by Morse and Berger,

Ac-

without

198. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
pages 129, 131; Sattaur, "Greens in muddy water over Indian dam," page 17; interview with Saad; further reading in Ashish Kothari and
Shekhar Singh, The Narmada Valiev Project, A Critique
(Delhi,
India:
Kalpavriksh,
Baba Amte, Cry
The
1988)
Beloved Narmada
(Chandrapur,
Maharogi Sewa
Maharashtra:
Samiti, 1989); Vijay Paranjpye, "High Dams on the Narmada,"
Studies in Ecology and Sustainable Development (New Delhi:
Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, 1990,
No. 3); Pravin Sheth, Sardar Sarovar Project: Dynamics of Development (Ahmedabad, Gujarat: Vikas Bharati, 1991)
.

;
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.

this

support

of

the

NGOs,

the

resettlement process

would
have had disastrous social and
ecological consequences. 1
For example. Anil Patel's "Save
the Narmada movement"
initiated to work on resettlement and
rehabilitation

”

(RiR)

policy,

and was

believes that

it

later joined by other NGOs.
is

the

This movement

responsibility of NGOs to ensure

that the dam builders keep their promises
and that the poor
and not the wealthy farmers get the benefits.
As a result of
their long battle with the World Bank and the
Indian Government, the Gujarat state government has
implemented a unique
R&R policy. 200 According to Omar Sattaur,
Today, all heads of households in Gujarat who
are to be displaced by the SSP, are entitled
to 2
hectares of land of their choice, as are their
sons. The government bears the costs of moving
and subsistence until the first harvest. Landless
labourers forced to move out of the zone to be
submerged and people squatting on government land
are offered the same compensation. ^1

Finally,

the dam builders were so impressed that they

want to use the R&R policy as a future model for national
guidelines. This is an important move,
fact

that

development projects

in

if one considers the

India

are

estimated

199. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar

.

pages 129,

130.

200. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar

.

pages 129,

130.

to

201. Goldsmith, Hildyard, and Trussell (Editors), The Social
and Environmental Effects of Large Dams page 199; Sattaur,
"Greens in muddy water over Indian dam," page 17; further
information in Uwe Hoennig, Tapping Indian Water Resources
~ Two Controversial Projects will bring Change to Millions
,

.

(D+C,

5,

1986)

Ill

displace

million people every year. Thus
NGOs can increasingly influence World Bank
policy toward ecologically and
socially responsible development
with their criticism and
with their pragmatic offers of solutions.
Their strategies
have to be indirect, however: For
example, NGOs succeeded in
pressuring the Indian Government which
in turn refused
2

to

take any more loans from the World Bank
with respect to the
Sardar Sarovar Dam Projects. As a
consequence, the Bank

definitively

cancelled

its

participation

in

the

Sardar

Sarovar Dam Projects in 1993 20 ^
.

The increasing participation of NGOs in Bank
projects
not only diminished the failures produced, it
also encouraged the Bank to include NGOs to an even stronger
degree in

future projects with environmental
1992,

impact.

For example,

in

NGOs were involved in 66 of 222 projects approved by

the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. 76 percent of these

NGOs were either indigenous intermediary NGOs or grassroots

groups based in borrowing countries. 203
Nevertheless, NGOs also face difficulties in implementing their local

programs in the Third World.

For example,

their activities are often rejected by developing countries,
because

the

latter

fear

the

activists

might

indoctrinate

them with Western ideals. Moreover, NGOs face the danger of
202. Sattaur, "Greens in muddy water over Indian dam," page
17; interview with Ms. Perumalpellai-Essex

203. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1992, pages 106, 107, 123; The World Bank, The World Bank
and the Environment 1990, page 7.
.

.
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nepotism,

cratic

mistrust from their clientele,

structure

due

to

increasing

and

loss of demo-

bureaucratization

-

a

problem most growing organizations have.
In addition, though
NGOs can be effective at the level of
community mobilization
and policy design, their limited resources
do not allow them
to achieve all this for thousands of
families
spread across

several hundred villages,

or for the protection of the en-

tire ecosystem affected. Thus,
to ensure

the

it remains a major challenge

long-term rehabilitation of people,

and the

implementation of environmentally sound policy in the
World
Bank's programs and projects. 204

Bray, "'Defiance' and the search for sustainable small
farmer organizations," pages 131, 133, 134; Handley and Rowley, "Pressure Politics," page 66; Morse and Berger, Sardar
Sarovar, pages 129-131.
204.
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CHAPTER

4

COMPARISON OF UNEP AND THE WORLD
BANK

4

•

1

Differe nce in Outputs

When one compares the outcomes of
the projects of UNEP
and the World Bank, it becomes clear
that they have different strengths and weaknesses. The World
Bank so
far has had

the financial resources and political
power to implement its
programs, but neither the environmental
knowledge nor the
will to promote the environmental sustainability
of its projects adequately. On the other hand, UNEP's
main contribution is the thorough research and planning
of programs and
projects in favor of sustainable development, but
it often
lacks sufficient resources to implement them
adequately. Although UNEP is a major global environmental agency,
it never

had the power to force the implementation of the
international environmental agreements it has planned or promoted.

Many governments are suspicious of any international agency
that would impose limits on their industrial activity, espe-

cially in hard economic times. UNEP thus depends on voluntary cooperation.

Accordingly,

most of its statements lack

the binding status of treaties, which can make their imple-

mentation difficult. In short, the World Bank tends to fail
in sustainable development at the planning

level,

and UNEP

tends to fail in sustainable development at the implementa-

114

tion level. The World Bank's
strength is its economic power,
while UNEP's strength is its informative
205
power.

On the whole, though the successes
of both institutions

to

facilitate

environmentally

sound

development

have

been

limited,

UNEP is more successful than the
World Bank:
openness allows for more influence by
environmentally

its

sound

values and strategies of NGOs which promote
sustainable development - at least in the limited amount of
cases when the
implementation is successful. On the contrary,
most of the
World Bank's programs in the past - though
implemented have inhibited rather than promoted sustainable
development,

as the case study on Sardar Sarovar has shown.

Many of the

organization's programs and projects have even proved to be
counterproductive: They not only inhibited but actively de-

stroyed

the

economic

environment,

development

human

alike.

well-being,

This

results

and

from

long-term
the

World

Bank's closed structure and focus on economic profits, which
has

begun

to

open

only

recently.

According

to

Beth

and

Robert Yarbrough,
Thus in the United Nations and the UNEP,
which were already predisposed towards Third World
norms, the Third World has had some success in altering international norms on aid, public goods,
and the global commons; conversely, in the World
Bank and the IMF, where market-oriented principles

205. Vig and Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1990s
page
316; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
pages
Bennett,
52;
International Organizations
51,
page 297;
Pearce, "Japan's billions may bypass World Bank," page 545.
.

,

,
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dominated and where Third World leverage
was less
important, success has been much more
limited.
However,

this thesis has shown that the World
Bank is

able to open its structure and to change
its policy, if the
organization wants to promote sustainable development
more

seriously in the future,
takes:

it has to learn from its past mis-

The local population should play a central role
in

World

Bank's

knowledge

and

program

and

project

vulnerabilities

are

planning,

integral

because
to

any

local

under-

standing of the overall conditions. The Sardar Sarovar Projects have

shown that

even resolute determination to com-

plete projects quickly in order to accomplish the antici-

pated goal will fail to promote sustainable development. Instead, construction should be halted until the necessary so-

cial and environmental

impact studies are completed.

Then,

the projects could be finished according to the results of

such studies and adhere to the Bank's own policies and prin-

ciples 207
.

This does not mean, of course, that people can never be

required to resettle in favor of the national interest,

or

that it is generally wrong to promote economic growth. However, the Bank and the governments concerned have to respect

certain minimum conditions

according to

the

standards of human rights and environmental

international
impact assess-

206. Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough, "Cooperation
in the liberalization of international trade," International
Organization Vol.41, No.l, Winter 1987, page 26.
.

207. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar
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.

pages 355-357.

No unattainable levels are required,
but India should
use the same world-class standards
for social and environ-

merits.

mental

goals

as

it

uses

for

engineering

technology.

This

might include the possibility that
alternative projects
which do not cause compulsory relocation on
a

severe environmental consequences

-

-

large scale or

have to be found. 208 Ac-

cording to Morse and Berger,
The Bank must ensure that in projects it decides to support the principles giving priority to
resettlement and
environmental protection
are
faithfully observed. This is the only basis for
truly sustainable development. 200

Without

integration

of

social

and

environmental

con-

cerns from the beginning, they become costly and burdensome
add-ons.

Thus,

in

the

project assessments

an

future the Bank should make ex ante

obligatory part of

its

operational

directives. This investment of time and specialized personnel,

including local studies and consultation, will eventu-

ally pay off. This learning process has already started. 210
The changes which have already occurred in UNEP and the

World Bank should not be underestimated.

Due to its recep-

tive structure, UNEP has been somewhat successful on the international, national, and local level promoting sustainable

development.

One must

be

aware

that UNEP

is

much younger

208. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar

.

pages 355-357.

209. Morse and Berger,

Sardar Sarovar

.

page 358.

210. Morse and Berger, Sardar Sarovar

.

page 354.
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than the World Bank, thus has less
experience with success—
ful implementation mechanisms.
UNEP has had certain successes in the form of agreements and
conventions, which have
promoted environmentally sound development
in

the

form

of

small-scale projects or at least of increased
public discussion on the issue. Though the World Bank is
much less receptive than UNEP, it has managed to open its structure
to some
degree in recent years, resulting in initiating the
process

toward more sustainable development

4

.

2

Role of Structure

The most

important difference between UNEP and World

Bank is their receptivity to outside influence reflected by
the

different

degree

of

the

openness

structures. While in the case of UNEP,

of

their

operating

power is shared be-

tween the Executive Director, the Governing Council, and the

Environmental Coordination Board, in the World Bank power is

concentrated at the top.

The hierarchical

most decision power to the director and

a

structure

gives

small board of di-

rectors at the second level of decision-making. In addition,
the Director of the World Bank is elected by the Board of

Governors (which has traditionally endorsed the US nominee)
and not,

as

in the case

of UNEP,

This makes him more independent
211.

Interview with Walubengo.
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-

by the General Assembly.

but it also seems likely

that the

economists will

elect

someone whose

focus

is

on

economic growth rather than on sustainable development.
UNEP's greater degree of openness makes it easier
for
NGOs to gain access to the organization for the more
people
7

are

sharing power

in

an

organization,

the

greater

the

is

likelihood that among them are some who are willing to support and strengthen the role and ideas of NGOs. In an orga-

nization with hierarchical structure,

on the contrary,

one

would expect that the people at the top are afraid of letting

any

external

influences

gain

access:

This

would

threaten the continued existence of this power structure and
the privileges of the top executives.

Similar arguments are true for most of the other institutional differences distinguishing UNEP's openness from the

World Bank's relative closure. For example in case of UNEP,
the

main

function

of

the

executive

head

is

coordination.

This means that he is used to listening to many opinions
an

attitude

which

increases

the

likelihood

that

those

-

of

NGOs are among them. UNEP is divided in many parts which are

interconnected,

and the organization maintains contacts to

other organizational units. This means that NGOs have additional opportunities to make themselves heard through these

parts and units. The same argument is true for the fact that
in the case of UNEP,

membership is open to all UN members,

and decisions rather depend on coordination and compromise.
The World Bank's closed structure not only makes wide-

ranging

reforms

difficult,
119

but

also

keeps

NGOs

and

their

wide-ranging reform proposals outside of the
organization.
The strong time-constraints for decision-making
prevent the
World Bank's decision-makers from listening
to a variety of
proposals - including NGO proposals - because
they

simply

lack the time to do it. The lesser degree of transparency
in
the World Bank hinders NGOs to appropriately
criticize
and

control the organization already at the planning stage
of

programs and projects. The locus of organizational power is
important insofar as more "Northern" NGOs can attend World
Bank meetings

and more

UNEP's meetings

-

"Southern"

NGOs

can participate

in

simply for financial and geographical rea-

sons. Given the fact that Southern NGOs are the ones mainly

concerned with issues of sustainable development, they have
more difficulties to gain access to the World Bank than to
UNEP.

Similar conclusions between the

structure

of

the

two

organizations and the likelihood of NGOs to gain access to
them can be drawn with respect to their financial structure.
The relative budgetary autonomy of the World Bank does not

require it to listen to anybody else than its few financial
donors

-

which hardly happen to be NGOs.

The same

is

true

for the World Bank's voting procedure, which is based on the

amount of

financial contribution.

autonomy,

on the other hand,

UNEP's limited budgetary

makes the realization of its

programs and projects dependent on the support of voluntary

contributions and other financial sources from

120

a

broad vari-

ety of sponsors. This increases the
likelihood that NGOs or
sponsors favoring their ideas are among them.

An additional difference between the two
organizations
is the amount of money they have available: The
World Bank's
extensive resources have allowed it to bestow or
withdraw

money to a much greater extent than any other IGO, thus
making it a powerful

policy.

instrument for the implementation of its

It not only has an enormous lending budget in com-

parison to UNEP, but also has considerably increased its financial sources over the last decades. UNEP, by contrast, is
not a funding agency and has a very small budget,

pending

on

the

governments.

good will

of

agencies,

thus de-

organizations,

and

The different amount of money the World Bank

and UNEP have available indicates the different structure of
the two IGOs and the different degree of access which NGOs

can gain:

It

can be

assumed that clients

and donors

will

only contribute a large amount of money when they know that

they have considerable

influence to decide

for which

pur-

poses this money is used. Consequently, they will refuse to

contribute large amounts of money to an organization whose
open structure and strong NGO influence promotes democratic
and unpredictable decision-making.

However,

despite

UNEP's

financial

disadvantages,

the

analysis of this thesis has shown the many advantages which

UNEP's structure has for strong NGO influence and the promotion of sustainable development in comparison to the World
Bank. An exception is,

for example,
121

that the World Bank can

pursue much quicker and more decisive
strategies and policy
implementations than UNEP. UNEP s open
structure
and

'

cat-

alytic function, though facilitating
democratic and reasonable decisions,
have the disadvantage that the
negotiation
and implementation process takes much
more time.
UNEP's

broad receptivity has created a degree of
power and influence distribution that resulted in a lack of
authoritative
leadership. In addition, while the UNEP Governing
Council

members are elected on a staggered basis
only,

for

three

World Bank Governors can hold the power for

years
a

long

time,

which gives the latter institution more stability
in
decision making and more continuity in values and strategies.

Thus UNEP seems to have difficulties in protecting itself

from

disturbing

external

influences.

Critics

therefore argue that UNEP's open structure,
broad diversity of NGOs involved, leads to

could

especially the
a

lack of deci-

siveness. However, the second case study has shown that the

World Bank's

structural

advantages

decisions and implementations

development

2

-

-

especially the

quick

rarely promote sustainable

12

.

Thus for the future,

the challenge

for both organiza-

tions will be to find a degree of openness which allows for
NGO input and thus sustainable development while encouraging

donor support.
212.

lenge

It

seems that UNCED tried to react to this

The World Bank and the Environmental Chalpage 12; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," page 57.

Le Prestre,
.
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problem: In Chapter 38 of Agenda 21, UNEP is
charged with an
enhanced and strengthened role. The organization is
advised
to focus on an action-and-results oriented approach,
and the

article

emphasizes

the

managerial

style.

structural

weaknesses,

necessary
least,

price

UNCED

If

for

necessity
should

maybe
open,

to

they

establish

fail

to

have

democratic

a

top-down

correct

to

be

UNEP's

accepted

decision-making.

when agreement is reached in UNEP,

real

as

At

change has

taken place toward more sustainable development. 213
The

World

structure

Bank'

has

to

open

to

a

much

stronger degree and to strengthen the role of NGOs within
the organization in order to facilitate sustainable development.

Optimists

believe

that

this

is

not

too

unlikely,

pointing out the increasingly good cooperation between the
two agencies, especially in the GEF, where UNEP is the sci-

entific core agency and the World Bank the "manager". On the

other hand,

Scientist
(KENGO)

,

at

pessimists
Kenya

such

Energy

as

and

Louis

Kang'ethe,

Environment

Research

Organizations

point out that as long as the World Bank does not

change its underlying values, the influence of NGOs will not
be sufficient to realize true change toward sustainable de-

velopment in the World Bank. 214
213.

lenge

The World Bank and the Environmental Chalpage 12; Imber, "Too Many Cooks," page 57.

Le Prestre,
.

more information
214. Interviews with Walubengo and Mwani;
on the issue in Louis Kang'ethe, "Definition of Desertification," in Manu, Chris (Editor), Resources (Nairobi, Kenya:
KENGO, Vol.4, No. 2, 1993), pages 5-6.
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The results of this thesis with
respect to World Bank
and UNEP can be generalized: An
organization which wants to
be successful with respect to the
promotion of sustainable
development should aim at the establishment
of a relatively
open structure. At the same time, it
should avoid UNEP's
mistakes of too much openness as analyzed in
order to avoid
lack of chaos as well as financial support.

4

•

3

Role of Values and Strategies

As

pointed

out

chapters

in

two

and

three,

found a compromise between the two ideologies

and socioeconomic concerns

-

-

UNEP

ecological

combined in the author's defi-

nition of "sustainable development." In the World Bank,
the contrary,

was

It

founded as

an

economic

institu-

exclusively aimed at economic growth. Even today, the

environmental department is merely
and

on

for a long time the ideology of economic lib—

era li- sm prevailed.
tion,

has

it

facts

is

led

dependent
to

a

on

the

a

Bank's

small part of the Bank,

overall

policy.

subordination of environmental

These

protection.

Though the environmental department and the overall Bank activities toward more sustainable development have recently
been extended, these efforts remain small in comparison with
the

broad

contacts

and

environmental

activities

of

UNEP,

which has already been founded with an exclusive focus on
the environment. In addition, the economic benefits at which

the

Bank

aimed

seldom

reached
124

the

Poor

-

as

originally

planned

-

but rather served to maintain and enrich
the World
Bank, its donors, and the governments of
the countries concerned. The Sardar Sarovar case study has shown
that very
well. It seems that the World Bank until
recently has
doubted the possibility to reconcile environmental
protec-

tion and economic development

-

at the expense of the envi-

ronment and, in the long run, of the economy.
These differences in the concept of sustainable development, in combination with the other differences in organi-

zational structure already analyzed

—

led to differences in

the degree of access which NGOs can gain in the organiza-

tions

.

Due to the fact that most NGOs share the same values as

UNEP and define sustainable development in

a

similar way,

the organization is more likely to listen to their advice

than the World Bank. The ideology of global interdependence,
the cross-cutting strategies and wide-ranging linkage of issues,

the emphasis on monitoring and consciousness-raising,

and the increase of consensual knowledge also make it rela-

tively easy for NGOs to gain access,

because for organiza-

tions with these preferences it is an advantage to listen to
as

many

opinions

as

possible,

from experienced NGOs. As

a

especially

consequence,

those

to

NGOs

'

coming

major influ-

ence on UNEP takes place on the planning level of the orga215. UNEP seems to see less conflicts between environment
and development than the World Bank; Tolba, "UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive Director," page 1153.
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nization s programs and projects. Some
NGOs also participate
in the implementation of programs and
projects which
'

facili-

tate sustainable development. However,

their involvement on

this level is not as important for the promotion
of sustainable development, because they have already
managed to in-

corporate most of their values and strategies in the
organization's planning level.
In case of the World Bank,

the preferred values of sta-

bility and predictability inhibit the fundamental changes in
World Bank policy as proposed by NGOs. As explained in chapter 1.1, an organization which copes with problems by shifting its strategies instead of its underlying values wants to

protect itself

from disturbing

external

factors

-

thus

it

will feel endangered by NGOs and their proposals of funda-

mental

change.

Though there have been

World Bank's strategies over the decades

some
-

shifts

in

the

the more liberal

McNamara years as compared to the more conservative Reagan
years - and some true value change has taken place toward

sustainable development,
superficial,

rather

most of the shifts so

focussing on damage

far

remain

reduction than on

long-term environmental and socioeconomic planning. 216 As
consequence,

NGOs'

a

major influence on the World Bank takes

place on the implementation level of the organization's programs and projects. Some NGOs also participate in the plan216. For example with respect to the McNamara years; Leslie,
The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing
Countries page 26.
.

126

rung of programs and projects,

Bank

Committee;

but

their

for example in the NGO-World

involvement

mostly restricted to some advice

-

on

this

level

is

for the reasons mentioned

above.

UNEP is in a different situation,

for the organization

has always believed in the value of sustainable
development.
Therefore, the organization's shift in strategies
simply
point out its efforts to approach its basic value
most effectively. This might be a major reason for the change
from
the concrete sectorial efforts in the 1970s and the
focus on

science and monitoring in the 1980s. 217
Finally,

it

is

the

"learning"

likely

that

point

of

the

UNEP's

implicit

mission

founding

of

supports

from external knowledge sources such as NGOs as

part of the organization's character. The World Bank's es-

tablished implicit mission of "adaptation," on the contrary,
forces the organization to interpret NGO influence as dan-

gerous to this mission, thus the organization tends to fight
NGOs and their values of sustainable development. Though
recent years

positive

and NGOs increased,

interactions between the World

it is questionable

if their

in

Bank

involvement

is strong enough to be called cooperation or even collabora-

tion.

Due to this systematic exclusion of external factors,

217. Scientific American Magazine, Managing Planet Earth
pages 74, 75, 121; Bennett, International Organizations
pages 297, 298; Le Prestre, The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge pages 12, 13, 61; Husain, "The World Bank
and Economic Policy in Developing Countries," page 49.
,

,

,
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NGOs will have to fight very hard to
gain more influence in
the future - as can be seen in the
case of the Sardar

Sarovar Dam Projects.

According to the results of this thesis,

some general

conclusions can be drawn with respect to the best kind
of
NGO involvement within an organization for the
promotion
of

sustainable

development.

NGOs

will

be

most

successful

if

they gain access to an organization already at the planning
stage,

because at this stage the most important decisions

are made.

In addition,

plementation
avoid

to

stage

get

is

involved

Then they risk to be

worst damage as

a

their advice and support at the imvery
in

useful.

the

However,

NGOs

should

implementation

stage

alone:

restricted to the prevention of the

consequence of

a

lack of sustainability

already at the planning stage.

4

.

4

Role of NGOs

As will be shown in this chapter, the structural frame-

work for the role NGOs play in an organization is an additional

-

and the most obvious

-

indicator for the likelihood

that their ideas of sustainable development gain appropriate
access
UNEP,

to

NGOs

the

organization.

work

actively

For

within

example,
the

in

the

organization

case

of

through

lobbying, while in the World Bank, they are limited to giving some advice - especially through the NGO-World Bank Com-

mittee. UNEP includes NGOs in all areas, while in the World
128

Bank they have no possibility to participate in the planning
of structural adjustment programs. NGOs have access to most
of UNEP's

are

important meetings

refused this

right

and

case

in

informations,
of

the

World

while
Bank.

they

These

three differences show the much greater possibilities NGOs

have to integrate their ideas in UNEP's decisions than in
the Bank's decisions.

Though in both organizations NGOs do not directly par-

ticipate in important decisions, NGOs participate indirectly
in UNEP decisions by lobbying actively.

The very fact that

they have done so and still do indicates their positive ex-

perience with this lobbying

- an

experience NGOs have seldom

made within the World Bank. Finally, the fact that NGOs cooperate with UNEP proves that their influence reaches

a

much

more far-reaching level of decision making than in the case
of the World Bank. NGOs which have to focus on confrontation

signalize that they are excluded from all or most important
steps of planning and implementation within the World Bank.
The only way they can promote sustainable development within
the organization is to fight the fact that exactly the opposite is happening.
The strategic difference between confrontation and co-

operation as explained above is also likely to be the reason
why it was impossible to find two case studies of NGO in-

volvement on the same level of comparison. While most NGOs
are

able

to

influence UNEP already

tional planning level

-

at

the

early

interna-

thus promoting sustainable develop129

ment at the earliest and most effective stage

-

their influ-

ence on the World Bank is mainly limited to
confrontations
at the local level of the Bank's policy implementation. 218

To sum up, NGOs are involved to a much larger degree
in

UNEP than in World Bank activities. This is the major reason
why the promotion of sustainable development is much more
successful in UNEP than in the World Bank.

Though the author of this thesis has been able to in-

vestigate the influence of NGOs on UNEP and the World Bank,
she was not able to obtain considerable information on the

kinds of NGOs involved in the promotion of sustainable de-

velopment according to the characterization in chapter 1.3.
Thus she can only speculate about them and their possible
role in the future:
The Independent Report by Morse and Berger shows that

most NGOs actively involved in the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project are working on the local level, thus it is likely that

they

are

grassroots

and

service

NGOs.

At

same

the

time,

these local NGOs from the Third World also seem to be the

main activists at the INCD. 219 As the research in earlier
chapters shows, in both case studies local NGOs

-

though be-

ing from different continents and involved in different pro-

gram levels

218.

-

Interview

seem to share the same values of sustainable

with

Walubengo.

219. A complete list of all NGOs involved in both case studies in appendix B.
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development. This makes the comparison of the
two case studies easier.
Due to the importance of local grassroots and
service

NGOs

in

the two case

will play the same

-

studies

it

can be

assumed that they

or an even stronger - leading role in

the future. Their strong influence is reasonable insofar
as
the promotion of sustainable development is the main field

their concern and experience. At the same time,
is that

a

problem

these local Southern NGOs often lack the financial

resources

to

attend

national

international

conferences

on

sustainability concerns. Thus in the future it is important
that they increase their cooperation with rich international

Northern NGOs and coalitions of these NGOs. That way,

they

could not only get stronger financial assistance, but could
also try to "lobby" their opinions and propositions on sus-

tainability through these international (thematic) NGOs. For
example,

international

NGOs

located

in

the

United

States

could then attend all important NGO-World Bank meetings and

push forward the arguments of Southern NGOs. Northern NGOs

would also profit from this strategy, because sustainability
is

based on so many interconnected problems that it is of

global importance in the long run.

Southern

NGOs

should

identify

and

emphasize

their

shared points of view which will strengthen their position
in

favor

of

sustainable development.

identify and use the differences,

Northern NGOs

divisions,

should

and conflicts

of the industrialized countries to their advantage. The big131

ger the overall number of Northern and Southern NGOs and
the

stronger their unity,

the more they can influence IGOs and

governments toward sustainable development. 220
The case study on the INCD has shown

limitations

-

—

despite certain

the strong influence of NGOs on UNEP and their

promotion of

sustainable development.

They

are

clearly

of

increasing importance in raising awareness of environmental
and development issues and accordingly influence UNEP's values and strategies, by encouraging the IGO to push other in-

stitutions to become more responsive to sustainability concerns. This process is mutually enforcing,

because the more

legal participation rights NGOs have, the more they can in-

fluence

sustainable

tional,

and

local

development

level.

In

on

the

addition,

international,

na-

their increased

in-

volvement seems to convince UNEP and its participating governments of their usefulness,

resulting

in

the

support of

even more NGO involvement in the future. This positive de-

velopment not

only

with the World Bank
lesser degree,

occurs with
-

respect

to

UNEP,

but

though in the latter case to

given the more

a

much

restricted possibilities

external influence there. According to Professor Hamed,
The more knowledge on the World Bank is coming out, the more NGOs will be able to understand
the mechanism of the World Bank and either interact with it or know whom to complain to or how to
influence a decision. 221
220.

Interviews with Mwani, Hill, and Walubengo.

221.

Interview with Hamed.
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also

of

It remains to predict that the more the
World Bank will

open its structure on the planning level,

the stronger NGO

influence will be. This interactiveness in turn will
promote
an even stronger NGO involvement, allowing the values

and

strategies of sustainable development to show their true viability.

The increase in number and importance of NGOs is likely
to continue the trend of the last 20 years.
rood's

successful,

In order to be

their lessons learned during the negotia-

tions to prepare the INCD should be integrated into future

considerations.

For example,

general statements and princi-

ples should only be presented at the beginning of

a

confer-

ence. Afterwards, the detailed legal work is of much greater

importance. NGOs have to be aware that they have a right to

participate in UNEP and World Bank programs, and not only as
observers.

It

is also necessary

for NGOs to understand the

larger dynamics of such meetings,

for example some kind of

group is needed to monitor and analyze the positions of gov-

ernments as they evolve. 222 According to Tony Hill,
Above all, it is essential now that you have
really strong working groups that are looking at
the details of the text and making the textual
amendments you would like to see. 223
It is not sufficient to listen to what governments say,

but to engage them in discussions between negotiation ses222.

Interview with Hill.

223.

Interview with Hill.
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sions to understand and influence what they think.
Even more
important for NGOs is to influence the national
delegations
in their countries between the negotiation sessions.
This is
a

difficult

task,

however,

normally sworn to secrecy.

because

these

governments

are

Another future difficulty to be

overcome will be the possible rejection by developing countries. According to Wangu Mwangi, NGOs should not fight with

governments, but should operate in cooperation,

for example

to help governments with their expertise. The interviews of

the author with NGOs and government representatives in New

York have shown that there already is increased NGO-govern-

ment cooperation in countries of the Third World. In the future, NGOs should use their possibilities to promote the im-

plementation of sustainable development to an even stronger
degree by sharing their local experience with the respective
local officials.

The long-term aim is to obtain government

commitments to work with NGOs as partners. When governments

depend on NGO expertise in form of community work, for example,

they will allocate funds to them.

If

governments and

NGOs work together, they can combine the best contributions
of both:

Governments can profit from the criticism of well-

informed and independent NGOs.

At the

same time,

NGOs can

profit from the absence of bureaucratic duties and of too
much integration in

burden

them

However,

and

a

governmental system, which would over-

inhibit

their

concentration

and

purpose.

both sides should avoid becoming too dependent on

the other:

NGOs have to be aware of the dangers of corrup134

tion.

They

should

strategies,

always

and purposes

velopment.

This

is

the

try

to

maintain

in promoting true

advantage

of

the

their

values,

sustainable derather

critical

"watchdog position" of the NGOs dealing with the World Bank.
Here the NGOs involved are not in as much danger of losing

their

aim

sustainability

of

as

are

NGOs

cooperating with

IGOs and governments. 224
For promotion of sustainable development in the future,

some NGOs have shown how more successful management of re-

sources can be achieved. Of special importance is the flexible

learning

process

approach

which

allows

projects

to

change course, predominance of people's priorities, and secure rights and gains for the Poor. At the desertification

conference it was made clear that in order to fight desertification,

global

true

partnership

necessary.

is

This

may

prove true also for the promotion of sustainable development
relevant

in general.

All

World Bank,

GEF,

ment,

as

well

institutions such as UNEP,

UNDP,

and the Committee on Sustainable Develop-

as

grassroots,

service,

and

thematic

NGOs

should be brought together in a focused working interactive
process. 22 5

224. Morse and

Berger,
Hill.
and
with Mwani

Sardar Sarovar

.

page

131;

interview

225. Goree, Mwani, and Saini (Editors), "Report of the Workshop 'Listening to the People: Social Aspects of Dryland

Management'", page
pages 19, 20.

1;

Toulmin,
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"Combatting Desertification,"

Point

8

(5.)

of the NGO statements

be an important

challenge for the future:
In envisioning implementing tools,
essary, subject to the national legal it is necspecif icitle ® of ® ach individual state, to
recognize legal
eff ctive and timely participation
of
Tndwfn
dl dUal
a ™»? NGOs ln the domestic application
?
Ii
i2
of the adopted Convention.
Such legal rights
should enable citizen groups and NGOs to
fully cooperate with Governments in the real
development
and enforcement of the Treaty provisions
and its
domestic legislation. 26

T

NGOs must become involved in the legal details
in order
to reinforce their legal status, and thus to
improve their
knowledge on international law and affairs. They have
to be

aware that according to the UN Charter of Human Rights,
they

have the legal right to be heard and to vote,

because NGOs

represent the interests of the "people." 227
Today,

about 80 percent of the NGOs are still dealing

with social

and

environmental

aspects

of

agricultural

and

rural development. 228

226. NGO

interventions at the Second Session of INCD

.

page

5.

227.

Interview with Saad.

228. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1991, pages 104, 105; The World Bank, The World Bank and the
Environment 1990, page 3.
.

.
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4

.

5

Alternative Theories

The author of this thesis has interpreted the results
of her research

terms of

in

institutionalism.

She

is

well

aware of possible limitations of her approach. There appears
to be a direct connection between the increasing influence
of NGOs

other

and

changes

factors

Changes

in

the World

in

could

be

strategies

the

and

cause

Bank and UNEP.
of

structures

this

might

However,

relationship.
also

have

oc-

curred in the absence of NGO influence. 229

tive
and

In chapter

1.2,

approaches

of

the author has explained the alterna-

incrementalism.

neorealism,
In

group

addition,

theory,

rationalism,

alternative

explanations

have been mentioned which are not part of a particular theory but may be important. The following paragraphs will as-

sess

the

outcome

of

this

thesis

from

the

perspective

of

these alternative theoretical approaches and explanations.
A neorealist would support the idea that the strong po-

litical and financial influence of the United States is the

major cause for the refusal of the organization to let external

factors such as NGOs gain influence.

The USA could

even be responsible for the closed structural framework es-

tablished at the point of the World Bank's founding; in this
For example changes in McNamara years, which were followed by the creation of some new departments in the World
Bank and could be due to the loss of its original function
after the war, to international economic growth, or to increasing power of Third World Countries.
229.
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case,

the

scene"

country would be the

from

the

beginning,

driving

responsible

force
for

"behind

the

the

structural

framework analyzed in this thesis. A slightly different neorealist explanation would point out the donor and recipient
interests as being hostile to the idea of sustainable devel-

opment in the World Bank, fearing for a loss of their money
and political influence.

tive results

In the same way,

environmental

of

positive or nega-

projects such as the Sardar

Sarovar Dam Project in India may not be due to NGO involveExternal

ment.

factors

such

the

as

powerful

influence

of

other governments may have been the most important factor.

Another reason for change toward more environmental protection might have been the pressure by Senator Robert Hasten
and the US Congress, threatening US vetoes of Bank projects
and

refusal

to

promotion

of

the

strong

allocate

Similarly,

funding.

sustainable

development

could

UNEP's
be

the

consequence of a lack of influence of one powerful actor or
a

dominant group in the organization.

Institutionalists can counter the neorealist approach
in different ways.

They can either argue that the possibil-

ity to exert powerful pressure on an organization is in it-

self a

consequence of certain structural

frameworks.

This

leads to the question: What was first: Power or structure? A

second argument would be that in some cases powerful actors
inside

and

outside

the

organization

NGOs, thus working as NGOs' mediators.

can

be

influenced

For example,

by

Senator

Hasten got most of his information about the Bank's failures
138

to promote sustainable development from two
American NGOs:

The Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural
Resources Defense Council. Institutionalists would also argue
that the

importance of NGOs in the World Bank can be seen by appoint-

ment of former NGO member Mohamed El-Ashray as head of the
Environmental Department. 230
Group theory would underline that the different success
of

sustainable development in World Bank and UNEP and the

recent opening of the World Bank's structure have resulted
from a group equilibrium and from changes in this equilibrium.

For example,

group theorists would refer to the fact

that the World Bank definitively cancelled its participation
in the Sardar Sarovar Dam Projects in 1993 - due to the fact

that the Indian Government had lost its interest in the project and thus refused to take any more loans from the Bank.
In the same way,

the policy outcome of the INCD could have

been shaped by an equilibrium of interests of all parties
and governments involved in the negotiation process

-

in fa-

vor of sustainability.
Institutionalists can counter group theory by arguing
that the group interests and changes of these interests sim-

ply reflect the different degree of NGO influence on these
groups.

For example

in

case

of

the

INCD,

the

second case

study shows how NGOs managed to bring their own ideas into

230.

P.

Haas, From Theory to Practice

139

.

1992,

page 38.

the draft of the Convention - indirectly, that means through

skillful lobbying of the governments concerned.
A rationalist would support the idea that as countries

polluted or used up their mineral resources, forests, soils,
lakes,

stream,

and wildlife,

and the capital

cline as well as the economy,

began to de-

the Bank and its officials

became convinced that the promotion of sustainable develop-

ment was the most reasonable reaction for the Bank's prosperity

well

as

as

for

the

well-being

of

the

people

con-

cerned. The Bank could also have decided itself to open its

structure to NGO influence: World Bank money often goes into

private pockets in the countries concerned, and incompetent
administrations, rulers or belligerent regimes who are neither well
cess,

equipped nor sympathetic to the democratic pro-

therefore

often disrupting projects.

It

is

possible

that the World Bank concluded after 40 years of such experience that if $1 million of money are allocated to NGOs,

90

percent of it will go to the right place, but if allocated
to

governments,

only

25

percent would

be

well

spent.

The

positive experience with such NGO collaboration could further have facilitated an opening of the Bank's structure to-

ward NGOs. 231
Institutionalists

can

counter

rationalism

by

arguing

that it was the fact that NGOs criticized the Bank and mobi"The World Bank and the IMF in Sub-Saharan
page 10;
Africa," page 100; Ayres, Banking on the Poor
Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in D e^
velopinq Countries page 3; interview with Hamed.
231. Adams,

,

,
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lized public opinion which

initially caused IGO actors to

about past Bank failures and to draw the appropriate

conclusions.

In the same way,

the ease of NGOs to gain ac-

cess to UNEP could have been used by UNEP's actors to profit
for their decisions from NGO advice rather than drawing con-

clusions based on their own experience.

Incrementalism

involves

certain

a

rationality

of

IGO

actors, thus it is relatively similar to the rationalist ap-

proach.
gence,

Differences

are

the

constraints

of

and costs in case of incrementalism.

talists would

argue

that

the

slow

time,

intelli-

Thus

incremen-

opening

the

of

Bank's

structure was based on past negative experiences of IGO actors with respect to the closed structure of their organiza-

Though the actors understood that the exclusive eco-

tion.

nomic

inhibited

focus

sustainable

development,

the

con-

straints mentioned above made it difficult for the Bank to
change

its

structures

quickly.

In

the

same

UNEP's

way,

strategic shifts over the years can be explained in terms of
incrementalism.

Institutionalists can counter incrementalism in

a

simi-

lar way as rationalism. They can argue that the step-by-step

changes are rather due to NGO influence on IGO actors than
to the decision of these actors themselves.

Finally, some counterarguments to the structuralist ap-

proach are not part of any particular theory.
hand,

factors

such

as

the

global

economic

On the

situation

one
or

events such as the oil crises might have had considerable
141

influence

on

the

promotion

of

sustainable

development

as

well. Accordingly, in the future development
issues might be
of stronger importance than environmental
issues, because
nations struggling for short-term economic survival
tend to
ignore long-term sustainability concerns. Alternatively,

difficult political situations

-

such as the collapse of the

former Soviet Union or the conflicts in the Middle East

-

may have diverted attention from the promotion of sustainable development. 232 A different explanation is that instead
of NGOs,

other external factors such as the public in gen-

eral may have been the most important factor of conscious-

ness-raising toward the promotion of

sustainable

develop-

ment. According to Professor Hamed,

We do not know really whether there is genuine or defensive mechanism because there has been
a lot of criticism [of World Bank projects] and
the new administration and the new President felt
that having public relations campaign is important. 233

However,

this thesis has tried to prove that the most

important driving force with respect to the changes in World
Bank

and

UNEP

are

the

emerging

power

and

perspective

of

NGOs. The author has tried to illuminate in this thesis that

the positive

structural

changes

in

the

World Bank and

in

pages
232. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics
"UNEP - 1991 Annual Report of the Executive
50, 51; Tolba
Director," page 1164.
,

,

Interview with Hamed
interviewed in appendix B.

233

.

;
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a

complete

list of all

people

UNEP toward more openness are effectively
due to NGO pres
sure and influence. 234

234. The World Bank, The World Bank and the Environment
1992, pages 37, 38; also read P. Haas, From Theory to Practice 1992, pages 42, 43.
,

.
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APPENDIX A
FIGURES

1975

1980

1989

Regular budget

0

Voluntary contributions of governments

to the

Environment Fund
Trust funds

Counterpart contributions

Figure A. 2 Source of UNEP Funds. United Nations Environmen
(Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP, 1990)
tal Programme, UNEP Profile
page 37.
.
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Q)

s

A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION

0

UVEP lod iu ptrmen Live ipooiorrd « wide variety oC
pUnj, profnmma, declmoooi ind i*rtemaiu which provide
•
irwneworh lor (k>b«] lod repcnu] environment!] kub. The alfM..
°° 'he* p*fd ihowi i represent! tm
umpJe.
*cx the y*an,

Figure A. 4 A Framework for Action. United Nations Environ
UNEP
Kenya:
(Nairobi,
mental Programme, UNEP Profile
1990), pages 42, 43.
.
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Outcomes such

of vegetative cover

as: loss

baring of soils

A

increased erosion

reduced productivity

Due

to:

Heavy pressure

Insufficient investment

on ,and

eg. terracing, fertilisation

Underlying physical conditions:

Land shortage

Poverty

soils, climate, vegetation, etc.

Short time horizons

Inappropriate
technologies

Size

&

distribution

population/land

Agricultural

Land tenure

Research

price policy

insecurity

extension

Marketing

Alternative

Technical

incomes

options

Population growth

infrastructure

Health

Education

&

Training

Overall government policy

World trade conditions

Credit availability

Structural adjustment

Levels of debt

<fc

‘Governance’

Exchange

Availability

rates

donor funds

Global climatic trends

Figure A. 5 Multi-Level Set of Explanations for Desertification. Camilla Toulmin, "Combatting Desertification: Setting
the Agenda for a Global Convention," Dryland Networks Programme Issues Paper, (London, England: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)
No. 42
June
1993)
page 3
:

—

,

,
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APPENDIX B
NAME LISTS

NAMES OF NATIONAL NGOS INVOLVED IN THE
SARDAR SAROVAR DAM PROJECT

Anil Patel's "Save the Narmada Movement"

Umbrella Organization "Narmada Bachao Andolan"
Guajarat NGO "Arch Vahini"

Ashram "Anand Niketan" (Leader Harivalabh Parikh)
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NAMES OF INTERNATIONAL NGOS INVOLVED IN THE
SARDAR SAROVAR DAM PROJECT

NAME OF NGO

NAME OF REPRESENTATIVE

FAX NUMBER

FOE-Japan

Yukio Tanaka

01181337606959/350

IRN

Juliet Majot

5108481008/476

IRN

Patrick McCully

5108481008/476

Both Ends

Paul Wolvekamp

01191206208049/268

The Ecologist

Nicholas Hildyard

0114425873748/445

The Ecologist

Alex Wilks

0114425873748/445

ASW

Bruni Weissen

01149302511887/279

KePa

Risto Iaomaki

01135806941786/537

KePa

Gunnel Nycander

0114618673512

Probe

Pat Adams

4169648239/776

CED

Villo Komei

0113580318427/566

Greenpeace

Francesco Martone

0113965783531/474

FIAN-Germany

Frank Brassel

011492823496956/342

FOE-Italy

Roberto Smeraldi

01139668308610

KWIA

Wendel Trio

0113227968054/594

FIAN

Christian Ferrie

01133142592236/265

FIVAS

Eric Hoenes

011472204594/348

Erklaerung

Peter Bosshard

0114112726060/382

Urgewald

Heffa Schuecking

0114925831081

Aid/Watch

Carol Sherman

01161213440078/951

LHCR

Jim Ross

2129670916/524

FOE Austria

Lyla Mehta

0114315268405

Coll. Narmada/
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UNITED
NATIONS
General Assembly
D istr

GENERAL
A/ AC .241/9/Add.
14 December 1993

INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE
EOR THE ELABORATION OF A
CONVENTION TO
COMBAT DESERTIFICATION IN THOSE
EXPERIENCING SERIOUS DROUGHT AND COUNTRIES
'OR
T
<m - pw,ticu

^

sss i::ss

cncd,

H«w York, 17-28 January 1994
Agenda item 1

NVurT.ON OF THE ACENDA AND OTHER
ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS
Lk fS of Non-Ggvef nme n t al Oro.ni,.t
R ecommended for accreditation

rM

Not* by th* Secretariat

SSd

0v * rw"« n t«l organization*
which thC S^cVetarlat health
"‘JJl" r <juir#m#nt§
of rul# 49 of
th# Ru 1#« of Proc#dur# (A/AC 241/3t
3
p,rticulir
decision* 1/1 and 2/1 concerning the
plrt icip^t ion^of*
f
nor
>-9°
v ernmental
organization* a* adopted by th* Prioaratorv
s
*
Un
d
Conference on Environment Ind Development
^*
at
firV.nd
’

1.

-

Aide au Sahel
b.p.

sei

Bamako
Mall
Tel:
Fax:

Not given
Not given
Establiehed: 1988
Membership:
National

Activities relevant to th* Committee:
W*

U

10

n

effort

to

'^
w*
other *Cro
NGOs
and
the
Government
regeneration of wetland*.

For th* text of th* decision*,
A/46/48 (Annex I).
GE. 93-62851
94-01322
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A.si.ts in th. construct ion of
combat erosion.
Collaborate » with
on
r*fore*tatior.
project •
and

see documents

A/45/46

(Annex

I)

and

2

.

Association Malienne pour le Developpoment (AMADE)
Hippodrome Rue 594 X 439
B.P.

2646
Bamako
Mali
Tel:
Tax:

(223)
(223)

22
22

Established:
Membership:

59 09
59 09/22

23

59

1983

National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Works towards the empowerment
of
grassroot organisations through the establishment of co-operatives and
access to credit and other financing. Promotes alternative sources of
livelihood which utilise alternative sources of energy.

Association Malienne pour la Promotion du Sahel (A.M A
B.P.

6026

P

R O S

>

Bamako
Mali
Tel:
Fax:

(223)
(223)

22 53 95
22 02 91

Established:
Membership:

1989

National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Implements agro- forestry pro jects
in the Siby region of Mali and conducts projects on integrated
development at Kamale.
4.

Both Ends
Damrak 28-30
1012 LJ Amsterdam
The Netherlands
623 0823
620 8049
Established: 1990

Tel:
Fax:

(31 20)
(31 20)

Membership:

National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Provides services to NGOs in
concerned countries by desemminating information on desertification.
Stimulates discussions on desertification with the Dutch government,
the public and other NGOs.

5.

Centre for Our Common Future
Palais Wilson
52 rue des Paquis
Geneva 1201
Switzerland
Tel:
Fax:

(41 22)
(41 22)

Established:
Membership:

732 71 17
738 50 46
1988

International

Activities relevant to the Committee: Acts as an information exchange
mechanism and a global information clearing house on sustainable
development initiatives, utilising its extensive network covering over
170 countries.
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6

.

Christian Cars
120 Baines Avenue
p O Box 33
Harare
t imbabwe
Telt (2634) 24 752
Pax
(2634) 708 248
Established! 1989
Membership:
National
:

Activities relevant to the Committee: Assists
environmental
protection
projects,
such
reclamation, natural veld management and water
environmental education and financial support
7.

farmers in implementing
as
woodlots,
gulley
conservation. Provides
for projects.

Club Unesco FGminin "La Colombe"
B.P.

80.498

Lome
Togo
Tel: (228) 21 49 65
Pax:
(228) 21 77 94
Established: 1990
National
Membership:

combating
in
Activities relevant to the Committee: Educates women
Provides support for reforestation activities, tree
deforestation.
nurseries and a reforestation program run by local women's groups.

8.

Collectlf des Organisations
D'Ivoire (CONC.ACI)

Non

Gouvernementales

Actives

en

Cote

20 B.P. 525

Abidjan 20
Cote D'Ivoire
Tel: (225) 26
Pax:
(225) 43
Established:
Membership:

23 12
36 34
1992

National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Develops action plans with its
members (over 27 local NCOS) covering all environmental problems. Its
members work closely with rural communities in erosion control,
reforestation, public awareness and education. Also collaborates with
UNDP as a centre for environmental information.
9.

Council of Swaziland Churches
P.O. Box 1095

Manzinl
Swaziland
Tel: (268) 539 31
Pax: (268) 535 87
Established: 1976
National
Membership:
of long-term
Activities relevant to the Committee: Undertakes a number
cu
agr
project;
micro-water
a
as;
such
programmes
training for
programmes and an environmental care programme providing
rural communities.
't
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10.

Development Alternative* Network (DAN)
P 0 Box 17038
Nairobi
Kenya
Tel:
254 2
506 628
r*xt (254 2) 723 791
Cablei Da.
Established:
1993
Membership:
National
(

)

t0 th * Co"“ Ut «' Promotes the con.erv.tion
of
African natural
reeourcee.
Involve* local
in
th#
management and sustainable use of degraded land. coimunltle*
Produce* education
resource materials for use by NCOs and governments.

Environment Development Society
Nagorian ka Bas
Jodhpur-342 002
India
Tel: (91
28486/37536
fax: Not given
Established:
1993
Membership:
Regional

—

)

Activities relevant to the Committee: Conducts
research
on
local
problems of environmental degradation.
Holds awareness raising
workshops encouraging local communities to actively participate in
protecting the environment.
12.

Environmental Policy and Society (EPOS)
Uppsala University
Sturegatan 9, ltr.
753 14 Uppsala
Sweden
Tel:
Pax:

(46)
(46)

18 18 33 25
18 18 27 32

Established:
Membership:

1991

National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Operates an Interdisciplinary
research network concerned with environmental security in relation to
competition for natural resources. Organises seminars on the Drylands.
13.

P6d6ration des Associations des Parents d'elBvee du Cameroun
26 Bd. des Nations Unies
B.P. 1831, Douala
Cameroun
Tel:
fax:

(237)
(237)

Established:
Membership:

42 56 26
43 29 17

1971

National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Conducts awareness campaigns,
Organises reeducation and training for extension officers.
forestation and erosion control campaigns.
Participates in program
development activities on environment and conservation.
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14.

Federation dee ONC au Togo
39 Route de Kpallmd
B.P.

(

FONCTO)

1176

Lorn#

Togo
Tell
Fax:

(228) 21 49 65
(228) 22 17 32
Xetabliehedi 1986

Membership!

National

Activities relevant to the Committee! Co-ordinates an NGO network on
the management of natural resources and the protection of the
centre
on
appropriate
documentation
environment.
Operates
a
technologies. Organises training on sustainable development for NCOs.
15.

Foundation Palx et Developpement (F.P.D.)
Immeuble Fahd Ben Abdel Aziz
Boulevard DJliy
Kbaye x Kacodou Ndiaye 146ae
Dakar
Senegal
Tell (221) 22 90 08/22 93 50
Faxi

(221)

22 90 73

Established!
Membership!

1991

International

Activltlee relevant to the Committee! Combats aridlsation and restores
degraded ecosystems. Protects the environment by combating bush fires
Promotes biogas
and transforming vegetable waste Into cattle food.
energy.
16.

Fundacton Ambient# Y Recursoe Haturales (FARM)
Monro# 2142
1428 Buenos Aires
Argentina
Tali
Faxi

(54 1) 781 6115
(54 1) 781 6115

Established!
Membership!

1987

Regional

on
research
Activities relevant to the Committee! Conducts
Publishes legal papers
implementation of environmental conventions.
Conducts technical analysis of legal
relevant to desertification.
Provides
instruments to facilitate involvement of regional NCOs.
environmental legal assistance to States in the region.
17.

Fundaclor. Habitat
San Lorenzo 1582
3000 Santa Fe

Arg entlna
Tell (54 42) 32425
Faxi
(54 42) 32425
Established! 1992
National
Membership!

Activities
seminars
academics
Government

campaigns and
relevant to the Cocmltteei Organises awareness
decision-makers,
at
aimed
development
sustainable
on
Facilitates dialogue with the
and the business community.
topics.
on environmental
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18

.

Gilma Youngsters
P 0 Box 167 */R
Tama la
Ghana
Tal: Not given
Tax: Not givan
Established
1991
Membership:
National
:

Activities

ralevant to tha Committee:
Rime to organise doodIs to
* ,
f " he P P r °i* ct>
tree planting exercises, education and
i
liferam
*i
literacy work.
Promotes cultural and entertainment activities
and
organises youth training.
'

19

Recherche Action pour

'

la

KA P £ S
B.P. 6026
( >*

20.

Promotion Economise et

Sociale

)

Bamako
Mali
Tel: (223) 22 53 95
Fax: Not given
Established: 1990
Membership:
National

Activities relevant to tha Committee: Organises
campaigns
such
as
repairing access roads and sanitize drains to clean up the district
around Bamako for the benefit of the urban population.
Conducts
education and awareness campaigns.

21.

22.

Institute of Development Studies
8-B Jhalana Institutional Area
Jaipur-302004
India
Tal: (91 41) 515 726
Fax: (91 41) 515 348
Telex: (365) 2163 IDSJIN
Established: 1981
Membership:
National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Conducts research in the area of
development strategy, economic and social policy and resource planning
and management. Provides training on environment, agriculture, women's
development, poverty and health.
Operates a multidisciplinary NCO's
resource centra for Rajasthan Stata.
Instituto da Investigacion
Autonoma da San Luis Potosi
Alta ir 200 - P 0 Box 504

da

Zonas

Deserticas

de

la

Universidad

Fracc. del Llano, San Luis Potosi
78377 Mexico
Tel: (525) 48 22 21 30
Fax: (525) 48 22 21 30
Established: 1954
Membership:
National

Activities relevant to tha Committee: Organises national seminars on
combating desertification.
Concerned with the conservation and
rational utilization of the natural resources of arid and semiand
lands

Interdisciplinary Center for Technological Analysis and Forecasting
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Tel-Aviv University
Tel-Aviv 69978
Isrssl
Tel:
Fsx:

(972 3)
(972 3)

641 28 82
641 01 93
1972

Established:
Membership:

National

pro).ct. based on eat.ut.
•ultl.p.etKl
23

.

*PPlld*tioe

de

eo<3 r »P*i« Physique
2onale
?
i0n #t do Rech «che Lettres
•t Sciences Humaines
r!e p|
57 rue
Pierre ^
Taittlngen
Reims 51 100

d

i

FO,r,T’ a

Prance
Tel:
F«x:

(33)
(33)

26 05 36 00
26 05 36 46

Established:
Membership:

With

™

1973

National

ln

.g.neiJ

COU * b° r *' 1 °"

Lesotho Council of NCOs
109 Christie House
Orpen Road, P.B. A445
Maseru 100
Lesotho
Tel:
Fax:

317 205
310 412
Established:
1990
(266)
(266)

Membership:

National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Participates
in drought relief
operations and long term sustainable development
recovery programmes
Relief YnSVd’iSU’T"'
and on Agriculture,
25.

« coap.i.alon

onft.a.t.r .ad

LJSu™"

Environment and Natural Resources.

Namibia Development Trust
P O Box 8226
57 Pasteur Street
Windhoek-West, Bachbrecht
Namibia
Tel: (061) 380 02/3
Fax:

(061)

Established:
Membership:

33 261

1989

National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Supports the participation
of
local communities in land issues. Involved in environmental
awareness,
promotion and training programmes.
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26

.

National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Swaziland
P.O.

Box 298

Mbabane
Swaziland
Tel: (268) 442 48
Fax: Not given
Established: 1968
Membership:
National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Operates a training programme for
pre-school
teachers
which
includes
an
environmental
section.
Implements a wood-lot implementation strategy for local administrative
bodies and the public.
27.

Rajastan Pradesh Bharat Sevak Samaj
Rishi Niwas, Baba harish Chandra Marg
Jaipur - 302 001
India
Tel: (141) 62939/729S2
Fax: No fax
Eetablished: 1967
National
Membership:

Activities relevant to the Committee: Organises activities to counter
ecological degradation in the Western region of India, particularly in
the "Great Indian Desert". Educates people for conservation of natural
resources of the region.
28.

Sahel Solidarite
01 BP 372

Ouagadougou 01
Burkina Faso
Tel: (226) 31
Fax:
(226) 31
Established:
Membership:

18 85

18 85

1973

National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Organises activities to combat
soil erosion, principally aimed at assisting communities to improve
their means of production, their knowledge and especially their
attitude towards the environment.
29.

Secretariat de Concertation des ONG Maliennes
Avenue Chelck Zayed X 121
Dravela - Bolibana, B.P 3264
Bamako
Mali

(

SECO-ONG/MALI

Tel: (223) 22 30 41
Fax: Not given
Established: 1989
National
Membership:
of
exchange
the
activities relevant to the Committee: Promotes
from the North
experiences through seminars and symposiums between NGOs Malian NGOs.
Supports the development programmes of
end South.
on the activities of local NCOS.
publications
ibutes
)istr
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30

.

Service Extension and Action Research
(SEARCH-NEPAL)
Anil Bhavan, Kamaladi
C.P.O. Box 4277
Kathmandu
Nepal

for

Communities

In

the

Hills

(977 1) 22 48 35/22 30 09
(977 1) 22 00 36/22 44 31
Established: 1989

Tel:
Fax:

National

Membership:

Activities relevant to the Committee: Provides training, advocacy, and
Implements integrated community
operational and empirical research.
Collaborates with other NGOs on projects
development programmes.
concerned with the empowerment of women.
31.

Solidarite Humaine
B.P. 2573
Lom6
Togo
Tel:
Fax:

(228)
(228)

21 38 22
22 17 32

1988
National

Established:
Membership:

of
Activities relevant to the Committee: Promotes the conservation
through
water resources. Supports the protection of natural resources
reforestation, agroforestry and biodiversity conservation programmes.
Promotes education and easy access to information.

32.

SOS Nature
B.P. 1838
Lom4

Togo
Tel:
Fax:

(228)
(228)

21 51 84/21 30 30
22 17 32

Established:
Membership:

1991

National

Implements reforestation and
Activities relevant to the Committee:
control programmes,
agroforestry programmes and erosion and shrub fire
Provides local support to local co-operatives.

33.

Swaziland Farmer Development Foundation
M.I.T.C. Complex
P.O. Box 549
Manzini
Swaziland
Tel: (268) 541 14
Fax:

(268)

Established:
Membership:

541 14
1985

National

between
Promotes co-operati
Activities relevant to the Committee: Government
improve
to
aiming
and
individuals
bodies,
private
projects
farming
group
Implements
agriculture in the country.
Provides expertise to member organisations
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34.

Tonga Nawe Environmental Action Croup
P.0. Bo* 2061
Kbabana
Swaziland
Tel:
Fa*:

(268) 413 94
Not Given
Established
1987
:

Membership:

National

Activities relevant to the Committee: Works with rural communities
promoting sustainable development. Liaises with government and lobbies
to ensure environmental issues and sustainable development are
included
in government planning.
35.

Zambia Alliance of Women
5 1068
Lusaka
Zambia
Tel: (2601) 263 073
Fax: Not given
Established:
1978
Membership:
National
P.0. Box

Activities relevant to the Committee: Organises a training of trainers
workshop on environmental issues in the Southern African region.
Promotes agro-forestry projects using environmentally sound methods.
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NAMES OF ALL PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Dominic Walubengo, representative of the Kenya Energy
and
Environment Organizations (KENGO)
1)

2)

Wangu Mwani, editor for "Econews Africa" in Kenya

3)

Tony Hill, representative of the UN Non-Governmental Li-

aison Service

4)

Professor Safei Hamed, Environmental Planning Specialist

at

the University

of

Maryland and Counselor to the World

Bank

5)

John K. Sambu, Minister for Environment and Natural Re-

sources in Nairobi

6)

Masse Lo, NGO representative from Enda-TM, Senegal

7)

Nadia Saad,

former employee in the World Bank's Environ-

mental Department

8)

Ms Perumalpellai-Essex

,

employee in the World Bank's En-

vironmental Department
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organizations competence and relevance to the
work of the Preparatory Committee
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Introduction
At the organizational session of the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention to Combat
Desertification
( INCD)
in January 1993 it was decided that
"Non-governmental
organizations invited to the Committee may take
contributions to the negotiating process, as appropriate, on
the understanding that these organizations shall not have any
negotiating role during the process, and taking into account,
in particular, decisions 1/1 and 2/1 concerning the
participation of non-governmental organizations adopted by the
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development at its first and second sessions "
(Decisions 1/1 and 2/1 you will find in annexes 1 and 2)
.

This means that NGOs can attend the INCD sessions as observers. They can make interventions and do their lobbying
work in which they have to comply with certain rules. However, since NGOs will not be the only ones that will sign
the Convention nor be primarily responsible for the implementation, their views will only be considered advisory and
not as a crucial element in the formal consensus building.
Some might claim that there are good arguments in favor of a
more influential role for NGOs in the process. In many cases
NGOs have been much more effective in combatting desertification than governments. They have built up a wealth of expertise. And their input will be indispensable in the implementation of the Convention.

Nonetheless, two rounds of negotiations have shown that if
NGOs play their cards well they can have a constructive input in the elaboration of the Convention. Many important
points that were brought to the fore by NGOs have been included in the draft convention.
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The next step is to persuade Governments to maintain
the
right things in the draft text, to delete the wrong things
and to include what NGOs feel is still lacking.
The purpose of this manual is to provide NGOs some practical
tips on how to maximize their influence in the negotiations.

Accreditation
Step one is getting access to the INCD process. NGOs that
wish to participate in the INCD have to request for accreditation to the INCD Secretariat. In order to obtain accreditation your NGO has to send to the INCD Secretariat documentation containing the following information:
a)

b)

c)

The purpose of your organization;
Information as to the programmes and activities of your
organization which demonstrates the organization's competence and relevance to the work of the INCD and in
which country (ies) they are carried out;
Copies of your annual reports with financial statements
and statutes of establishment demonstrating that the
organization is a legally registered non-profit organization
A listing of governing body members and their country
of nationality;
In respect of membership organizations a description
of the membership, indicating total numbers and their
geographical distribution;
In order to assist the Secretariat in compiling the NGO
list NGOs are requested to fill in a fact-sheet
;

d)

e)

f)

NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC and NGOs accredited
with UNCED are exempt from requirements stated in a) to e)
however it is necessary for them to complete the fact sheet.
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How to attend the INCH sessions?

After your request for accreditation has been
approved the
INCD Secretariat will send you invitations for
the INCD sessions. However, for most NGOs it will be impossible
to attend the INCD meetings without financial support.
The INCD
Secretariat and the UN NGO Liaison Service are doing
their
utmost to raise funds to facilitate NGO participation.
Obviously the funds are limited and not all NGOs that request
financial support can be serviced. To make a selection of
NGOs the INCD Secretariat and the NGLS consult a number of
NGOs that act as focal points for their country/region.
It should be emphasized that attending the INCD sessions is only useful for those NGOs who have done their
homework and who are active in lobbying at the national/regional level between the INCD sessions.
[

.

.

.

]

How to get information
For effective lobbying you need adequate access to information. There are several sources of information:
- If you are linked up to the E-mail system you can access
information through the computer conference INC. DESERT;
- Earth Negotiations Bulletin,
published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development;
- ECO, the NGO newsletter that is issued at all INCD sessions
- E&D File which is published by the United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service;
- ELCI issues circular letters which are a compilation of
material you need to prepare for the next INCD session. They
contain the NGO interventions, issues of ECO, the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, etc;
- The INCD Secretariat sends the most important official
documents to all accredited NGOs;
have committed themselves to inform
The focal points
the NGOs in their country/region;
- Reports of your government on the National Plans to Combat
;

[

.

.

.

]

Desertification.
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Lobbying during the TNCD sessions
During the INCD sessions NGOs can lobby through:
1.
Making an intervention;
^
Participating in the delegation of your country;
3.
Having meetings with delegations;
4.
Writing for ECO.
•

1.

How to make an intervention?

In the rules for NGOs it is stipulated that:

"Relevant non-governmental organizations may, at their own
expense, make written presentations in the preparatory [read
INCD] process through the Secretariat in the official languages of the United Nations as they seem appropriate. Those
written presentations will not be issued as official documents except in accordance with United Nations rules of procedure
;

and:

"Relevant non-governmental organizations in consultative
status with the Economic and Social Council may be given an
opportunity to briefly address plenary meetings of the
Preparatory Committee [read INCD] and meetings of the Working Groups. Other relevant non-governmental organizations
may also ask to speak briefly in such meetings. If the number of requests is too large, the Preparatory Committee
[read INCD] shall request the non-governmental organizations
to form themselves into constituencies and each constituency
Any oral
to speak though one spokesman (read spokesperson)
intervention by a non-governmental intervention would, in
accordance with normal United Nations practice, be at the
discretion of the Chairman and with the consent of the
Preparatory Committee [read INCD] or the Working Group, as
the case may be."
.
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In the

INCD process it has become good practice
wanting to make an oral intervention have to
do so
of all the participating NGOs. If you want
to make
vention on a certain subject it is important
to
following guidelines into consideration:

that NGOs
on behalf
an intertake the

First go through the agenda to find out when
and in
which working group the issue will be addressed.
It is
pointless to make an intervention if the issue you want
to
address is not the subject of discussion.
1*

In order to make your intervention constructive and to
the point it is important to carefully read what is written
2

.

about the issue in the negotiation text. It has happened in
the past that NGO representatives made interventions that
were less progressive from an NGO point of view than what
was already in the negotiation text. Through reading the negotiation text thoroughly you can avoid mistakes like these.

Prepare a draft text for the intervention at least a
day in advance. This will give you the opportunity to discuss the intervention with other NGOs in the NGO meeting
(NGO meetings are held every day)
It is crucial to discuss
the intervention with the other NGOs since interventions can
only be made on behalf of all the NGOs.
3.

.

Concerning the contents it is important to take into
account the following:
- In the intervention you address the chairman;
- You start the intervention with stating that you are
speaking on behalf of the NGOs;
- Don't make the intervention too long. NGOs get only 3 minutes to make an intervention. 450 words is the maximum.
4

.

After you have agreed with the other NGOs on the intervention text make sure that you make enough copies to be
distributed among the delegates.
5.
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Before making the intervention be sure
you ask the
Chairperson or the Secretary of the plenary or
the working
group to give you the opportunity to speak.
He/she will ask
you for your name, which NGO you represent and
the written
text of the intervention. He/she will also ask if
you speak
on behalf of all the NGOs. Then you will wait
until the
chairman gives you the floor. This is usually at the end
of
a long list of interventions made by government
delegates.

—Partic ipating

2_s

in the government delegation

A few governments have included NGO representatives in their
^®^-® 9 ^^-ion
It might be a good idea to approach your govern—
nisnt and ask them to do the same
There are advantages and
disadvantages of being part of the official delegation. The
advantage is that it puts NGOs in an excellent position to
express the NGO views from within. On the other hand governments will not allow an NGO representative in the delegation
to share freely with other NGOs what is discussed behind
closed doors. As a member of your country delegation you
might end up a little isolated from other NGOs.
.

.

3

.

Meetings with delegations

During the INCD sessions NGOs invite government delegations
to discuss certain issues. The meetings are announced in ECO
and are open to all NGOs that attend the INCD. If you organize a meeting with a delegation it is important to verify
whether the delegation is going to speak "off the record" or
not. In case of an "off the record" meeting NGOs will have
to promise to refrain from quoting the delegates in public.
The experience has been that meetings with delegates are extremely useful.

170

Of course it is also extremely
important to contact delegations of your own or other countries
"in the corridors". You
can explain to them the NGO position.
Delegates can brief
you on the background of their position.
It is important to
share this information with other NGOs
in the strategy meetings. This will enable NGO representatives
who prepare interventions to anticipate on the arguments
delegations are
going to use in this discussion.
4

.

ECO

ECO is an NGO newsletter which is issued on a
daily basis
during the 5 rounds of negotiations. The objectives
of ECO
are:
-

to give a critical analysis of the negotiations
from an
NGO point of view;
to inform delegates on the views and grassroots experiences of NGOs on desertification and related issues.
Though an ECO Team of NGO correspondents will be primarily
responsible for the production of ECO, all NGO representatives are invited to write articles and to participate in
the editorial meetings in which the contents of ECO are discussed. Delegates are anxious to receive their daily ECO every morning and they read the newsletter carefully.
ECO is
an important lobby tool.

Lobbying between the sessions
NGOs have to be aware of the fact that at the end of the day
the INCD Secretariat cannot include anything in the final
Convention unless it is supported by Governments. NGOs are
not negotiating parties so we have to work though our Governments. NGOs should persuade Governments to maintain the
right things in the draft text, to delete the wrong things
and to include what NGOs feel is still lacking.
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It will be too late if NGOs
start lobbying their delegates
sessi ° n = °my. Delegates go to
the INCD sessions
,n !„
with
their instructions and are usually
reluctant to move
away too far from the directions
given to them at home It
”UCh better that NGOs approach
their governments well
ahead of the INCD sessions and make
them familiar with the
NGO point of view while they are still
in the process of developing their position.

“

Again it is important to emphasize that
attending the INCD
sessions is not very useful unless the homework
is done.
How t o approach vour government?
The first step is to identify the ministry
(or ministries)
that are dealing with the INCD. Try to arrange
a meeting
with the officials who are in charge of
developing your
country's position in the INCD. Also contact those
members
of parliament that you think might have an open
mind to the
NGO point of view on desertification. They might be
willing
to address the issue in parliament or in a
parliamentary
committee meeting. Your position will be much stronger
if
you coordinate your lobby activities with other NGOs.

Before meeting the Government officials or Members of Parliament it would be a good idea to send a "lobby" paper containing the NGOs points of view concerning the INCD. For developing that paper the NGO statements made at the previous
INCD session can be very useful.

Wishing you success in your lobbying endeavors.
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Annex

l

1/1 Bo le of non-governmental organis
a tions in the nr» pJ v,ti on process for the United Nation.,
Conf«.r.n ro „„
ment and Development
•

At its 22nd meeting, on 14 August
1990, the Preparatory
Committee for the United Nations Conference
on Environment
and Development agreed that the effective
contributions of
non-governmental organizations in the preparatory
process
were in its interest.
1.

There was agreement on broad-based involvement
by relevant non-governmental organizations.
2.

The Preparatory Committee's policy should be to
encourage an equitable representation of non-governmental
organizations from developed and developing countries and from
all
regions and also to ensure a fair balance between non-governmental organizations with an environment focus and those
with a development focus. The Preparatory Committee would
encourage the participation of scientific and other organizations
3.

.

The Preparatory Committee decides that, only for the
purpose of its first session, the following rules would apply without prejudice to any decision that might be taken by
the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session:
4.

Non-governmental organizations shall not have any negotiating role in the work of the Preparatory Committee;
(a)

Relevant non-governmental organizations may, at their
own expense, make written presentations in the preparatory
process through the Secretariat in the official languages of
the United Nations as they deem appropriate. Those written
presentations will not be issued as official documents except in accordance with United Nations rules of procedure;
(b)
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Relevant non-governmental organizations
in consultative
status with the Economic and Social
Council may be given an
opportunity to briefly address plenary
meetings plenary
meetings of the Preparatory Committee
and meetings of the
Working Groups, other relevant
non-governmental organizations may also ask to speak briefly in
such meetings, if the
number of such requests is too large, the
Preparatory Committee shall request the non-governmental
organizations to
form themselves into constituencies and
constituencies to
speak to one spokesman. Any oral intervention
by a non-governmental organization would, in accordance with
normal
United Nations practice, be at the discretion of the
Chairman and with the consent of the Preparatory Committee
or the
Working Group, as the case may be.
(c)
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Annex B

1

2

{

— ° cedure— —

etermining

non-governmental

t ions competence and relevance t o the
work of thg

tory Committee

oraani na-

Prepara-

At its 28th meeting, on 18 March 1991, the
Preparatory
Committee for the United Nations Conference on
Environment
decided on the following procedure for determining
non-governmental organization's competence and relevance
to the
work of the Preparatory Committee:

Non-governmental organizations in consultative status
with the Economic and Social Council and others desiring to
be accredited for participation in meetings of the Preparatory Committee, in accordance with decision 1/1 of the first
session of the Preparatory Committee as endorsed by the General Assembly resolution 45/221 of 21 December 1990, may apply to the Conference secretariat for this purpose.
1.

All such applications must be accompanied by information on the organization's competence and relevance to the
work of the Preparatory Committee, indicating the particular
areas of the Conference preparations to which competence and
relevance pertains and which could include, inter alia the
following information:
2.

,

(a)

The purpose of the organization;

Information as to the programmes and activities of the
organization in areas relevant to the Conference and its
preparatory process, and in which country (ies) they are carried out;
(b)

Copies of its annual reports with financial statements,
and a listing of governing body members and their country of
nationality
(c)
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in

respect of membership organizations,
a description
of its membership, indicating
total members and their geographic contribution;
(d)

(e)

Non-governmental organizations
with the Economic and Social Council
satisfied these requirements to the
already provided such information to
3.

in

consultative status
shall be deemed to have
extent that they have
the United Nations.

In cases where the Conference
secretariat believes,
basis of the information provided in

on

the
accordance with
paragraph 2 above, that the organization has
established its
competence and relevance to the work of the
preparatory Committee that the organization be accredited. In
cases where
the Conference secretariat does not recommend
the granting
of accreditation, it will make available to
the Preparatory
Committee the reasons for not doing so. The Conference
secretariat should make its recommendations available
to the
P^®P a ^"^tory Committee at the start of the session.

The Preparatory Committee will decide on all cases
within 24 hours of the Conference secretariat's recommendations having been made available to its members, in the
event of a decision not being taken within this time frame,
interim accreditations shall be accorded until such time as
a decision is taken.
4.
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE FOR
THE ELABORATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION IN THOSE COUNTRIES
EXPERIENCING SERIOUS DROUGHT AND/OR
DESERTIFICATION, PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA
Third Session
New York, 17-28 January 1994
Agenda item 2
ELABORATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION
IN COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING SERIOUS DROUGHT AND/OR DESERTIFICATION
PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA

Negotiating Text of the Convention
Note by the Secretariat
1.
At its second substantive session
Secretariat to draft a single negotiating
serve as the basis for the discussions in
during its third substantive session in New
Committee's consideration.

Geneva, the INCD requested the
text of the Convention, which would
the two working groups of the INCD
York. This text is attached for the

in

2.
In preparing the negotiating text, the Secretariat drew heavily
on (a)
document A/AC. 241/12, the compilation of government views, statements and
drafting proposals prepared as a background paper for the second session, (b)
statements in the two working groups during that session and (c) written
submissions received from governments after that session containing additional
comments and drafting proposals In addition, UN agencies concerned with drought
and desertification issues were consulted.
.

3.
The proposed negotiating text does not include the wording of all the
drafting proposals received. The Secretariat's objective was, rather, to
integrate the proposals in a coherent text likely to gather broad support among
INCD member States. The Secretariat took special care, however, to ensure that
the text reflects all views expressed even though this lengthened it somewhat.
Brackets around portions of text or entire articles indicate clear cases of
diverging views.

4.
The negotiating text is based on the hypothesis that Regional Implementation
Annexes will be negotiated and form an integral part of the Convention. Should
INCD members decide to adopt a different approach, certain provisions of the text
will have to be modified accordingly. Pending further discussion of the matter
during the January meeting, the Secretariat has not introduced in the text any
direct reference to the specific regional instruments to be included. At a later
however,
might be appropriate to incorporate such references,
stage,
it
particularly in Article 17.
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Negotiating Text

CONVENTION ON COMBATTING DESERTIFICATION
IN THOSE COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING SERIOUS DROUGHT AND/OR
DESERTIFICATION, PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA

The Parties to this Convention,

Reflecting the urgent concern of the international community, including
States and organizations, about the adverse impact of desertification and
drought
Aware that arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid drylands together account
for a significant proportion of the earth's land area and are the habitat and
source of livelihood for a large segment of its population,

Acknowledging the global dimension of desertification, its effects in
regions of the world and the common interest of the international
community in combatting it.
all

Noting the high concentration of developing countries, notably least
developed countries, among countries experiencing serious drought and/or
desertification, and the particularly tragic consequences of these phenomena
in Africa,

among
Noting also that desertification is caused by complex interactions
including trade
physical, biological, political and socio-economic factors,
and other aspects of international economic relations,
social development and poverty
Conscious that economic growth,
developing countries
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of
objectives,
and are themselves essential to meeting sustainability
development as both a
Mindful that desertification affects sustainable
problems such as poverty,
causal factor and consequence of important social
food security, health and migration,

particularly the priority
Recalling General Assembly resolution 47/188,
and all other relevant United Nations resolutions,
r.lev.nt
on d.d.rtlt io.tlon ,„d drought, .. w.U
dLf.“», .nd
from other regions.
declarations by African countries and those
it prescribed for Africa,

decisions adopted »t the
Convinced of the validity and relevance of
and Development, particularly
United Nations Conference on Environment
Agenda 21 and its Chapter 12,
efforts and experience of
Appreciating the significance of the past
combatting desertification
States and international organizations in
the Plan of Action f
mitiaatina drouqht, particularly in implementing United Nations Conference
1977
Combatting Desertification which arose from the
on Desertification,
in the past, progress in
Realizing that, despite extensive efforts
mit
,and
icatlor
desfrtif
combatting
i
that a new approach is needed at all levels
development

ftti^

at

^

for co
Recognizing that the respons l b
with national y
^J-y
the consequences of drought rests ultimately
areas,
affected
in
implementation
depends on local

^
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and

Stressing the critical role played by women in many regions affected by
desertification, particularly in rural area* of developing countries, and the
importance of ensuring the full participation of both men and women in
programmes to combat desertification and mitigate drought.

Emphasizing the special roles of non-governmental organizations, youth
and children, and indigenous people in programmes to combat desertification
and mitigate drought.

Bearing in mind the relationship between desertification and other
environmental problems facing the international community, such as climate
change, conservation of biodiversity and availability of fresh water,
Searing also in mind the contribution that combatting desertification
can make to achieving the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity
and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and vice-versa.
Believing that strategies to combat desertification and mitigate drought
will be most effective if they are based on sound systematic observation and
rigorous scientific knowledge, and continuously reevaluated in that light.

Determined to spare no effort in combatting desertification
mitigating drought, for the benefit of present and future generations,

and

Have agreed as follows:

PART

I

INTRODUCTION

Article

1

Ose of terms
1

.

(a)

(b)

(c)

For the purposes of this Convention:

"desertification' means land degradation in arid, semi-arid and
dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors, including
climatic variations and human activities;
"drought* means a sustained, regionally extensive deficiency in
precipitation resulting in a period of abnormally dry weather
sufficiently prolonged for the lack of water to cause a serious
hydrological imbalance;
and economic
"land degradation" means reduction of the biological
~
productivity potential of rainfed cropland, irrigated cropland,
or a combination of
or range, pasture and forest land by one
processes, including, among others:
displacement of soil materials by wind and water erosion,
(i)

(ii)

and chemical
internal soil deterioration through physicalacidification,
ion
inisat
sal
as
such
processes
sealing,
aridification, nutrient depletion, compaction,
and
subsidence,
and
waterlogging
crusting,
,

(iii)

long-term loss of natural vegetation;
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(d)

"arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas*, or ’affected
areas*,
means areas where the ratio of average annual precipitation to
potential evapotranepiration is greater than or equal to 0.05 and
less than or equal to 0.65 and where the average annual
temperature is greater than [insert appropriate temperature);

(e)

"countries experiencing serious drought and/or desertification*,
or
"affected countries", means countries whose land areas
include, in whole or in part, affected areas, and which are
listed as such in Annex 1, list A;

(f)

"affected countries needing assistance”
countries listed as such in Annex 1, list

means

the

affected

B;

(g)

"countries in a position to provide assistance* means the
developed and other countries, as well as regional economic
integration organizations, listed as such in Annex 1, list C;

(h)

"combatting desertification" means all activities to directly or
indirectly prevent,
reduce or reverse land degradation in
affected areas; and

(i)

economic
means
"regional
organization"
an
integration
organisation constituted by sovereign States of a given region
which has competence in respect of matters governed by this
Convention and has been duly authorized, in accordance with its
and accede to this
internal procedures, to sign,
ratify,
Convention.

intergovernmental
Secretariat,
working with
competent
2.
The
organizations, shall maintain an information glossary of internationally
agreed definitions of other terms relevant to this Convention. The Conference
of Parties shall periodically review this glossary.

Article

2

Objective
1.
The objective of this Convention is to combat desertification (and
mitigate the effects of drought) in countries experiencing serious drought
and/or desertification, particularly in Africa. (, through effective national
action, supported by organized international cooperation and partnership
arrangements based on mutual interest, in the framework of an integrated
approach consistent with Agenda 21 [and aimed at achieving sustainable
development and livelihoods in affected areas.])

Achieving this objective shall involve a long-term central
[2.
strategy which focuses simultaneously in affected areas on improved
productivity of lands, conservation and sustainable management of lands and
improved living conditions at the community level, particularly through:
(a)

poverty eradication;

(b)

assurance of food and energy security;

(c)

sustainability of economic growth and employment; and

(d)

security and stability of financial resources.)
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(Article

3

Principles
9

6 pri nCtpl °* of the
Environment and Detelo^nt"
Rio Declaration o
in° the*"
.

(*)

respect both national
oovereiantv ,_j
to traneboundary r.lahrob.

..w

•

<b>
"“
Imp 1 emenVaVion 'of '
°" the desi " a " d
proYr*^. **
9
f
consequences of drought are ' J C o«!**t 'ddesertification
and the
taken
at
th
P
h
lo
est
98
administrative structures down
f
^1 co P° n i-ble level in
that an enabling
^y level, and
envTror^entC 1is Created
,
V"? at higher
facilitate local action;
levels to

^

(c)

SOlidarit y and
partnership,
throve"
CO ordlniU °n at
regional, regional and cooperation
subinternational
^
3 and better focus
f inancial,
human, organizational an
nd techr*ical resources
they are needed;
where

AT

(d)

q^e™

63

iop
«:::iS
no
to

^

,

,
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nerships
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organizations and
landholder e
establish an unde
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their
,

(e)
" ati ° nal
inst itfiftTonal
a "d
Jentff
examlne 4nd reconcile
economic, social, cultural
demo 9
V?'
lC
ecol
ical
a
"d
other
concerns in ord« to sustain th« fu^
U8e ° f land
affected areas for the
e Denetit
benefit of the
hi community as a whole.) in

£
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^

II

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article

4

General obligations

Convent ion

,

"divi^l" or’^ntlT’^er StashT 15 ;' 10 "’

api“:?!it.*"t
coherent loAg-t'.'Si^tra"
2

.

otfangemente,
0 c

iVViTl"?".!'.

“ rd ‘"“*

In pursuing the objectives of this
Convention

«*•*

thl *

«—lop

a

the Parties shall:

(a)

adopt an integrated approach addressing the
physical, biological
and socio-economic aspects of the processes
of desertification;

(b)

(give due attention, within the relevant
global and regional
bodies, to the situation of affected developing
countries with
regard to international trade, marketing arrangements
and debt;)
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^oS«;S„r^lV.d‘70

(or th.

mitigate the impact of external debt
on them;
(ti)
improve international market conditions
for their products;
(iii) reduce the effects of exchange
rate variations
(i)

on them; and

UV)

Ci

l

ind

^* de P° licie8 that will encourage the
Seve lor^^
productivity of affected areas, including
1® ****"'don"ent?
Practices, such as the subsidization of
gr icultural exports, that undermine
the efforts of local
population;

[(C)

eradication as a central element
combat desertification and mitigate drought;] of the efforts to

<d)

promote cooperation among affected country
Parties needing
esistance
in
the fields of environmental protection
and
conservation
of
natural
resources,
as
they1
relate
to
desertification and drought;

(e)

strengthen sub-regional and regional cooperation;

(

t

)

<g>

cooperate within relevant intergovernmental organizations to
the
extent that their mandate relates to, or has an
impact on,
desertification and drought; and

develop institutional mechanisms, as appropriate, keeping in mind
the need to avoid duplication.
Article

5

Obligations of affected country Parties
In addition to their obligations in accordance with Article
country Parties, conscious of their special responsibility in
desertification and mitigating drought, undertake to:

affected
combatting

4,

(a)

give due priority to combatting desertification and mitigating
drought, and allocate substantial resources proportionate to the
magnitude of the problem they are experiencing;

(b)

establish strategies and priorities, within the framework of
national environmental policy, to combat desertification and make
public the elements of such strategies and their effect on land
degradation in order to determine their efficacy;

(c)

focus
on
the role of
affected
local
populations,
while
concentrating
on
removing
the
underlying
causes
of
desertification and paying special attention to the sociofactors
economic
contributing to desertification processes; and

(d)

emphasize awareness and participation of local populations, both
women and men, recognizing that meaningful participation requires
full public participation and the inclusion of all elements of
society in the benefits of sustainable development.
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Article
Obligation, of country f.rti., i*

.

6

position

In addition to their

to

provide JsllJtMc .

obligations set out in i r
a
a
Partie. and other Parties in a position to
they ire themselves affected by desertif provldJ
ication and drought
(*)

(b)

»-

>

\oT

undertake
actively .upporb the effort, of affected
country Partle. needlno
-aaiatance, particularly the lea.t developed
among them, in their
effort, to combat de.ert i f icat ion and mitigate
drought; and
facilitate access to, and provide, financial
resource, and acce..
to appropriate technology, to ensure
that affected country
" e * cUn<J
* ssi9tanc «
in • position to effectively
implement their long-term strategies to combat
desertification
and mitigate drought.

Article

7

Priority to AJrica
In implementing the provisions of thi. Convention,
the Parties shall
give priority to affected African countries, in light of
the particular
situation prevailing in this region, while not neglecting other
regions.

Article

8

Relationship vith other Conventions
1.
The Parties shall encourage the coordination of activities carried
out under thi. Convention and under other relevant legal instrument.,
particularly the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Convent ion _on Biological Diversity in order to derive maximum benefit from
activities under each Convention while avoiding duplication of effort.
The
Parties .hall encourage the conduct of joint programme., particularly in the
field, of research, training and exchange of information, to the extent that
such activities may contribute to achieving the objectives of the Convention,
concerned
,

2.
The provisions of thi. Convention shall not affect the right, and
obligations of any Party deriving from a bilateral, regional or global
agreement into which it has entered prior to the entry into force of this
Convention for it.

PART III
ACTION PROGRAMMES, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
AND SUPPORTING MEASURES

Section

1:

Action programmes

Article

9

Basic approach
In carrying out their obligations pursuant to Article 5, affected
country Parties needing assistance shall prepare without delay, make public,
and implement national action programmes, and as appropriate sub-regional and
regional actioa programmes, as the central element of the strategy to combat
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affected country Parti.,
needing^ae.i.tance in° thi®.
or through appropriate

intergovernmental

“ be updated at
Developed count™
* ,B1 * tanc# *h*U
»upport
direct
« ba

^

org.nl.Vtio^

Article 10
national action programme

™

G3 19 to identify in a
P rogra
clear and concise manner th^
factors coT
3ntributln<3 to desertification, the
policy and institutional reforms
and orhJ
3 nece ”«y' thG -spective
roles of government
local c^unitie. and"!^
d land user3
and the resources
available or required.
National action
aP H„. programmes
H ireo, national
shall, inter alia
,

^

'

:

(a)

incorporate

a

'

a nd " ! nd iVa t*

framework.;

long-term and integrated approach
forminq cart of
**'"
1 * develo roent
P
n? " t he * Te'ut
relationship
lo^bip " ^ooff ° the
he* programme to that

%

^

<b>

distinct
situations;

f lexible
r

^ ^

to ada P t to local conditions and allow
for

dlfferent

socio-economic and ecological

(c)

give priority to the implementation of
preventive measures for
lands that are not yet degraded, or
which are only slightly
degraded, without neglecting degraded areas;

(d)

C
n enablln<3 national environment by
removing legislative
„if
and other
obstacles to required action, particularly
local
action, and by giving local populations access
to appropriate
V
management technologies and information;

(e)

provi e for effective participation by grassroots
organizations
and local populations, both women and men, particularly
resource
users, in policy-planning, decision-making and
implementation
order to promote local initiatives and develop a sense in
partnership providing incentives to improve land management; of
and

(f)

give grassroots organizations, and non-governmental
organizations
more
generally,
an
effective
role
in
the
preparation,
implementation and review of the programmes, making full use of
their expertise [and granting them institutional recognition and
appropriate assistance].

2.
National action programmes shall include clear goals, criteria and
benchmarks, within precise timeframes for execution, and mechanisms
for
systematic observation, so as to assess and measure progress in their
implement at ion

[Article 11

Fields Co be covered in national action programmes
Taking into account the conditions and requirements specific to each
affected country Party needing assistance, national action programmes may
include, inter alia measures in some or all of the following fields as they
relate to affected areas and their populations:
,
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(*>

the development and implementation nf
relating
mea8ur ®'
to
capacity-building,
«warene.a,
scientific and technical cooperation education^and
reB
° UrCeB and
mechanism., in accordance wi^h
Article? iS* to" 23*,

V

.

,

[(b)

^

opportunit ie^
livelihoods tourism promotion, rural
in^T/tructure * market
CO°^€rat ^ ve8 -d access to credit
and o t h e^ f i n a n c lYl^ aecv
<

<

'

^ce.^]

(c)

of

ec onomic

Practices

c1* 1

OC a

and

n8
t0
a nd° energy
and
en

instruments to ensure sustainable
proper resource valuation, includinq
a

^^tural

-PPort
progrUes?
agricultural
ag?^ultur“l
pricing, minimization of government
interference in agricultural production and
export incentives,
(d)

food
security,
including improved overall productivity
of
agricultural lands, introduction and development
of droughtresistant fast-growing crop plants, food security
reserves and
expansion of feeder-road networks;

(e)

land management,
including land tenure and other relevant
legislation, soil conservation, sand dune fixation,
based assessment networks, prior environmental impact communityassessment
of projects and rational management of agricultural
land watersheds, forests and wildlife;
,

pasture and range management, including secure access to, and
use
water and grazing land, allocation of control over water
points to pastoral communities, and enactment of pastoral/range
activity legislation that, inter alia recognizes herding as a
sustainable use of marginal land and ensures the complementarity
of grazing and agricultural activities;

(f

of,

,

(

9

)

maintenance and sustainable management of vegetation cover,
including management of forest resources by local communities'
creation
and
protection of
forest
reserves,
agroforestry
activities and reforestation of degraded areas;

(h)

water management, including maintenance of hydrological capacity,
water conservation, environmentally sound measures to develop
rivers,
lakes, catchment areas,
watersheds and groundwater,
acquisition of water development technologies at affordable
costs, development of infrastructure for exploiting fossil water,
water quality control measure, and sustainable irrigation and
drainage systems;

(i)

meteorological and hydrological services, including strengthening
of personnel and improvement of data collection,
analysis,
exchange and dissemination to users;

j)

energy, including the development and efficient use of various
energy sources, the promotion of alternative sources of energy,
particularly solar and wind energy, and specific arrangements for
the transfer, acquisition and adaptation of relevant technology;

(M

conservation and utilisation of all types of biodiversity in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention on Biological
Diversity

(

;

(

1

)

national population policies,
including those to deal with
population pressure on land-carrying capacity; migration, both
within and between countries; family planning services; and
changes in demographic composition; and

185

(»)

institution*!.
and
I4 tl ° n ° f

legal

frameworks,
including
the
v « structures, mechanisms
con * lict * •« * ic ient ly , the coordination to
of
nation* *Vl
national
activities related to drought and desertification,
and
operational measures to empower local communities,
both women and
men, such as the transfer of fiscal
responsibilities.]

re^lvI*V

* dflli ni “ tr * t
-

»-

M
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Article 12
Sub-regional action programmes

Affected country Parties
needing
assistance
shall
prepare,
as
appropriate, sub-regional action programmes to harmonize,
complement and
increase the efficiency of national programmes. The provisions
of Article 10
shall apply autatis mutandis to sub-regional programmes.
They may include,
inter alia, measures in some or all of the following areas:
(a)

assessment and strengthening, as appropriate, of sub-regional
institutions and their rationalization to avoid duplication, to
resolve potential conflicts and to effectively perform functions
necessary for the implementation of this Convention;

(b)

scientific and technical cooperation in accordance with Articles
18 to 20;

(c)

(d)

joint programmes for the reforestation and rehabilitation of
degraded ecosystems that straddle national boundaries,
and
agreements on the management of shared resources, such as rivers,
lakes, aquifers, wildlife and grazing lands;

joint programmes of cooperation with respect to migratory flows
transhumance
people,
the development and promotion of
alternative sources of energy, and hydrology and meteorology;

of

,

(e)

joint programmes to combat locusts and other pest invasions; and

(f)

review of trade practices, within the sub-region, that might have
an adverse impact on the efforts of local populations to combat
desertification.

Article 13
Regional action programmes

Affected country Parties needing assistance shall consult and cooperate
regionally, as appropriate, in the preparation and implementation of a
regional action programme, which may include measures in Article 12, subparagraphs (a) to ((f), to ensure the adoption of a coherent strategy for the
region as a whole. The provisions of Article 10 shall apply mu tat is mutandis
to regional action programmes.
(Article 14
Heasu.res in action programmes to mitigate the effects of drought

may
Af f ected country Parties needing ass ista nee subject to drought
lude in thei r action programmes, int<»r alia. some or all of the following
sures to mit igate its effects:
(a)

the strengthening of early warning systems, inc lud ing local and
nat lonal facilities as well as joint systems at the sub-reg icDnal
and regional levels, and mechanism a for assist ing re f ugees and
dis placed persons;

186

<t>)

(

<=

(d)

the strengthening of drought
preparedness *nd management,
including drought contingency pi *ne *t the loc*l,
n*tion*l, subregion*! *nd region*! level*}
the establishment of food security system* including
storage and
marketing facilities, the strengthening of coordination
and
better management of food aid; and

programmes in areas such as public works and employment safety
nets to help local communities cope with drought.]
Article 15

Assistance in the elaboration and implementation
ot action programmes

Developed country Parties and other Parties in a position to provide
assistance shall support, consistent with their capabilities, the elaboration
and implementation of action programmes, both bilaterally and
through
competent intergovernmental organizations, through financial, technical and
other forms of assistance as provided for in this Convention. Supporting
measures shall include, inter alia
:

(a)

financial cooperation of sufficient duration to provide an
adequate degree of predictability for action programmes, allowing
for necessary long-term planning by countries needing assistance;

(b)

use of assistance-delivery mechanisms which better enable support
at
the
local
level,
including
through
non— governmental
organizations;

(c)

increased
flexibility
in
project
design,
funding
and
implementation in keeping with the experimental,
iterative
approach indicated for participatory action at the local
community level; and

(d)

streamlined administrative and budget procedures to increase the
efficiency of assistance programmes.
Article 16

Coordination in the elaboration and implementation
of action programmes
1.
Affected country Parties needing assistance and all country
Parties providing assistance to specific action programmes shall work closely
together, directly and through relevant intergovernmental organizations, in
the elaboration and implementation of action programmes.

The Parties shall develop operational mechanisms, particularly at
2.
the national and field levels, to ensure the fullest possible coordination
among country Parties providing assistance, countries needing assistance and
relevant international and non-governmental organizations, in order to avoid
duplication, harmonize interventions and approaches, and maximize the impact
of assistance. Arrangements relating to the form of such coordination are set
out in the Regional Implementation Annexes.
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Article 17
Regional Implementation Annexes

:.pl.~«.tlon Annexes

B* ,l0M1
,

(4)

the

(b)

ea3UrGS t0 b ® tak6n jointly by groups of country
Parties
rhno!r
choosing to cooperate in the preparation and
implementation of
action programmes in a particular region or
sub-region; and

(c)

the degree and nature of assistance required
from country Parties
in a position to provide assistance in order
to elaborate and
implement action programmes.

specific areas to be covered in the action
programmes of
countries of a particular region or sub-region
and the measures
required in each of these areas;

Section

2:

Scientific and Technical Cooperation

Article 18

Information collection

,

analysis and exchange

1.
In meeting their obligations in Articles 4 to 17, the Parties
agree to integrate and coordinate the collection, analysis and exchange
of
relevant short-term and long-term data and information to ensure systematic
observation of land degradation in affected areas and better understand the
processes and effects of drought and desertification.
To this end, thev1
shall;

(a)

support the establishment of a global network of institutions and
facilities for information collection, exchange and monitoring at
all levels, which shall:
(i)

use compatible standards and systems;

(ii)

encompass
meteorological,
climatological
and
hydrological stations, including sites in remote
areas

(iii)

use and disseminate, in a targeted and effective way,
modern technology for data assessment, such as high
resolution satellite imagery, areal photography and
geographical information systems; and

(iv)

link national and sub-regional data and information
centres more closely with global information sources;

(b)

ensure that information collection,
analysis and exchange
activities address the needs of local communities, and those of
decision-makers, with a view to resolving specific problems, and
that local communities are involved in these activities;

(c)

support and further develop, as appropriate, bilateral and
multilateral programmes aimed at defining, conducting, assessing
and financing data and information collection, analysis and
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exchange, including inter alia
and integrated sett of physical, resource inventories
data banks
biological, social and economic
indicators
,

(d>

make full use of the expertise
of relevant intergovernmental
organizations and non— governmenta 1
organizations, particularly to
disseminate relevant information and
experiences among different
regions;

*

give greater weight to collection,
analysis
socio-economic data, as well as its integration and exchange of
with physical and
biological data; and

(

(f

)

exchange,
and make freely,
openly and promptly available,
information from all sources, including
not only the results of
scientific observation and' research,
such as climate and
hydrological data for drought early warning,
but also information
on training and technologica 1 programmes
as well as indigenous
and traditional knowledge.
'

2
The Conference of Parties [, on the advice
of the Scientific
technological Council,] shall prepare and adopt,
as soon as practicable
SyStem for the collection of information
to be
used by all affected country DParties.
Such guidelines shall be based on the
incorporation of key variables in minimum data sets.
.

The Secretarlac shall catalogue relevant existing
,3'
arrangements and
,
facilities
to enable the Conference of Parties to
adopt,
as
soon as
practicable, measures necessary to ensure the effective
operation of the
g °bal network referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraph (a)
[, which shall be
based on the Evaluation and Monitoring Centre established
in accordance with
Article 27.] Maximum use shall be made of existing institutions
at all levels.

Article 19

Research and development
1.

In meeting

(a)

contribute to increased knowledge of the processes leading to
desertification and drought as well as the impact of, and
distinction between, causal factors, both natural and human, with
a view to achieving improved productivity as well as sustainable
use and management of resources;

(b)

respond to well defined objectives, address the specific needs of
local populations and lead to the identification of solutions to
satisfy those needs;

(c)

protect,
integrate
knowledge

(d)

develop and strengthen national and sub-regional
research
capabilities in affected countries needing assistance, including
the development of local skills;

(e)

account
take
into
desertification; and

(f)

give greater weight to socio-economic research, interdisciplinary
research and participatory research.

their obligations in Articles 4 to 17, the Parties
undertake to promote technical and scientific cooperation in the fields
of
drought and desertification through appropriate institutions. To this end,
they shall support research activities that:

and
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the

enhance

traditional

relationship

and

between

indigenous

poverty

and

Research Panties for particular regions and sub-regions,
f;
reflecting
different local conditions, are determined in the
Implementation Annexes. In addition, the Conference of Parties shallRegional
review
research priorities periodically (, on the advice of the
Scientific
Technological Council,] and the Secretariat shall maintain an inventory and
of
relevant research institutions.
The Conference of Parties shall [consider, as soon as practicable,
[3*
whether to] establish a clearing-house mechanism linked to the data and
information network developed pursuant to Article 18, paragraph 3, to promote
and facilitate technical and scientific cooperation pursuant to paragraph
1,
sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) as the core of a network of institutions at the
international, regional and national levels.]

Article 20
Transfer, acquisition

,

adaptation and development of technology

1.
In meeting their obligations in Articles 4 to 17, the Parties
undertake to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer,
acquisition, adaptation and development of relevant, environmentally sound
technologies in accordance with national policies. Such cooperation shall be
conducted bilaterally or multilateral ly, as appropriate, making full use of
the expertise of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The
Parties shall, in particular:

(a)

fully utilize relevant existing national, sub-regional regional
and international information systems and clearing-houses, as
well as the mechanisms developed pursuant to Article 18,
paragraph 3 [and Article 19, paragraph 3], for the dissemination
of information on available technologies, their sources, their
environmental risks and the broad terms under which they may be
acquired

(b)

assess the cost and benefits of available technology and
facilitate access to technologies most suitable to practical
application for specific needs of local populations, paying
special attention to the social and economic impact of such
technology;

(c)

facilitate technology cooperation among affected country Parties
other
assistance
or
financial
through
needing assistance
appropriate means;

(d)

take appropriate measures to create domestic market conditions
and incentives, fiscal or otherwise, conducive to the transfer,
acquisition and adaptation of suitable commercial technology and
knowledge

(e)

promote the conduct of joint research programmes and ventures
between suppliers and recipients of relevant technologies, in
both the public and private sectors, for the development of
improved, affordable and accessible technologies; and

(f)

,

extend technology cooperation with affected countries needing
assistance to sectors such as utilization of biodiversity and
business and
small
industries,
cottage
genetic resources,
tourism, which can provide alternative livelihoods.

2.
The Parties shall give special attention to the protection,
promotion and use of relevant traditional and indigenous technology and knowTo this end, the Parties
how, which may have been neglected in the past.
undertake to:
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(«)

mak« inventories of, and
«
°n
technology and know-how, and it.
" UCh
potential u^eT^ln'V
" cooperation
with
relevant
Intergovernmental1
lnd
*
nd
non-governm«ntal
organization.;
i

'

'

<b)

encourage and actively support the
development, improvement and
dissemination of such technology *nd
know-how,
or of new
technology based on them; and

(c)

facilitate, as appropriate, the adaptation
of such technology and
know-how to large-scale use and integrate
them with modern
technology, as appropriate.

3.
Specific provisions for carrying out
cooperation pursuant to this
Article, taking account of the conditions
prevailing in particular affected
country
Parties,
sub-regions and
regions,
are
included
in
Regional
Implementation Annexes.

Section

Supporting Measures

3:

Article 21

Capacity building, education and public awareness
The Parties recognize the significance of capacity
buildinq, tha*institution building, training and development of indigenous
scientific
capacity, in efforts to combat desertification and mitigate
drought. In all
capacity building activities, they shall emphasize:
13

(a)

capacity building at all levels, but particularly at
the local
level through full participation of local people,
including both
women
and
men,
and
partnership
with
non-governmental
organizations and local organizations;

(b)

the strengthening of extension services to disseminate relevant
technology more effectively, and the training of extension agents
and members of rural organizations in participatory approaches to
land management;

(c)

fostering
expertise
possible,
assistance

the use and dissemination of the knowledge,
and practices of
local people relying, wherever
on local rather than foreign experts in technical
of

programmes;

(d)

the adaptation of relevant environmentally-sound technology and
traditional methods of agriculture and pastoralism to modern
socio-economic conditions;

(e)

the provision of appropriate training and technology in the use
alternative sources of energy,
of
particularly to reduce
dependence on wood for fuel;

(f)

cooperation to strengthen the capacity of affected country
Parties needing assistance to develop and implement programmes in
the field of information collection, analysis and exchange in
accordance with Article 18,
including the acquisition of
appropriate land degradation monitoring technology;

(g)

innovative ways of promoting alternative livelihoods, including
training in new skills;
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Article 22

financial resources
1

centrality of adequate financing for
9
achievin: the
objectives of \the
h
r
Convention, the Parties
resources consistent with their capabilities,undertake to provide finar ial
national plans, pnontie.
prioritie- and
programmes They shall,
particular:
.

m

.

(a)

(

t>

ensure the provision of financing and
for spec f ic
activities which me e the objectives of incentives
this Convention;
give priority to Africa, in accordance
with Article 7, while not
neglecting other regions;

(c)

rationalize and strengthen resources already
allocate:
for
combatting desertification and the effects of
them more effectively and more flexibly, drought by using
assessing their
successes and shortcomings,
removing bottlenecks to their
effective use, and reorienting programmes in
light
the
integrated approach adopted pursuant to this Convention; oi

<d)

give due priority and attention, within the governing
multilate ral institutions, to development assistance forbodies of
affected
countries needing assistance in order to support
activities
likely to advance the implementation of action programmes;

(e)

explore new methods of innovative financing, such as economic
or
environmental instruments and taxes, to raise funds from both
public and private sources;

(f)

provide for equitable burden-sharing among countries providing
assistance;

g

ensure the replicability and internal sustainability of projects
to combat desertification and mitigate drought; and

(

>

[(h)

allow Parties providing financial assistance the flexibility to
determine utilization of their funds, including the ability to
designate relevant bilateral aid as contributions to its funding
arrangements
.

Affected countries needing assistance shall allocate a substantial
portion of their own financial resources to achieving the objectives of this
Convention (and shall establish national funds to combat desertification and
mitigate the effects of drought.)
2.

3.
Developed countries and other Parties in a position to provide
assistance shall facilitate the mobilization of, and make available on a
regular, timely, predictable (and concessional) basis [,on such terms and
conditions as may be mutually agreed,) [new and additional) [adequate)
financial resources to assist in the implementation of action programmes of
affected countries needing assistance, and requesting such assistance.

(4.

Developed country Parties reaffirm their commitments in Agenda 21

to reach the accepted United Nations target of 0.7 percent of Gross National

Product for Official Development Assistance.)
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Article 23
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flnancial resources needed to

(3.
In order to supplement
available resources, the
Conference of Parties shall establish, currently
as soon as practicable, a specialized
fund to combat desertification and
m' itigate
the effects of drought. In so
doing,
it
shall give due conside ration
international finance corporation' and to otherto the establishment of an
innovative financing sources,
such as specific deposits by multilate
ral agencies. The Conference of Parties
shall set and review at least every three
the policies, operational
modalities and programme priorities of theyears
criteria for access to the fund. Thes e shall fund, as well as eligibility
include, inter alia the level
of development of affected countries
needing assistance and the priority to
be given to Africa.
,

he modaUtie3 in Paragraph 3 shall provide for
transparency and
V j- n the management of the resources of the fund, and allocation
_
of a specific percentage
of these resources to local and non-governmental
programmes

accou

,

•

I

.

PART IV

INSTITUTIONS
Article 24

Conference of Parties
A Conference of Parties is hereby established.
2.
The Conference of Parties is the supreme body of the Convention.
It shall keep the implementation of the Convention under regular review,
and
shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its
effective implementation. To this end, it shall:

1

(a)

periodically review the operation of the Convention and of the
institutional arrangements in light of the experience gained, the
evolution of scientific and technological knowledge (, as well as
the international context);

(b)

promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures
adopted by the Parties, and determine the form and intervals for
transmitting the information to be submitted in accordance with
Article 28, review the reports and make recommendations on them;

Along the lines of the proposal in General Assembly document A/36/141
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(c)

assess, on the basis of all information made available
to it the
implementation of the Convention by the Parties, the
of
meaeures taken pursuant to the Convention, and the effects
deqree of
progress toward achieving its objectives;

<d)

make
recommendations
on
any
implementation of the Convention;

(e)

establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the
implementation of the Convention;

(f)

review reports submitted by its subsidiary bodies and provide
guidance to them;

(g)

revise periodically the lists of countries in Annex

(h)

agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of procedure
financial rules for itself and any subsidiary bodies;

(i)

adopt amendments to the Convention

3.

(j)

(k)

in

for

the

1;

and

accordance with Article 32;

seek,

as

appropriate,

the

(

services

information provided by, competent
governmental organizations; and
(l)

necessary

approve a comprehensive programme and regular budget, (based on
agreed assessed contr ibut ions to be borne by the regular budget
of the United Nations], to ensure the effective operation of the
Secretariat,
the
subsidiary bodies
(and
the
international
networks agreed upon in accordance with Articles 18,19 and 21];
)

4.

matter

and cooperation of, and
intergovernmental and non-

exercise such other functions as may be necessary for the
achievement of the objective of the Convention, as well as other
functions assigned to it pursuant to the Convention.

The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt
its own rules of procedure, which shall include decision-making procedures for
matters not already covered by decision-making procedures stipulated in the
Convention. Such procedures may include specified majorities required for the
adoption of particular decisions.

The first session of the Conference of the Parties shall be
convened by the interim Secretariat established in accordance with Article 38
and shall take place not later than one year after the date of entry into
force of the Convention. Thereafter, ordinary sessions of the Conference of
the Parties shall be held (every year unless otherwise] [at regular intervals
as] decided by the Conference of the Parties.

Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be
S.
held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference, or at
the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the
request being communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat, it is supported
by at least one-third of the Parties.
At the opening of its sessions, the Conference of Parties shall
[6.
elect a Bureau comprising a chairman, three vice-chairmen and a rapporteur.
Due regard shall be paid to the need to ensure equitable geographic
distribution and adequate representation of those countries affected by
drought and desertification, particularly in Africa.)

The United Nations, i ts specialized agencies and any State member
7.
represented
thereof or observers thereto not Party to the Convention, may be
Any body or agency,
at sessions of the conference of Parties as observers.
which is
whether national or international governmental or non-governmental,
has informed the
which
and
Convention,
the
by
covered
matters
in
qualified
,
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Secretariat of its wish
r
c
o
as an observer,
th - confe
*:
:s
d
B ;.::-:i ;.re
Part ies present object’
The
admission and participation'of
be subject to the rules
°obee^e?.°i h if 1
of procedure adopted by the
Conference of Parties

2y^

:sjs

Article 2S

Secretariat
A Secretariat is hereby
established.

1

2

(a)

to make arrangements for sessions
of the Conference of Parties
and its subsidiary bodies established
under the Convention and to
provide them with services as required;

<b>

to compile and transmit reports
submitted to it

(c)

to facilitate assistance to affected
Parties needing assistance
ic Urly
p
le *’'
S;
°"mp XTitltk tod
c
UnLCati ° n of
information
required
in
u
accordance with the
provisions of the Convention;

,d

ita

’

* nd

«»•»

-

(e)

to ensure the necessary coordination
with the secretariats of
other relevant international bodies and
conventions;

(f)

to enter, under the overall guidance
of the
Parties, into such administrative and contractual Conference o
arrangements a
may be required for the effective discharge
of its funct

(

a

*he functions of the Secretariat
shall be:

.

9

to
perform other
secretariat
functions
specified
Convention and such other functions as may be determined in the
by the
Conference of Parties.

)

3.
The Conference of Parties, at its first session, shall
designate
permanent secretariat and make arrangements for its
functioning.

(Article 26

Scientific and Technological Council
A Scientific and Technological Council is hereby established.

1.

2.
At the request, and under the supervision of, the Conference of
the Parties, the Scientific and Technological Council shall provide
advice on
scientific and technical issues relating to the activities carried out under
the Convention with a view to achieving its objectives,
including in
particular the preparation and implementation of national, regional, and subregional action programmes.

(The Scientific and Technological Council shall consist of 20
3.
experts appointed by the Conference of Parties in their personal capacity.
It shall be multidisciplinary and its composition shall have due regard to the
need to ensure adequate geographical representation. Members of the Council
shall be elected for a term of three years.
They shall be eligible for reelection. (The Scientific and Technological Council shall be open to
participation by all Parties and shall be multidisciplinary. It shall comprise
government representatives competent in relevant fields of expertise.)
J
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The Council shall report regularly
through the Secretariat, on all aspects of its to the Conference of Parties
work.

(Article 27

Evaluation and Monitoring Centra
1
A Drought and Desertification Evaluation and
Monitoring Centre is
hereby established.
.

2
Under the authority and supervision of the Conference
of Parties,
the Drought and Desertification Evaluation and Monitoring
Centre shall:
.

(a)

assist, coordinate and strengthen, as appropriate,
international
and intergovernmental programmes aimed at defining,
conducting,
assessing and financing research, data collection and systematic
observation of drought and desertification in accordance with
Articles 18 and 19;

(b)

support the establishment of a network of national, sub-regional,
regional and international institutions and technical facilities,
as appropriate, for the continuous assessment and monitoring of
drought and desertification;

(c)

support international and intergovernmental efforts to strengthen
national
scientific and technical research capacities and
capabilities, particularly in Africa; and

(d)

ensure the coordination of activities at the local,
sub-regional and international levels.

national,

3.
In carrying out its activities, the Centre shall cooperate closely
with relevant intergovernmental organizations to avoid duplication of effort.
4.
The Centre shall report regularly to the Conference of Parties,
through the Secretariat, on all aspects of its work.
5.

The Centre shall be located in (...]( in Africa).]

PART V

PROCEDURES
Article 28

Communication of information on implementation
1.
Each Party shall communicate to the Conference of Parties, through
Secretariat, reports on the measures which it has taken for the
implementation of this Convention. The Conference of Parties shall determine
the timetable for the submission of such reports.

the

Affected country Parties needing assistance shall provide a
2.
detailed description of the action programmes adopted pursuant to Articles 9
to 14 and of any relevant information on their implementation. Any group of
affected Parties needing assistance may make a joint communication on measures
taken at the regional and sub-regional levels in the framework of action
programmes. Other affected country Parties shall provide a description of the
strategies adopted pursuant to Article 5 and of any relevant information on
their implementation.
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*t the request of any Party to the dispute, in accordance with the procedure
set out in Annex
unless the Parties otherwise agree.]

Article 31
Status of Annexes
Regional Implementation Annexes and other Annexes form an integral part
of this Convention and, unless expressly provided otherwise, a reference to
this Convention constitutes a reference to its Annexes.

Article 32

Amendments
1.

Any Party may propose amendments to the Convention.

Amendments to the Convention shall be adopted at a session of the
Parties.
of
The text of any proposed amendment shall be
ccrr.municated to the Parties by the Secretariat at least six months before the
The Secretariat shall also
meeting at which it is proposed for adoption.
communicate proposed amendments to the signatories to the Convention.
2.

Conference

The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any
3.
If all efforts at
proposed amendment to the Convention by consensus.
consensus have been exhausted and no agreement reached, the amendment shall,
as a last resort, be adopted by a two-thirds )(( three-fourths majority vote
of the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted amendment shall
be communicated by the Secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it
to all Parties for their acceptance.
[

]

Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be
4.
An amendment adopted in accordance with
deposited with the Depositary.
paragraph 3 shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the
ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of
of the Parties to the
acceptance by at least (two-thirds [three-fourths
Convention
]

]

The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the
5.
ninetieth day after the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary
its instrument of acceptance of the Baid amendment.
for the purposes of this Article, “Parties present and voting"
6.
means Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote.

Article 33
Adoption and amendment of Annexes
to an
Any additional Annex to the Convention, and any amendment
1.
the procedure for
Annex, shall be proposed and adopted in accordance with
or amendment
amendment of the Convention set forth in Article 32. The adoption
Depositary to all Parties.
of an Annex shall be communicated by the
has been adopted in
2
An Annex, or an amendment to an Annex, that
.hall enter into force for -U
.ccorfL with paragraph 1 the
date of the communication by the depositary
Convention six months after
or of the amendment, ****** *
to such Parties of the adoption of the Annex
in writing, within that
those Parties that have notified the Depositary
The Annex or
or the amendment.
Annex
the
of
non-acceptance
their
of
period
.
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the Amendment to *n Anne* ihall enter
their notification of non-acceptance into force for Parties which withdraw
which withdrawal of auch notification on the ninetieth day after the date on
has been received by the Depositary.

r

into force.

Untl1 BUCh tlmG ** the

"* ndm « nt

to the Convention enters

Article 34
Right to vote

Except aa provided
Convention shall have one vote.
1.

for

in

paragraph

2,

each

Party
y

to

the

2
Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within
competence, ahall exercise their right to vote with a number
of votes
em
equal
to the number of their member States that are Parties
to the Convention
Such an organization shall not exercise its right
to vote if any of its member
States exercises its right, and vice versa.
'

.

.

^

Article 35

Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of
the Convention.

PART VI
FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 36

Signature
The Convention shall be open for signature at
on
by
States members of the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies or
that are Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and by
regional economic integration organizations.
It shall remain open for
signature, thereafter, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York until
,

Article 37
Ratification and accession
1.
The Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession by States and by regional economic integration
organizations. It shall be open for accession from the day after the date on
which the Convention is closed for signature.
Instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

2.
Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a
Party to the Convention without any of its member States being a Party to the
Convention shall be bound by all the obligations under the Convention. Where
one or more member States of such an organization are also a Party to the
Convention, the organization and its member States shall decide on their
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respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under the
Convention. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall not
be entitled to exercise rights under the Convention concurrently.
3.
In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the
extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by the
Convention. They shall also promptly inform the Depositary, who shall in turn
inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their
competence

Article 38
Interim arrangements
The Secretariat functions referred to in Article 25 will be carried out
on an interim basis by the Secretariat established by the General Assembly of
the United Nations in its resolution 47/188 of 22 December 1992, until the
completion of the first session of the Conference of Parties.

Article 39
Entry into force
The Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after
1
the
s ixt ieth )[ f if t ieth ][ fort ieth )[ thirt ieth
deposit
of
of
the
date
instrument of ratification or accession.
.

[

For each State or regional economic integration organization
2.
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention after the
instrument of
deposit of the [sixtieth] fiftieth) fortieth [thirtieth)
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter
into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by such State or
regional economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification
or acceptance.
(

[

J

For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, any instrument deposited
3.
by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as
additional to those deposited by States members of the organization.

Article 40

Reservations
[No reservations may be made to this Convention.)

Article 41
Withdrawal
which the
At any time after [two] [three) years from the date on
1.
withdraw from
Convention has entered into force for a Party, that Party may
Depositary.
the Convention by giving written notification to the
one year from
Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of
2
notification of withdrawal, or
the date of receipt by the Depositary of the
the notification of withdrawal.
on such later date as may be specified in
.
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Article 42

Authentic texts
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this

day of
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one thousand nine hundred

NGO Interventions at the 2nd Session oflNCD
-

I

Thoc

NGO

Statement on Land Tenure

arc the views ot ihc

NGO

Panics

community concerning

the

oooJ for governments to commit themselves to the
revision of
tanO tenure laves in countries affected b> desertification
and to
adopt national action plans to revise these laws through
a
participatory approach involving local communities.
NGOs
and women's groups

Bamako meeting

In the

it

was emphasised

that to

be effective

and protect the land tenure

(and water resource nghls) of aJI groups but particularly
these
of tbc pastoraJtsts who live in areas most vulnerable to
land
degradation and desertification In addition we feel that

the

nghls of pastoral ists to follow their traditional routes of
transhumance. which may cross international borders, need to
be protected to ensure that rational and land use patterns
developed over many ccntunes arc not disrupted leading to
ov erg razing and desertification.

The NGOs at the Bamako meeting concluded that land is
owned al different levels: by government, communities and
individuals either on a formal or a customary basis The
support processes which arc participatory ad

2coov enuon must
truly

democrauc and which harmonize customary and legal
to dev dope! ecu ve and equitable land tenure systems

systems

I

applicable

the

and be given the nghl to

make

statements

Conference of Parties with relevant

ItUOTTTUlJOa

One

of ihc mosi important functions
of the Conference of
will
be to review
progress in

Parties

combatting

desertification

Panics to the convention w,i; subm.t
repons
implementation of the Convention
during each ordinary session of the
Conference of Panics
Provisions should be nude for the effective
participation

on
the Convention must recognise

as observers

and provide

the progress of their

by
NGOs wntmg these progress reports. These reports should
elaborate on successful and unsuccessful
projects to combat

m

desertification,
3
so that countnes

and communities facing this
problem can learn from each others experiences.
The reports
should elaborate upoo the financial and technical
needs at the
countnes and communities involved. The national
reports
should also deal wub some of the root
causes and
consequences of desertification. The relation between
destruction of biodiversity, desertification, climate
change,
structural adjustment, trade and debt should be
dealt with.

A Sccretanat should be established to facilitate the fuhcttoning
of the Conference of Parties. In order to facilitate
elTecuve
participation by

NGOs

equipped w oh an

NGO liaison

the Secretarial

would need

to be

unit.

at all levels.

Though NGOs.
The convention should acknowledge

ihe

fact

manv

that

lradiuonal six-ieucs have a system of land lenure quite cblTcrcm
from the Western notion of title deeds. Without such

realization,

land holding systems arc verv
For example, land used by nomadic
pastoraJists is usually used on a pcnodic or episodic basis.
This land is not under utilized as mosi people not familiar
traditional

vulnerable 10 prrdalion

with such a system may think.

at face value, sec the use of establishing
subsidiary bodies sucb as an implementation committee and

an evaluauon and monitoring center,

we

also think that before

up new organizations, the existing bodies should be
evaluated and rationalized The Convention should permit the
Conference of Parties to establish subsidiary bcdies and NGOs
should be involved in the development and functioning of any
selling

new bodies

to

be created.

We

Naiional government must ensure that ail the systems which
apply to land ownership are w ell defined. Governments should

ask the members of the INCD to lake these views
account and to include them in the text of the Convention.

guarantee equitable access nghls to land for pastoraJists. small

women, indigenous people and other groups.
Accommodation should be made for diversity of land tenure

-

NGO

Statement

in

On Women

scale fanners,

Summary:

systems within the legal structures or concerned states For
ibis to be achieved, commitments must be made by
governments to implement participatory action research
programmes which determine the relationship between land
tenure and the desertification process

participation of

NGO community wishes to work with governments in
such a participatory approach to the revision of land tenure
laws and to ensuring that all codes, laws and regulations

and desertification processes in developing
countnes because they are the ones who suffer first and
foremost We are the ones who (ill the land while our male
counterparts go in search of jobs in the cities, we are the ones
who go in search of fuelwood; we are the ones who walk

women's action and knowledge in
relation to desertification and drought has been recognised in
the INCD.
This recognition must be accompanied b\
commitments to concrete programmes supporting the effective

combat

The

role of

women

desertification

First of

all

let

me

in

and

decision-mating and actions
oj drought.

to

the effects

stress that

women's

role is crucial in

relation to drought

The

pertaining to land lenure are translated into local languages and

thereby

made

accessible to local people. In addition,

undertake to educate

marugemcm

We

communiucs

in

NGOs

proper land use and land

INCD

in

search of dnnking water;

takes these vtews into account and

includes them in the text of the Convention

NGOs

to

work with

NGO

Statement on Institutions

NGOs

favor the establishment of a Conference of Parties as
supreme decision making body within the Convention
The Conference of Panics should meel on a regular basis w nh
a maximum interval of 2 years between the meetings. NGOs
w ish to be inv ned to attend ihe meetings of the Conference of
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it

in sustainable

in

para 21 (c) of

ways

proposal for the
241 12 which

A/AC

women can participate fully at
and economic decision-makjDg on
measures to combat drought and desertification. We also
support the view expressed in para 60 (e) of A/AC.24T12
which calls for commitments based on the importance of the
all

the

are also guardians of a

therefore support the Tunisian

Preamble contained

affirms the need to ensure that

-

we

wealth of indigenous knowledge about the land, ns needs and

Us potcnnal, and how

practices

request that the

miles

levels of political

role of

women

However. this affirmation needs lo be translated into concrete
go\ eminent support for specific, and adcquatclv fuaial
programmes that enable and strengthen the full participauon
of women, including programmes that
•

increase the level of education and training of

women

Planet, organized by Women s Env trocmcnt
art! Development
Organization Chapter 24 puts forward a comprehensive
list
cx

activities which governments should
undertake.
especially relevant tn the present context.

Some

are

Further emphasis on the importance of women's
role is lo be
in Agenda 21 on which our present endeavour
are based
The section which deals with encouraging and promoting

found

•

ensure proper access to land (essential as collateral for
credit) through appropriate tenure systems

•

create rural banking systems to facilitate
to credit tch 24. Agenda 21)

women

women

s

•

involve

•

support the transfer of technology that enhances the
indigenous knowledge of combatting drought and

has e

attached

lo

this

observations on the role of

made by governments

at

statement

women, and

some

- NGO Statement
On The Role Of Basic
Community Education In Combatting

4

Drought And Desertification
NGOs are concerned that u hile rural populations
additional

commitments
Rio on strengthening our role These
of the

commitments must be taken

fully into account in the present
negotiations and reflected finally in the international legal
commitments made within the Convention.

The Importance of Women's Role and Knowledge
In Combatting Desertification and the Effects of
Drought

Women

'lo support local communities in their own
efforts in
combating desertification, ensuring the full participation
oj women
(Agenda 21. chapter 12. section 56 af)

tn capacity building

desertification

We

popular para ct pon on tdenuHes the following as an
objective

access

are only too
well aware oT the effects of deseruficauon they are not
adequately aware of the causes. Effective education of rural
populations fared with desertification is essential if we are to

combat

this global

problem.

feeling of hopelessness of

Without effecuve educauon.

many

of land degradation will continue to result in the migration of
'deseruficauoo refugees' to already over-burdened cities anJ

neighbouring countries

We

should not limit ourselves to educauon

countries sulTcnng from deseruficauon

frequently

the

rural populations in the fare

in the dev

eloping

The peoples of

the

regarded as contributors to the
desertification process because of our activities as fuel wood

developed world need lo be as aw are of the struggles of their
brothers and sisters against the problem of desertification as

gatherers and food crop producers
Senegal, Burkina Faso and northern

they are for example, of the issues of deforestation

are

But research in Sudan.
has demonstrated
that women possess valuable knowledge about the sustainable
use of land, forests, water systems, soils, food crops and
wildlife which is grounded tn indigenous learning and dailv

Ghana

experience and innovation

NGO

Rural Community Education
have considerable
experience gained over many years in community development
efforts.
In the field of sustainable development they have
found

that the

conventional approach of delivenng lectures to

on technical issues is ineffective Educanon
communities on desertification needs to be

rural populations

Women's knowledge

has often been ignored in efforts to tackle

so our opportunities to make our
contribution to sustainable development in this area have been
seriously curtailed Women have a vital contnbutiooto make
If our activities contribute to degradation it is due to lack of
desertification and

alternative energy resources and our struggle to sustain our

livelihoods and those of our families

of

rural

muluscctoraj in

approach since the dtfficulues facing the
NGOs hav e also found that to
be effecuve. educauon of rural commumues affected bv

com muruues

its

are of this nature.

desertification needs lo be participative

NGO

and gov ernment
agents have to become facilitators to help the commumues
develop their own plans based on their own extensive local

know ledge and

the technical suggestions of the facilitators.

We

have noted with appreciation that the role of women in the
social and economic lives of both developed and developing
countries has gained general support as an element to be
included in the Preamble lo the Convention But the NGOs
have reservations about the adequacy of the emphasis placed
on the role of women in combatting desertification.

NGOs therefore recommend that

government extension agents
parocipao'e approaches to the
educauon of rural popuJauocs facing deseruficaDon. We also
recommend that extension agents be appraised annually
against agreed goals and those who continue to fail to meet
be retrained

in multisectoral

these goals be reassigned to other areas or retired.

Women do indeed

have an important part to play as managers
of natural resources But responsibilities as managers must be
backed by access lo dcctsion-makjng and resources Olherw ise

Community Radio

Broadcasting: One suggesuon from

We

of NGOs to reinforce community
cducaoonoo deseruficauon, was for the development of rural
community radio stations broadcasnng in local languages.
Programming for such radio stations, formulated with the
input of local communities, would use local knowledge and

already

success stones

the

management

may

result in extra

already

overburdened

role

on women who are

burdens being placed

would like to remind delegates of the commitments they
made at Rio Chapter 24 of Agenda 21 deals with
Global Action for Women towards Sustainable and Equitable
Development

Women's

.

work, ideas and values of 1,500

who met

at the

substantially on

This chapter drew

Action Agenda 21 which

is

the

a compilation of the

women from around

World Women's Congress for

the

world

a Healthy
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the

Bamako meeting

Local

commumues

also need to be trained in

management and producuon of programmes for their local
radio stations Some governments are now setting up these
community radio stations, others, with resmeuve legislauon
on pnvate and decentralised broadcasnng should be encouraged
bv this convenuon to enact new legislauon
the

Excessive

primary

educat.om

substanually lower

ForTe^e
The

national

nL^ £!t

"

T*

*' en

UCk 1°^ nrWrKl;lJ r'sourc
« from Ox
cumcula which have hole
1

local

1 W£
J

crops, can create near
irrev ersibte
of the

relevance

laree

vn,

gpWd.water,tn,. y

above can be subsumed
under

>..

aw,n.

the

which .eedTTo

°*

communities.

pumping of ground water
and

recognised as a key element
in sustaining

w

~r

£

iter resourors

Parc n is are often reluctant
to send their children
to school in
learn a national language
and ,deas which they
neither
undentand or see l„Ue relevance
of ln their daily l,?es
<Stn
chilJren themselves give
up school after onlv a few

™

Tjn

,n

^ •**»

Zn

10 «**

of

life

E

In order to

intergovernmental

coenta. this problem ,n
countries suffering from
desertification NGOs propose
that a significam
proportion cf
ponun and secondary school cumcula
should
JfIcxaU level by
teachers, government
extension agents local
associations mcludtng

women's and mdigenojT

l

Soo£

d n0n ' g0 ' enuntnUj
<*«anisauons. Edition
moreawaj from learning exclusively
by

j7 also
meOK.xls should
(

6> cxfKncnx throughproblem
solving
“""'I*
Pn mars and secondary
Pnnun
educations should no, be exclusively
dassruum based but include
practical

SlulS"

work relevant

0"' SGCX and fO'-enuncn.

1

agents should be ,nv„cd
a to
participate

cxtcns.on

both class-room and
practical educauon in schools
dealing w,th all environmental
matters but parttcularly with
desernf, canon

recommend

N'GOs

that the local'

,

e^Z ;\

extended technical assistance

^ecopoons

5

An

Contribution To Drought:
Perspective From Asia
The INCD has been considering
drought

NGO

Summary.

as a
natural phenomenon, however
there are significant human
contnbunng causes to aspects
drought
of
particularly those
that underrrune the hydrological
capacity of catchment areas.
Recognition of these human causes in which

governments

and intergovernmental orgamiations
are ke\ actors - and

actions to mil, gate their effects must
be incorporated in The
Comention and in regional and nahonal
actions plans

During

the

Geneva proceedings of the INCD
clear, unambiguous distinction
between

current

Convention, a

oeseraficauoo and drought was made.
While deseraficaDoc
was defined as being caused by human
intervention, drought
has been solely annbuted to
meteorological causes
Is that
really the case 0 Many areas net)
in water-resources in the past
arc non repeatedly being declared
as drought prone Why? Let

us look

at

some

Indian situation,

be

•

a

illustrations
it

is

from the Asia region. From the
must be considered to

clear that drought

complex issue
Deforestation and hydrological destabilization
in the
mountain catchments of nvers can male the rivers
and
streams dry up in post-monsoon periods causing
surfacenaler drought

Imensive use of agnxhemicals have caused sals
to lose
moisture -conserving capacity, leading to soil-water

their

in

spue of adequate

rainfall

.
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the

tK£ 1
r

programme one

of ih^

„

for

2®°*

*' sh toemphas.ze that

account the

The Coovenuoo must
human contnbuuoo to drought
to male

parties can aJdress
111

take into

sure that

U

and reverse the processes

that are
exacerbating the waicr scaraty
situauon caused bv surface
w ater drought and sal- w a
ter drought

6

-

ONG

Declaration des
sur
Participation Populaire

la

La mtse en oeuvre de

la panic,pation populaire
necessite une
Ion S politique reelle. La
convention devran

comme une

la

condition sine

qua non de

projets de lutte centre la
desertification.

la

considerer

mise en oeusre des

Ptus.eurs iravaux

on. (U r *a!„<s sur la
panic, pat, on
Dan si e cas des pays afncains. elle
a fait lobjet
chane la Charur Afncaine de la
parhapauon populaire
(Arusha. Tanzame). L'Agenda
21 en parie egalement de
mamire sans Equivoque.
populaire.

dW

Si jusqu'ici sa mise en
oeuvre n'est pas effecuve dans
beaucoup de pays, e'est qu'elle t>e
bcneficie pas panout dfine

rtelle volonuf potiuque.
nouvelles choses sur la

II

s'agit

done mans de

d,re de

quest.on, mais d'amener les
au dell du di scours, en adopunt des
demarches qm permeneot la ccncr<usauoo
de la paruapation

gouvernemems

i alter

populaire

La paruapation populaire est une quesuoo
globale qui ne peut
problimes de politique fonodrc et des impacts
des rafcamsmes du commerce intemauoria]:
#tre s^parte des

•

une poliuque forviere inadapirfc met les
populaUoos dans
une situation prfcaire. et il devienl
difficile de

les

mobiliser pour I'env iroanement.

commerce

s'agissant

du

illustration,

en dehors de

la

international, la meilleure
boissc des cours des produits

de base, est
exportation de viandes fortemcnl
subvenuonndes de certains pays du Nord vers d'autres
pays du Sud
En Afnque de I'Ouesr ces exportations
acculent les 4 000 000 d'fleveurs sahtfliens
& la ruine
I

drought

amended

^

in local

Human

-

Tn

enhanong wood production
was to turn the
catchment areas into profitable
monoculture plantations of
commercial species like pine or
eucalvpms and this has been
major cause of flash floods.

element of the curriculum should
languages and lhai teachers be
trained m (he
causes and remedies ot
desertification
be taught

FAO

0f

<

to the

m

organizations freq^n'u""*
'
For example
D repLxs

importantcausaJ factor.

Ce * s.tuauoo fa'onse I'exode
des populauons vers lcs
Mllcs el lcs P°' s du ScTd
Comment metlre en oeuvre la
fxirticipauon populate. s'.l oh
a plus de populations"

m
rund

lor

A

AC

241/12).

A mechanism

for dotng this could

Combatting Deseruficauoo.

La

pmtopat.on popular exige. pour ne
pas rester un voeu
p<cux. une volonuf politique
du Nord 4 sengager 4 aligner
sa

The Conference of

the Panics should elaborate
the entena lor
funding thereby taking into
account

Mitique commeraale sur sa pohnque
d'aide aiLvelop^mem
J
S du Sud i a
PP ,1< t ucr lcs engagements deji pns en
maucrc dc participation populsure

"^

'

Au

plan

nattona!.

la

die les el of dev

ihe

participation populatre exige
des
c

preuiables:

extent

accfcs effecuf a la terre el

•

au\ ressources nanirriles.

principles

^enforcement des capacity d'analyse des
populauons.
Celui-ct passe par une information,
une Education
en\ ronncmentale et une formation
adaptbes aux bescxns
des populations, notamment les
1

et les

jeuoes,

la

decentralisation des pouvotrs de
decision et des
responsabihtfs en panant de I'analvse
cntique

des

institutions.

valorisation du savoir traditionnel des
populations et
de leurs valeurs socio-cullurelles,
ainsi que de la
dimension *thno-sociologique de leurs
mfthodes de
gestion des ressources.
la

Proteger par la loi
des comm unautes

la liberie

de reunion et d'associauon

Cest

a ccs conditions que on peut
garanur I'engagement des
populations 4 une pleine panicipation aux
programmes de
I

lutte

cootre la desertification

ONG

Les
en oeuv

re

s'engagent 4 collaboreT 4 toute acuon visant

de

la participation

la

mise

populaire.

pem

l

suffire a elle seule

acteurs

non plus

II

of

semble done que tous

countries

include popular

insolsemem as an integrated

transparency

and accountabilus

in

the resources.

We would like to remind the committee
members that
desemr, cation is not a process
that should be seen isolated
irwn economical and financial
factors at the global leiel The
negative impact of these factors
on desertification will not be

cwnpensated for by funding only.
Measures
debt relief and trade reform are
oecessarv

To

in the areas

of

be mote specific

Measures to combat desertification have
been ineffective
e'en non-existent because the
governments of affected
coumnes have been unable to generate the
neccssan financial
means Therefore NGO support the v, e w S
expressed in Article
09 a) of document A/AC 241/12 w
I

i

i

hich calls for reducing
debt burdens, improving market
condiuons and comraoditv
markets, lowering trade barriers and
cushioning

the effects of

deteriorating foreign e\change measures.

- The EC's policy of dumping subsidized surplus
beef in the
countries of the Sahel threatens the
livelihoods of millions of
people and harms the environment
Therefore

NGOs

like io see included in the

Les gouvemements 4 eux seuls De peuient
amier 4 bout de ce
acuon des ONG. meme si elle est pemnente.
ne

defi,

NGO

programs, and also taking into
account

management of

le

femmes

in the

of the countries affected,
and.

which

participation and

element
I

dopment

to

Convention a clause

in

would
which

contraenng panics commit themselves to
abolish subsidies on
expons of products that undermine the livelihoods
of people
w bo rely on and and semi and lands.

les

(ONG et Gouv emements) som condamnes 4coUaborrr

7 - NGO Statement on Financial Resources
and Mechanisms

Producnon for export can have a negative impact
on and
and semi and lands leading to desertification.
Examples at
groundnut production in Senegal and cotton
production in
3

additional financial resources from affected and
oonafTeaed countries on a proportional basis will
be needed to

Mali. Ii should be included in the Convention,
that in those
cases that export producuon causes
desertification, the
possibility of implementing alternative
environmentaJIv

implement the Convention In order to secure predictability
and unding on a prompt basis the Convenuon
should include
financial obligations that are legally binding
for all

will be invesogated Research for
these purposes has to be provided for in
the Convention If
alternatives cannot be found, production has
to be stopped

New and

I

contracting parties

sound producnon methods

provided compensatory economic avenues for
the

people

affected have been clearly established'

Concerning additional funding we would also like to remind
developed countnes of the UN norm of 0.71 of the GNP
to
be spent on development assistance At the moment
onlv few
developed countries meet thal norm

We ask the members of the 1NCD to lake these views
account and to include them in the text of the Convennon.

An independent

8 Relating

fund for desertification should be established
through which existing and new funds will be channeled.
This
fund should guarantee transparency, democratic accountability
to all signatories

and adequate assessment of projects. Also
NGO should have access to all informauon concerning the
spending of the fund. The Convention should stipulate a
percentage that should beallocated to NGOs and local

communities

(as has been

proposed by the

OAU

section
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NGO

On

Legal Aspects

Ratification

And Domestic

Statement

To

in

Implementation Of The Convention
Early attention needs to be given to Ihe process
lor
implementing new legal tools and harmontj
ng pre-existing
domestic legislation and regulations in the light
of the
Convention.
There is a need to foster international
cooperation to facilitate timely accomplishment
of this task.

Iniemanoni environmental
treaues have had vmous
I

2??***°**

mp(cmfnui(1 «' Ph-*e at ,hc
domestic
rdUr,au,on '»»*
-L^uon^
nT"' amendments nor the Jo not implv the
of necessary
harmonization of
prc<xisung legislation in light of
the requirements of
the new
conventions
As a result, follow -up
adjustments renTn
pending unless implementing
legal measures are
adopted v«
legislation or regulation
In the meantime
'

'

level

ihe provisions of

U* Climate and
principles,

it

convenuons and

and draw on
fora address, ne
global

Biodiversity

convennons and ihe Fores,
should seek lntegrauoo.
coordmauon jvJ

mans

international env ironmentaj
treaties have limited
practical
vt hile trying
to meet their goals.

effects

The

general aw areness on this matter
and there ,s a challenge ahead to
2.

is

-

maimenance of
"
h enu,ls

'

growing worldwide

^

formula^ international
nat.onal decisions, which once
adopted will make a difference
realiu
For the purposes of this
particular negotiauon
process on combatting desertification,
and once the mean 1S
adopted and enters .mo force, it
must be ensured that the
objectives of the Convention are
pursued through specific
mcasur «. individual!) adopted
by the raids,
ng
sutes Mans of these measures
need to have legally binding
effects on stales and individuals
and. subject to the diversity
of
options provided by die different
legal systems ,n the world
appropriate legal tools must be
put in place .f the Convenuon
a " eff «cuve international

sustainable

^

combatting desertification.

for

-

vjjAjiniuiiu\

|

or

the

^

sound and healthy global
environment
aha,
rational and ecologically

management of

l-md degradation

m

instrument

a

natural resources,

and loss of producUve capacity

avo.dmg?
,

solidarity and a recogruuon
by the developed countries
of their responsibility under
Principle 7 of the Rio

Declaration

<v

that

panics must take measures to
anucipaic prev ent or
attenuate the causes of drought
and deseruficauon and to
seek solutions at the iruemaoonal,
regional, nauonal and
local level;

'

that all parties

seek to prevent, reduce and where
possible
land degradation by utilizing
ecologically
sustainable land use management
practices, by

reverse

3 Analysis on implemeniing
tools and harmonization
of
domesue pre-evisung law. n |,ght of the
new Coovcnuon. ,s

employing and incorporating appropriate
tradiuonal
methods and by taking account of
local cultural jrvl

,

a necessary

and useful exercise for nations
seriously w dling to
agree on new international
environmental obligations Such
an analysis may be initialed
once the treats is

open

for

ratification, taking advantage
of the interim period of time
required for the Convenuon to enter
into force.

d As such penod is addressed by
Item E,
Inlerim Arrangements-, it ,s recommended

hoc Secretariat

facilitate international

III.

Section 3

(hat the present

on
ad

cooperation among

States 10 foster early analysis of
implementing
tools and harmomzauoo of pre-existing

domesue legal
domesue legislation.

5 In envisioning implemenung tools, it is
necessary, subject
nauonal legal specificities of each mdiv

development values;
vi

that NGOs especially
environment, development,
women's, youth local communities and
indigenous
groups - as well as individuals - must
be mvolv ed at all
relevant levels of decision making
to combat
Jesemficauoo. To enable these NGOs to
focus their
individual and collective talents
creatively, financial
assistance and institutional recognition
needs io be
prov ided lo facilitate full

and effective participation

in the

implementation of the Convenuon,

to the

iduaJStale, to
recognize legal nghis for effective and
umely participation of
individuals and NGOs in the domestic
application of the

adopted Convention
groups and NGOs to
real

Such

legal nghis should enable anzrn
cooperate with Governments in the
development and enforcement of the Treaty provisions
and
fully

ns domestic legislation.

9

-

ii
recognize the need to develop co-opcranve
arrangements among all levels of government.
communiDes. NGOs. the private profit making sector and

landholders to establish an understanding of the
nature
and value of land resources, to work towards
their
ecologically

sustainable use and to raise funds
improve their management at the local level.

to

Principles

The Jo! lowing principles hove been pul
forward by
being the minimum required lo ensure that
the

SGOs

as

Convenuon

vtn that national policies and institutional
arrangements need to be put in place to idenufy examine
and reconcile economic, social, cultural, demographic,
.

achieves

goals.
Il is fell lhai a separate
Article for
preferred as it clearly sets out the basis from
which contracting parties will operate. The
community

Principles

ils

is

SCO

which

involved with the development of the Convention
lo
Combat Desertification urges all parties lo the Convention lo
recognize the global nature of the problem and the
presence of
deserafU ation in both the developed and developing world.
is

and other concerns in order to sustain the full
range of uses for land for the benefit of the whole

ecological

community

x

into the future.

that education, especially basic literacy, is

main keys lo local populations acquiring
knowledge required lo combat desertificauon;
the

For the purpose of achieving ecologically sustainable
development wnhin ihe conlext of the objectives of this
Convention and to implement us provisions, annexes and
protocols, the Parties shall be guided, inter

alia,

by ihe

following principles:

that the

degradation of productive ecosystems is
human progress and to the
survival of the populations concerned
Because of its
posing

a

serious threat to

irans-txxder effects, there

207

one of

the basic

is

a need lo establish worldwide

mernauona)

cooperation. espccialh with
respect to
rade pohc.es. the
prtn,s,c*i of aid aod
ass.sun^e L^r
tranvler ol Uichnologv
and in the consent auoo
protec U on
or tf, health and
mtegnb of

™°n

'*

£at Pnnopfes
Declaration

£££

5. 7. g.

,

0

.

Principles from the

Principle

Rio Declaration

5

,l

i eSSS

an Pe° Ple

SWI

m “'
Principle

p. 20 and 27 of the Rio
underpin the thinking
oUJI

15.

shall speeificaJIv

ln

-

-

** «s^ual

task

- - 2s? 5

7

States shall cooperate tn
a spirit of global
partnership to
conse.se. protect and restore
the health and ,n\^v
of
Eart^

^

s ecosystem
In t,e» of the different
contnbuuons to
global environmental degradation.
States base common
bm
differentiated responsibilities

The deseloped countnes

acknowledge

the responsibility that
thes ^car
n the
international pursuit of sustainable
development ,n sievs of
the pressures then socieocs
place on the global
environment
and of the technologies and financial
resources
,

thev

command

Principle 8

To

achieve sustainable development
and a higher qualitv ot
for all people. Slates should
reduce and el.mmate
^susumab'e patterns of production and
consumpuon
promote appropriate demographic
policies
life

Z

Principle 10
Environmental issues are best hamiled
u,th the panic, potion
of all concerned cinzrns, at the
relevant level A. the national
level, each mdmduaJ
shall have appropriate
access to

mJormanon

concerning

the environment that is
held bv public
authorities, including information
00 hazardous materials yd
activities
their communities, and the
opportunity to
participate ui decision-making
processes Slates shall facilitate
and encourage public a ware ness and
participation bv

m

m/ormanon

makine

widel> available. Effective access
to judicial and

adraimstranve pnxeedings, including
redress and remecK
be provided.

shall

Principle If
order io proieci the environment, the
precautionary
approach shall be widelv applied bv States
In

according to

capabilities

damage,

Where

there are threats of

their

senous or irreversible

lack of

full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effecuv
e measures to prevent
environmental degradation.

Principle 17
Environmental impact assessment,

as a national instrument,
shall be undertaken for proposed
activities that are likely to
have a significant adverse impact on the
environment and are
subject to a decision of a competent national
authority

Principle

20
have a vital role in environmental management
and
development Their full participauon is therefore essential
to
achieve sustainable dev dopmem.

Women

208

Prineiple

24

s*"r,w
cooperate

,n

Principle

*>«<
ns further development,
as

27

necc^

w.
°

^

Priorities
The

lack of political will

is

often seen as the missing link

between eomenuons and their ratification, between project
In the case of the present
design and implementation.
negotiations for the elaboration of a con\enlion to combat
desertification, donor governments are more and more reluctant
to chip in additional funding for the continuation of the
negotiations on the ground that the money should and can be
raised locally by the demanding governments. In both cases,
political will is required and governments are delaying decision
making on the issue because they are afraid of unpopular
measures, on one side there is a growing public awareness of
the fact that aid money is being wasted, especially the money
that is spent at international meetings; on the other side, the
worrisome economic and social situations make it dangerous
for debt-laden and currency-hungry countries to even try and
impose additional sacrifice on their populations.
Yet, should either party decide to step forward and succeed in
overcoming their domestic obstacles in order to come up w ith
the badly wanted money, additional political will will still be

required to guarantee that NGOs will be given an equal
opportunity access to public funding, and in order for them to
and
be in a position to foster greater popular participation
This
capacity building at the grassroots lev el.

enhanced

question of how much importance the
illing to consider the role o( NGOs in the
and other areas of sustainable
dcserlilicution
against
struggle

raises, of course, the

go\ cmmcnis arc w

development
not just
Recent history clearly demonstrates that NGOs should
to
ha\e
will
Thev
list.
priority
the
sit and wait to be put on
against
struggle
the
as
recognition
lor
harder
fight even
dcseruficauon is also a fight between nauonal pnonues.

pas toute seule. Les OSG
pour obtenir les resources
doivenl el
pour renfocer la participation
necessaires
etrangeres
on
locales
politique ne nail

La volonte

peuvenl

populaire

el

la suciler

deve topper les potentiality locales dans

contre la desertification.
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